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SUMMARY 
 
New ventures are pivotal for job creation in societies. They have been an attractive 
choice not only for founders who wish to start their own business but also for skilled 
individuals seeking employment. New ventures could be an opportunity for 
individuals to improve their skillset as they have more freedom in new ventures than 
in large firms. However, high rate of failure and dissolution among new ventures 
could affect individuals’ working life. On one hand, the experience could be the 
basis for subsequent success in other organizational settings as departing 
individuals’ entrepreneurial experience can represent a beneficial resource. On the 
other hand, high uncertainty in startups and liabilities of newness and smallness may 
have negative consequences for individuals. The aim of this dissertation is to study 
the consequences of new venture failure on different groups of actors engaged in 
entrepreneurial activities. To do so, the overall research question that guides this 
dissertation is: What are the consequences of new venture failure on different 
stakeholder groups involved in entrepreneurial activities?       
Overall, this dissertation has 5 Chapters, including a synopsis, three main studies, 
and a background study. Chapter 1 is the synopsis that discusses the major 
knowledge gap leading to the broad research question, which is followed by two 
sub-questions. Furthermore, in this Chapter, I overview the theoretical background 
related to each study. I also introduce the methodology approaches (i.e. qualitative 
and quantitative methods) that I adopted in this dissertation, their strengths and 
weaknesses. Then, I discuss the main conclusions and contributions of the four 
studies in this dissertation.     
Chapter 2, “Entrepreneurial failure: Distinct perceptions among founders, 
employees, and investors”, aims to understand failure from the viewpoint of 
different groups of stakeholders (i.e. founders, employees, and investors) in 
entrepreneurial activities. Findings of this study show that depending on individuals’ 
expectations about startups and the consequences that affect them, each group has a 
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different understanding of failure. Another interesting finding is that there are 
hidden misalignments in the purpose for joining startups among different groups. 
This can be one of the reasons for their tensions, particularly between founders and 
investors.    
Chapter 3, “Falling off the unicorn: the structural shortcomings of startup 
employment”, is the study addressing the experiences and consequences of 
employment in startups. Results of this study show employees are biased about what 
they expect to gain out of the experience of working at a startup, and what the 
startup provides them. These biases might be due to the characteristics of new 
ventures, since investors and founders do not uncover unrealistic expectations for 
employees, as startups need skilled individuals. 
Chapter 4, “Till death do us part? New venture dissolution and enduring work 
relationships”, investigates whether NVTs keep their ties and work together after 
the dissolution of new venture, and to what extent they might intend to do so. 
Findings show that technical people with prior joint work experience co-move. 
There is a tendency to establish their business among co-movers. Co-movers are the 
individuals whose human capital is homogenous (i.e. age, education, gender, 
occupation).    
Chapter 5, “Open for entrepreneurship: How open innovation can foster new 
venture creation”, is a background paper which aims to explore how an open 
ecosystem can affect individuals in entrepreneurial activity to survive their business 
with respect to the challenges of high rate of failure among startups. The results of 
this study were the base for developing Study 1 in this dissertation. The findings 
show that ecosystem collaboration, user involvement and an open environment can 
be beneficial for the survival of startups.  Moreover, the entrepreneurs’ mindset 
moderates the impact of these three mechanisms on the startups’ survival.  
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RESUME 
Nyopstartede virksomheder er afgørende for nye jobmuligheder i samfundet. Det har 
været et attraktivt valg for grundlæggerne og åbner samtidigt arbejdsmuligheder for 
talentfulde jobsøgende. Nyopstartede virksomheder giver ofte de arbejdssøgende 
større frihed til at udvikle deres færdigheder end hvad de normalt ville få i et stort 
veletableret firma.  På den ene siden, den erfaring som medarbejderen får ved at 
være en del af en nyopstartet virksomhed, unaset om den er nedlagt, setter 
medarbejderen en god position for efterfølgende jobsøgning. På den anden side, at 
være del af en nedlagt nysopstarted virksomhed sender en negativ signal. Målet med 
denne afhandling er at studere konsekvenser af nedlæggelse for dem som er 
involveret i nyopstartet virksomheter. Afhandlingen er dermed baseret på den 
følgende overordnede undersøgelsesspørgsmål: Hvad er konsekvenserne af konkurs i 
en nyopstartet virksomhet til forskellige stakeholders, som deltager i 
iværksætteraktiviteter? 
Denne afhandling indehoder 5 kapitler, herunder synopsis, tre hoved studier og en 
bagrundsundersøgelse. Kapitel 1 indeholder synopsen, som diskuterer problemet der 
leder til det undersøgelses spørgsmål, som er efterfulgt af to underspørgsmål. 
Ydermere undersøger jeg den teoretiske bagrund, som er relateret til hver enkelt 
studie. Jeg intruducerer også de kvantitativ og kvalitativ metodisk tilnærminger, 
samt deres styrker og svagheder. Afslutende diskuterer jeg afhandlingens 
konklusionerne, og bidrager af de 4 hoved studier. 
Kapitel 2,“Entrepreneurial failure: Distinct perceptions among founders, 
employees, and investors”, giver en forklaring på de udfordringer at forskellige 
stakeholders kan stå over for (for eksempel: iværksætter,, ansatte og investorer) i 
forbindelse med nyopstartet virksomheder. Det resultat af undersøgelsen viser at 
afhængigt af de enkelte parters forventninger, har stakeholderne forskellige 
opfattelse af hva betyder at har fejlet. En anden vigtig opdagelse i undersørgelsen, 
viser at der ofte er misforståelser mellem de forskellige stakeholders, i forbindelse 
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med formål ved at deltager i den nyopstartet virksomhed. Især mellem iværksætter, 
og investorene.  
Kapitel 3, “Falling off the unicorn: the structural shortcomings of startup 
employment”, omhandler de oplevelser og konsekvenser som en medarbejder 
oplever i ennyopstartet virksomhed. Det resultat af undersøgelsen viser at 
medarbejder i en nyopstartet virksomhed, ofte er partiske over hvad de får ud af 
erfaringen og hva deres arbejdet kan give dem. Disse skævheder kan skyldes selv 
egenskaberne ved nyoppstartet virksomheder, siden investorer og stiftere ikke 
imødekommer urealistiske forventninger til medarbejdere, da nyopstartede har 
behov for dygtige personer. 
Kapitel 4, “Till death do us part? New venture dissolution and enduring work 
relationships”, omhandler om en anden gruppe af stakeholders, nemlig 
iværksætterhold. Studiet udforsker om iværksætterholder beholder den tætte bånd 
etter virksomheden nedlægges, og vælger at arbejde sammen senere. Undersøgelsen 
viser en tendens at iværksætterer med ligende humankapital (i.e., samme alder, 
uddannelse, køn eller beskæftigelse) vælger at samarbejde igen. 
Kapitel 5 indehoder baggrunds artiklen “Open for entrepreneurship: How open 
innovation can foster new venture creation”, som omhandler hvordan åben 
ækosystemer kan have effekt på den innovative proces i opstarts processen ved en 
ny virksomhed, kan overleve med den overhængende fare for at fejle. Resultatet af 
denne undersøgelse lægger grund for at udvikle problemstillingen i denne 
afhandling. Konklusionen af undersøgelsen er at samarbejd i økosystemer, brugers 
engagement og et åben arbejdsmiljø har positiv indvirkning på chancen for at den 
nyopstarted virksomhed overlever. Derudover, grundlæggernes tankegang virker 
som moderator til indvirkningen af disse tre mekanismer på nyopstartede 
overlevelse. 
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Chapter 1. Synopsis 
1.1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurship has been receiving more attention from scholars because it has a 
valuable effect on economic development (Carree & Thurik, 2010; Lee, Yamakawa, 
Peng & Barney, 2011; Van Stel, Carree & Thurik, 2005). Furthermore, 
entrepreneurship is believed to have a positive role in innovation and growth 
(Audretsch & Keilbach, 2010). Job creation is another significant outcome of 
entrepreneurship (Haltiwanger et al., 2013; Neumark et al., 2011) where recent 
studies demonstrate that a large proportion of employment growth can be ascribed to 
startups (Anyadike-Danes & Hart, 2015). In some countries, up to 10 percent of new 
jobs are created through entrepreneurial activities (Neumark et al., 2011). 
Policymakers and practitioners are increasingly focusing on promoting 
entrepreneurship activities; they believe entrepreneurship could be the source of 
economic growth (OECD, 2017; Sorenson et al., 2019; Stemler, 2013) because the 
creative knowledge and competences applied in establishing a new business can lead 
to job creation and new skills training, all of which influence the development of 
society (Baum & Silverman, 2004). 
Despite these positive effects, entrepreneurship is also characterized by uncertainty 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2005), risk-taking behavior (Sommer, Loch & Dong, 2009), 
resource constraints (Yli-Renko, Autio & Sapienza, 2001), and market entry 
challenges (Alvarez & Barney, 2010). Given the situation under which entrepreneurs 
build their business, it is not surprising that a large number of entrepreneurs abandon 
their startup efforts, voluntarily or otherwise forced, even within a short period after 
they are established (Dahl & Reichstein, 2007; Kirchhoff, 1994). In some instances, 
this abandonment is referred to in more neutral terms, such as an exit (Wennberg et 
al., 2010; Wennberg & DeTienne, 2014). In most cases, however, it is surrounded 
by an air of negativity because it is often the result of not achieving certain 
objectives. Such events are thus commonly regarded as failures, where one uses 
terms such as closure, dissolution, and even death (Balcaen et al., 2012; Bates, 2005; 
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Cope, 2011; Coad, 2014; Head, 2003; Jenkins & McKelvie, 2016; Ucbasaran et al., 
2013; Wennberg & DeTienne, 2014).  
Historically, new ventures that failed have not received much attention, as there are 
cognitive biases in understanding the survival and growth of entrepreneurial 
ventures. However, as with most often-occurring events, there has been increasing 
interest in understanding the failure phenomenon in detail, particularly in the last 
decade (e.g., Jenkins & McKelvie, 2016; Jenkins & McKelvie, 2017; Minniti & 
Bygrave, 2001; Lin, Yamakawa & Li, 2019; Shepherd, 2003). New venture failure 
is seen as a negative event, and indeed it involves the loss of something dear to those 
involved. Much of the research has therefore found adverse financial, emotional, and 
social effects on individuals (Cope, 2003; Singh et al, 2007; Ucbasaran et al., 2013). 
For instance, failure may result in decreased self-efficacy and feelings of grief, 
which may hinder learning from the failure (Cope, 2011). Consequently, these 
feelings may adversely affect entrepreneurs’ motivation to continue entrepreneurial 
activities (Shepherd et al., 2009).  
However, failure does not only have negative consequences; it also can lead to 
positive externalities for the entrepreneur. Failure can potentially be important in 
terms of entrepreneurs developing knowledge and skillsets that are vital resources 
for subsequent entrepreneurial activities, as the literature on learning from failure 
has highlighted (Minniti & Bygrave, 2001; Nielsen & Sarasvathy, 2016; Politis & 
Gabrielsson, 2009). Alternatively, through entrepreneurial recycling, low-
performing activities can be transformed into high-performing ones either in the 
form of new established ventures or being integrated in an established firm, as the 
released resources may be put to new and more productive use (Baum & Silverman, 
2004; Knott & Posen, 2005). This might then increase the overall competitiveness, 
which may stimulate innovation (Davidsson, 2008). It can also lead to a dynamic 
economy and positive economic development (Pe'er & Vertinsky, 2008). Thus, new 
venture failure can potentially play an important role in positive societal outcomes. 
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Despite the increasing interest in understanding failure, much of this research 
revolves around the (single) entrepreneur, including their motivation to re-launch a 
new venture, the physiological and behavioral effects of failure, and learning from 
failure (Dahlin, Chuang & Roulet, 2018). This is surprising, as it is a well-
established fact that entrepreneurship is seldom an activity conducted by a single 
entrepreneur; rather, entrepreneurship involves a team (see, e.g., Gregori, Ukobitz & 
Parastuty, 2018; Klotz et al., 2014). Not only is this common but the evidence also 
shows new ventures founded and led by new venture teams (NVTs) achieve better 
results than single-founded ventures (Gregori et al., 2018; Lechler 2001; Stam & 
Schutjens, 2006). 
Furthermore, the entrepreneur often relies on the involvement of others who 
contribute to the new venture, either in terms of labor or providing financial support 
and advice (Hayward, Shepherd & Griffin, 2006). Due to the small and flat structure 
of new ventures and the high involvement and commitment of these stakeholders 
they will also be affected by the ups and downs of new ventures but may not in the 
same way. These stakeholders will also be affected by the failure of the new venture, 
but they are rarely the object of investigation in studies on failure. 
How different groups of stakeholders (i.e., NVTs, employees, investors, founders) 
respond to failure and how their work life may be affected by failure can have 
important implications for entrepreneurship research. Because the motivation, 
expectations, and experiences of different groups of stakeholders differ (Roach & 
Sauermann, 2015), how they are affected by failure can be distinctive from one to 
another group. For instance, new venture employment has been an attractive choice 
for skilled employees and a satisfactory place to work (Benz & Frey, 2008). 
However, it involves instability and the risk of failure, which may turn challenging 
experience. Therefore, understanding the effect of working in new ventures and how 
new venture failure can impact the working life of stakeholders other than 
entrepreneurs can have important implications for the entrepreneurship process. 
The aftermath of new venture failure 
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In this dissertation, I dig deeper in the consequences of new venture failure for 
different stakeholders. In particular, this dissertation explores what the different 
stakeholders gain from being involved in new ventures and highlights future career 
implications. Specifically, I look at employees and NVTs in two separate studies. I 
also touch upon investors, founders, and employees in another study to understand 
perceptions of failure related to the failure experience of these groups of 
stakeholders. By drawing on two rich datasets, one gathered through a large set of 
qualitative interviews and one based on register data, this dissertation aims to 
contribute to the entrepreneurship literature by investigating new venture failure and 
its consequences. 
This introductory section consists of four parts. It starts with an overview of new 
venture failure and its consequences for different groups of stakeholders. This forms 
the foundation for formulating the research questions. It is followed by an 
explanation of the research approach to answer the research questions. The section 
concludes by detailing the overall structure of the dissertation. 
1.1.1 After new venture failure: stakeholders’ perspectives on new 
venture post-failure  
Conducting research on new venture failure is inherently difficult. First, a detailed 
analysis of failed businesses is difficult, as data on startups often has a strong 
survival bias (Wennberg, 2009). Finding and contacting failed startups and their 
founders is a difficult and time-consuming process because contact information is 
seldom available. Trying to contact other stakeholders is even more difficult. Even if 
these individuals are identified, they may be reluctant to talk about their experiences 
because of the stigma associated with failure or because they do not consider their 
business to be a failed venture (Zacharakis et al., 1999).  
Despite the challenge of addressing this phenomenon, it is an important issue to 
tackle as the literature on learning from failure recognizes that failure often does not 
mean the end of the entrepreneurial process (Shepherd, 2003; Ucbasaran, et al., 
2010; Ucbasaran et al., 2013). Many vital entrepreneurial resources, including 
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technology, financial assets, and human resources, do not disappear with the failure 
of the new venture and can possibly be used in recognizing new opportunities. In 
this situation, the well-known saying that “life goes on” is valid. This is true for the 
entrepreneur and the other stakeholders involved.  
Compared to a single-founded new venture, entrepreneurship involves team of 
individuals (Gartner et al., 1994; Lazar et al., 2019). Because team-based startups 
have the potential for improved performance compared to individual-based ones, 
there is a growing tendency to run a business with a team (Klotz et al., 2014). In the 
challenging situation of closing a new venture, NVT members may decide to 
continue working with each other because they are aware of their skills, knowledge, 
and competences, which facilitate communication and more effective collaboration. 
Such close ties may result in re-starting the new venture in the form of a serial new 
venture team. Therefore, understanding the extent to which the mobility of NVTs 
lead to keep their ties can have important implications for the performance of 
entrepreneurship activities. 
Employees are crucial stakeholders in developing and launching a product. Studies 
show that a large number of highly skilled science and engineering graduates are 
employed in startups (Neff, 2012; Roach & Sauermann, 2015). Working for a 
startup can potentially have positive and negative effects on employees. On one 
hand, employees may have opportunities for developing more skills as they acquire 
more responsibilities and take on different tasks. On the other hand, they might not 
gain the specialization that is often required to be employed in established firms 
(Sorenson et al., 2019). One approach to determining the outcomes for new venture 
employees is to investigate how working for a new venture and being involved in 
entrepreneurial activity can shape their entrepreneurial abilities in order to gain the 
skills needed to go from paid employment to self-employment (Sørensen & 
Fassiotto, 2011). Another line of studies is to investigate the earning effects of new 
venture employment, which depend on the size of the firm and on whether one is an 
early or a late joiner. However, it is likely that employees will have decreased 
earnings as a consequence of working for a new venture (Sorenson et al., 2019). Yet, 
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in this regard, understanding how employees experience working for new venture 
and how they are affected by ups and downs of startups can have important 
implications in benefiting from entrepreneurship activities as employee.         
Other central stakeholders include the investors, who through their investments and 
competences have a significant impact on the growth of startups. In addition to 
providing funding, investors can have other effects on new ventures, including in 
relation to operating services, networks, and moral support (Davila, Foster & Gupta, 
2003; Fried & Hisrich, 1995). As the major source of financing, investors can be 
affected negatively by the failure of a new venture. Therefore, understanding how 
investors experience failure can have important implications for successful 
entrepreneurship processes.  
1.1.2 Research questions  
Given the above, different stakeholders are involved in entrepreneurship activities 
for different reasons, such as getting ideas into practice, expanding social networks, 
developing skills, or generating wealth (Carter et al., 2003; Wennberg, 2009). These 
motivations vary among different groups of stakeholders (i.e., founders, employees, 
investors, NVTs), as each group may engage in entrepreneurship activities for 
different purposes and expectations. When the new venture is forced to close down 
(due to bankruptcy, poor performance, or people’s decisions), it is important to see 
what happens to different individuals as the main resources conveying knowledge, 
skills, entrepreneurship capabilities, and experiences. Yet, little attention has been 
paid to the aftermath of new venture failure for different groups of stakeholders in 
entrepreneurship activities, including whether their expectations are fulfilled and to 
what extent they intend to remain involved in entrepreneurial activities after the 
closure/failure. This dissertation addresses these questions, focusing on the different 
stakeholders in entrepreneurship activities, including employees, NVTs, investors, 
and founders. Accordingly, the main research question is as follows.  
What are the consequences of new venture failure on different stakeholder 
groups involved in entrepreneurial activities?  
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I separated the primary question into two topics. The first addresses the effects of 
failure on different actors. The second addresses the working lives of the actors after 
failure. I broke down these two topics, described below.  
Founders are not the only actors involved in entrepreneurial activities who are 
affected by new venture failure. Investors and employees also play a pivotal role in 
the process of starting a new venture and are also affected by its dissolution. 
Investors are the main source of risk management that make investment decisions in 
uncertain circumstances (Aldrich, 1999), and employees are at the heart of product 
and service development and have a complementary role to founders in 
entrepreneurial activities. As the ones experiencing the ups and downs of a startup, 
both investors and employees are affected by the financial, psychological, and social 
costs of failure (Ucbasaran et al., 2013). Given that all these actors have different 
roles and responsibilities in entrepreneurial activities, they are not affected by new 
venture failure in the same way. Failure may have different implications for each 
group based on their experience of failure and their position in the new venture. In 
the first sub-question, I address the different actors’ differing perceptions of failure.  
Sub-question 1: How do different actors (i.e., founders, investors, and employees) 
perceive failure based on their experience of failure outcomes? 
Although the vast majority of new ventures dissolve within a short period of time 
after their launch, many of their resources do not simply disappear. Individuals as 
the main sources of job creation and economic development (Carree & Thurik, 
2010) in entrepreneurial activities will act in other organizational settings after a 
new venture fails. As the research shows, this mobility is accompanied by diffusing 
knowledge and information, which is valuable for recognizing new opportunities in 
order to continue the entrepreneurship process (Campbell et al., 2014). In this 
dissertation, I rely on different perspectives to examine life after a new venture 
(failure) for two groups of actors involved in entrepreneurial activity, i.e., employees 
and NVTs. Both groups are very important in new ventures; however, there is a lack 
of focus on them in the literature. Teams are important, as team-based ventures have 
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the potential for greater performance compared to ventures undertaken by 
individuals (Klotz et al., 2014). Employees are also important, but we do not know 
how they experience new ventures and their post-startup life. Employees are 
essential in entrepreneurship, as they themselves might become successful 
entrepreneurs (Sørensen & Fassiotto, 2011). Therefore, the second sub-question is 
as follows.  
Sub-question 2: What are the outcomes of new venture failure for employees and 
NVTs? 
1.1.3 Research structure  
The three main studies in this thesis (Chapters 2–4) have been developed to answer 
the research questions. Study 1 (Chapter 2), “Entrepreneurial failure: Distinct 
perceptions among founders, employees, and investors” addresses the first research 
question, where the perceptions of failure are explored from a novel perspective of 
three main stakeholders in new ventures, i.e., founders, employees, and investors. In 
particular, this study explores how each group perceives failure in terms of their 
experience and the outcomes of a new venture.  
The second question is addressed by Study 2 and Study 3. Following the outcomes 
of working in a new venture, Study 2 (Chapter 3), “Falling off the unicorn: The 
structural shortcomings of startup employment”, investigates what employees gain 
(e.g., experience) from new ventures and whether their experiences match with their 
reasons for joining a new venture. This study deals with the outcomes of working in 
new ventures in general and also discusses failure outcomes.  
Study 3 (Chapter 4) approaches the outcomes of a new venture (failure) from 
another perspective. Titled “Till death do us part? New venture dissolution and 
enduring work relationships”, this study investigates the outcomes of new ventures 
for NVTs. This study explores NVT co-mobility after the termination of a new 
venture, described as “dissolution”. Dissolution refers broadly to the end of a 
venture. This end might not be limited to failure; it might also be a decision to close 
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the business to pursue other goals, which is a limitation of the dataset in this study. 
However, we make a distinction between low-performance and high-performance 
dissolution (Wennberg et al., 2010). By considering the (low) performance up to 
dissolution, we come close to Shepherd’s (2003) definition of failure, which is 
discussed in more detail in the next section.  
I have included a fourth study (Chapter 5) in this dissertation as a background and a 
basis on which to form Study 1. This study, “Open for entrepreneurship: How open 
innovation can foster new venture creation”, addresses the failure and survival of 
new ventures in terms of open innovation approach and investigates how open 
ecosystems can impact the actors to survive their startups in terms of the main 
challenges of new ventures in these ecosystems. According to one of the findings, 
entrepreneurs’ mindsets can play a moderating role in the probability of new venture 
survival. This was the basis for the idea of developing Study 1, in which individuals’ 
perceptions and how they understand the failure phenomenon based on their 
experience of entrepreneurship activity is explored.  
In Table 1, I summarize the approach of each study.  
Table 1: Summary of approaches for the three main studies 
 
Research 
question 
Group of 
actors 
Outcome of the new venture 
Level of 
analysis 
Research design approach 
Failure Dissolution 
Left by 
actors 
Study 1 
Sub-
question 1 
Founders, 
employees, 
investors 
   Individual 
Qualitative, 86 in-depth interviews 
in Denmark and the US 
Study 2 
Sub-
question 2 
Employees    Individual 
Qualitative, 86 in-depth interviews 
in Denmark and the US 
Study 3 
Sub-
question 2 
NVT    Team 
Quantitative, IDA database, sample 
of 11,903 NVT members, affiliated 
to 2403 new ventures 
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1.1.4 Structure of the dissertation  
This dissertation consists of several parts. This first part, the synopsis, includes an 
introduction, an overall theoretical framework, the research methodology, 
synthesized conclusions of the different studies, and an overview of the 
dissertation’s contributions to entrepreneurship research, practice, and policy. 
Following this synopsis, I present the four studies that address the research questions 
of the dissertation in different ways. These studies are presented in article form in 
separate chapters.  
1.2 Theoretical framework 
In this section, I address two main theoretical foundations of this dissertation. First, I 
shed light on the concept of failure, including various descriptions of failure in the 
literature and the issues related to failure (i.e., the costs and benefits of failure). I 
then illustrate the importance of understanding how different actors in 
entrepreneurial activities can perceive failure. Afterwards, I review theories on the 
outcomes of new venture dissolution, focusing on different groups of stakeholders in 
entrepreneurial activities (employees and NVTs).  
1.2.1 New venture failure definition 
In entrepreneurship research, failure can be understood in various ways, depending 
on the context and scope of the research. It is important to have a clear description 
of failure in both entrepreneurship theory and practice. Ucbasaran et al. (2013) argue 
that a clear definition of failure affects the processes and outcomes of the 
observations of the study, and it allows for comparisons among different studies. 
Researchers have applied various definitions in a number of different ways. In this 
section, I provide an overview of definitions of failure from different perspectives in 
the literature. To clarify how the various definitions differ from each other, I have 
categorized them into four main themes: (1) failure as the termination of a business; 
(2) failure as a low-performing business; (3) failure as low performance below a 
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certain expectation threshold; and (4) failure as bankruptcy. Table 2 lists the key 
characteristics of these definitions.  
Table 2: Summary of failure definitions in the literature 
Theme Sample publications Summary 
Termination of the business Bruno et al., 1992; Singh et al., 2007 Discontinuance of the business (i.e., exit) due to 
various reasons, including legal problems, retirement, 
shifting to a new business 
Low-performing business Coelho & McClure, 2005; Shepherd, 2003 Termination of the business due to poor performance 
(costs exceeding revenues) 
Low performance below a 
certain expectation threshold 
Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Ucbasaran et 
al., 2010; Ucbasaran et al., 2013 
Closing the business because it has not met the 
entrepreneurs’ expectations 
Bankruptcy 
Shepherd & Haynie, 2011;Zacharakis et al., 
1999 
Discontinuance of the business based on observable, 
recorded events 
Failure as the termination of the business: This view is based on the definition by 
Bruno, Mcquarrie, and Torgrimson (1992), who view failure as the discontinuance 
of a business for reasons such as legal problems, partnership disputes, or a shift in 
interest in continuing with the same business. Singh, Corner, and Pavlovich (2007) 
use this definition to keep the concept of failure broad enough for the purpose of 
taking a holistic view in their study. Earlier studies view the discontinuance of a 
business (i.e., exit) as failure, which includes not only closing a business but also 
selling a business for reasons such as retirement, poor health, or wishing to move on 
to another venture or industry (Watson & Everett, 1996). In recent studies, however, 
there appears to be another view, where failure is not necessarily equated with an 
exit because exiting a firm might occur for reasons other than failure, including 
exiting with success (Wennberg et al., 2010). Therefore, the term “exit” is used to 
mean exiting a firm because of the founder’s decision or because the exit is impelled 
by low performance. In this definition, failure is synonymous with exit (Shepherd & 
Wiklund, 2006). However, in this definition the performance of the firm is not 
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captured at the exit moment because the exit may be for different reasons than 
failure, such as a founder makes a decision to pursue employment career in 
established firms (Headd, 2003). Therefore, the exit cannot be considered a failure 
(Davidsson, 2008) unless there are personal failures that prompted it.  
Failure as a low-performing business: This perspective on failure is narrower than 
the previous one. This definition tries to distinguish failure from exit by equating 
failure with insolvency (Shepherd, 2003). In this view, a business is considered to 
have failed when the business cannot survive in the market because costs exceed 
revenues such that continuing the business would not be reasonable (Coelho & 
McClure, 2005). Shepherd (2003:318) provides a similar definition when he states 
that “failure occurs when a fall in revenues and/or a rise in expenses are of such a 
magnitude that the firm becomes insolvent and is unable to attract new debt or 
equity funding; consequently it cannot continue to operate under the current 
ownership and management”. 
However, the magnitude of the costs is not determined in this approach and may 
differ according to stakeholder. In this approach, a business may be sold or merged 
with another firm in order to avoid bankruptcy. This perspective on failure is applied 
in some conceptual studies to understand how entrepreneurs might react to new 
venture failure (Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd & Haynie, 2011) in coping with failure 
and the loss of the business (Shepherd & Haynie, 2011). 
Failure as low performance below a certain expectation threshold: Some studies 
go into greater detail and emphasize that entrepreneurs’ expectations are important 
in measuring economic performance. In particular, this approach upholds the general 
notion of low economic performance in relation to new venture failure (Coelho & 
McClure, 2005; Shepherd, 2003) but adds that entrepreneurs’ threshold for poor 
performance should be taken into account. In this regard, Ucbasaran et al. (2010) 
define failure as the sale or closure of a new venture because it has not met the 
entrepreneur’s expectations. Cannon and Edmondson (2001) have the same idea and 
conceptualize failure as “deviation from expected and desired results” (Cannon & 
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Edmondson, 2001: 162). This perspective reflects the differing thresholds for low 
performance among entrepreneurs. Similarly, Ucbasaran et al. (2013) refine the 
definition of failure as “the cessation of involvement in a venture because it has not 
met a minimum threshold for economic viability as stipulated by the entrepreneur” 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2013: 175). This subjective perspective suggests that with the 
same level of performance, different entrepreneurs may have different views. One 
may consider the new venture as a success, and another may interpret it as a failure 
(Gimeno et al., 1997). This definition can be applied in studies that compare habitual 
entrepreneurs with unexperienced entrepreneurs (Ucbasaran et al., 2010). 
Failure as bankruptcy: A narrow perspective of failure is simply defining it as 
bankruptcy, which relies on observable evidence. Such a definition is appropriate for 
operationalizing failure and for forming samples (Zacharakis et al., 1999) as 
bankruptcy signals a failing venture (Shepherd & Haynie, 2011). However, failure is 
broader than bankruptcy, as there are other indications involved in failure that may 
be overlooked in this narrow approach. For example, interpersonal conflicts among 
new venture members and personal obligations can create major issues that result in 
the termination of a business (Singh et al., 2007).  
The above categorization shows that new venture failure has been operationalized in 
a number of different ways from very narrow to very broad perspectives. The choice 
of each category for defining failure is connected to the intentions of the researcher. 
As the review of definition of failure shows, there are different definitions that rely 
on the operationalization of new venture failure without paying attention to the 
individual experience of failure (Ucbasaran et al., 2013). This is an important gap to 
address because there is a need to understand how people active in entrepreneurship 
conceptualize business failure. In Study 1 (Chapter 2), I address three main 
categories of individuals, including founders, investors, and employees, and 
investigate how they perceive failure. Understanding failure from the individual 
viewpoint can reveal some hidden issues in startups, such as inter-relationships 
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among different actors and the psychological costs of failure for each stakeholder 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2013).  
1.2.1.1 Definition of failure in this dissertation 
To define failure, I have applied different approaches that are presented in existing 
studies. Depending on the research question and aim for each study, I used different 
definitions. In Study 1 and Study 2, new venture failure is defined based on a 
subjective perspective whereby failure is described by interviewees. The purpose is 
to understand the interpretation of people involved in entrepreneurship activities. In 
Study 3, due to the limitations of the database in distinguishing failure, we followed 
Wennberg et al. (2010) who described different exit routes and made a distinction 
between exiting after low performance and exiting after high performance. In this 
study, we define the failure of a new venture as low-performing dissolution, which 
is in line with the definition of Shepherd (2003:318). In this definition, “failure 
occurs when a fall in revenues and/or a rise in expenses are of such a magnitude that 
the firm becomes insolvent and is unable to attract new debt or equity funding; 
consequently it cannot continue to operate under the current ownership and 
management.”   
1.2.2 Understanding the costs and benefits of new venture failure 
Failure can potentially be an upsetting experience that hinders learning and the 
continuation of entrepreneurial activities (Cope, 2011; Shepherd, 2003). However, it 
might be beneficial for society because valuable knowledge can be reassembled to 
create a new business (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007; Knott & Posen, 2005). The 
purpose of looking at the costs and benefits of new venture failure is to show the 
importance of business failure in entrepreneurship and why we need to understand it 
in depth.  
Costs of new venture failure 
Generally, failure is an undesirable condition that may negatively affect the 
entrepreneurial process. Failure can manifest in the form of loss of income and an 
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increase in expenses. These may be loss of the investment or increasing expenses, 
both of which can lead to an exit. Other costs of new venture failure are emotional, 
including feelings of anger, humiliation, pain, and blame (Cope, 2011; Shepherd, 
2003; Singh et al., 2007; Singh, Corner & Pavlovich, 2015), that can manifest in the 
form of depression that is severe enough to adversely affect individual motivation 
(Singh et al., 2007). This can lead to a diminished belief in one’s ability to do 
specific tasks successfully and can hinder general task performance (Shepherd, 
2003). The experience of entrepreneurial failure may generate feelings of 
uselessness and undermine entrepreneurs’ self-confidence and their belief in 
success, which can lead to a loss of motivation to continue entrepreneurial activities 
(Jenkins et al., 2014; Shepherd, 2003; Ucbasaran et al., 2013). Not accepting failure 
can lead to delaying the termination of a business. By doing this, extra personal 
funding and investment may be required to keep the business going. However, this 
extra spending may not help avoid failure. As a result, the financial loss can 
aggravate negative emotions, which can lead to diminishing opportunity recognition 
and the diminished likelihood of continuing any entrepreneurial activity (Shepherd 
et al., 2009). Failure may also impact personal and professional relationships and 
can result in the loss of one’s social network (Ucbasaran et al., 2013). Due to the 
stigma associated with failure, the quality of social relationships may decrease. 
Stigma may also lead to negative discrimination in terms of employment 
opportunities and access to resources (Shepherd & Haynie, 2011).  On a related 
note, the stigma associated with failure might make an entrepreneur choose to no 
longer be involved in the entrepreneurship, which could have damaging effects on 
the economy and society (Ucbasaran et al., 2013). 
Benefits of new venture failure 
The benefits of failure are often highlighted in the literature on learning from failure 
(Nielsen & Sarasvathy, 2016). Entrepreneurs can learn from failure by using 
information about why their business failed to get feedback, improve their 
knowledge, and learn how to manage their business more effectively (Shepherd, 
2003). Using this knowledge can involve different factors, such as relationships with 
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external stakeholders, building new partnerships, and understanding the market and 
challenges of the business (Cope, 2011; Singh et al., 2007). Entrepreneurship is a 
learning process (Minniti & Bygrave, 2001), as it involves uncertainty. Failure is 
part of this process, and it means that something was wrong with the process. This is 
why researchers believe failure encourages learning, as most entrepreneurs want to 
understand what led to the failure (Politis, 2005; Ucbasaran et al., 2009). 
Additionally, learning can take the form of behavioral changes (Daft & Weick, 
1984; Huber, 1991). While success may enhance one’s confidence, failure motivates 
a change in one’s mentality and behavior in terms of business development (Sitkin, 
1992). Many entrepreneurs who have experienced business failure have strong 
intentions to start subsequent businesses (Hessels et al., 2011; Stam & Schutjens, 
2006). This may be as a consequence of learning from failure (Ucbasaran et al., 
2013). The research has shown that entrepreneurs with such experience can identify 
more business opportunities within a given period than those without such 
experience (Ucbasaran et al., 2009). In sum, business failure seems to serve both as 
an opportunity to learn and continue the entrepreneurial process and an adverse 
motivation to continue entrepreneurship activities. 
1.2.3 New venture failure and the implications for different stakeholders 
New ventures are becoming an increasingly important part of the economic system 
because they are considered pivotal sources of job generation and economic growth 
(Reynolds & White, 1997). Understandably, new venture success, growth, and the 
major determinants for survival (e.g., Eftekhari & Bogers, 2015; Klepper, 2002; 
Shane, 2003) have received the most research attention (Santarelli & Vivarelli, 
2007). Few studies on entrepreneurial failure mainly address the causes of failure 
(e.g., Correa et al., 2017; Zacharakis et al., 1999), new venture performance, and 
venture exit (e.g., Nielsen & Sarasvathy, 2018; Wennberg et al., 2010).  
Previous studies mainly focus on the experience of entrepreneurs, the startup’s 
performance (Dahl & Reichstein, 2007; Geroski et al., 2010; Klepper, 2002), or the 
differences in the performance effect on employees in terms of pursuing other 
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opportunities (Klepper & Thompson, 2010). Yet, the experience and consequences 
of working in startups still have not been studied. In my dissertation, I approach the 
consequences of new venture (failure) for different groups of stakeholders in 
entrepreneurial activities, including employees and NVTs. Studies 2 and 3 look at 
the outcomes of new ventures. In Study 2 (Chapter 3), the effect of working in a 
startup on employees is addressed, as they are one of the critical elements in 
entrepreneurship even though they are often disregarded in the existing research that 
focuses on founders. In Study 3 (Chapter 4), NVTs are addressed in investigating 
the extent to which a team can stay together after the dissolution of a new venture. 
In the following, I shed more light on the theories of life after a new venture for 
employees and NVTs. 
1.2.3.1 New venture (failure) and employees  
In this section, I focus on reviewing the implications of new venture employment. I 
start by elaborating the pivotal role of employees in entrepreneurial activities and 
then review the outcomes of new venture (failure) employment for employees.  
Why employees matter in new ventures 
For a successful business, a comprehensive strategy, effective processes, and a 
saleable product are very important elements that cannot be accomplished without 
an efficient workforce. This may be the reason employees are called the most 
significant assets in organizations. In the context of entrepreneurial activities, 
founders and investors do not carry all the knowledge and capabilities for new 
venture development; skilled employees are required for different specialties. 
However, despite the important role of employees, there is a lack of focus on them. 
In terms of entrepreneurship activities, employees are one of the foundations for 
identification, creation, and exploitation of opportunities (Alvarez & Barney, 2005; 
Campbell, 2013). A number of studies show the rate of hiring recent talented 
graduates is higher for new ventures than established companies (Nyström, 2012; 
Nyström & Elvung, 2014). For instance, Ouimet and Zarutskie (2014) use US data 
that indicate young workers are more attracted to new ventures. Similarly, Roach 
The aftermath of new venture failure 
18 
 
and Sauermann (2015) show that skilled engineering graduates have more intention 
to start their careers at startups (National Science Board, 2012).  
New ventures attract workers with various skills because the work involves 
heterogeneous tasks. Hiring workers with different capabilities is more efficient for 
new ventures, as complex tasks can be done by fewer employees with greater 
capabilities. Dahl and Klepper (2015) state that the more productive a new venture 
is, the more workers with various abilities can be hired. Engaging in 
entrepreneurship activities may encourage employees to start new ventures as 
founders (Nanda & Sørensen, 2010; Sørensen & Fassiotto, 2011), which can be 
beneficial for society as a whole (Baum & Silverman, 2004). Yet, many will work as 
employees (Halaby, 2003; Sørensen, 2007) and engage in entrepreneurship activities 
as side work. Therefore, due to the importance of employees in new ventures and 
their value in the growth of entrepreneurship activities, it is essential to understand 
how they experience working in new ventures and what the outcomes are. In the 
following, I elaborate the major implications of working in new ventures as 
employees.  
Implications of new venture employment  
Employees of a new venture differ from the founders in various ways, such as 
owning equity, autonomy, pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards, responsibilities, 
and commitment to the firm. Therefore, the experience with and consequences of 
new ventures (i.e., ups and downs, success and failure) are different for employees 
than for founders (Sorenson et al., 2019). The experience of new venture 
employment can have advantageous and disadvantageous implications for 
employees.  
The experience of working for a new venture can lead to the development or 
creation of general human capital that would have not occurred in the absence of 
such experience. It can positively influence employees’ value as human capital 
because people have different responsibilities and tasks that can help improve their 
skills and capabilities. In addition, because of the smallness and resource limitations 
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of startups (Aldrich, 1999), a small number of people have to establish job 
specializations with a wide range of tasks, which is essential for a firm’s success 
(Rosen, 1983). As an outcome, employees can gain experience in various roles that 
they would not achieve in established organizations (Campbell, 2013). The flat 
hierarchy of startups gives employees opportunities for autonomy with little 
bureaucracy (Sørensen, 2007) in doing high-level tasks alongside managers (Wagner 
2004), which would not be possible in large firms. Working in a high-risk, uncertain 
entrepreneurial environment provides employees with skills and capabilities that 
may lead to recognizing new opportunities (Shane, 2003) for starting a new 
business. The research shows that some individuals join startups to gain 
entrepreneurial skills and experience in order to start their own businesses 
(Elfenbein et al., 2010; Lazear, 2005; Roach & Sauermann, 2015). Employees can 
acquire required skills or learn how to acquire those skills to launch a new venture 
by interacting with entrepreneurs. These skills and capabilities can potentially make 
more entrepreneurial opportunities attractive. Moreover, such valuable social 
contacts facilitate access to resources that may lead to lowering the costs of 
entrepreneurial entry and enriching the value of entrepreneurial opportunities 
(Nanda & Sørensen, 2010).  
On the other side, there are potential downsides with new venture employment. 
First, undertaking a wide range of tasks may not lead to increasing the human capital 
of employees because there may not be enough focus on a particular specialization 
to become highly skilled (Sorenson et al., 2019). Second, the risky and uncertain 
environment of startups, which may include tensions among stakeholders (i.e., 
founders and investors), may lead to feelings of instability among employees. These 
feelings can prevent them from concentrating on their specializations. In addition, 
these issues may also adversely affect the employees’ career after the new venture. 
Not being sufficiently skilled in a specialty may cause employees to accept lower-
level jobs with less desirable compensation. Finally, the fragile nature of new 
ventures with high failure probability makes jobs in new ventures uncertain. Finding 
themselves out of a job, employees may face major challenges and adverse 
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consequences (Brand, 2015), such as prolonged unemployment and accepting less 
attractive positions for less money and lower-level tasks (Sorenson et al., 2019). 
However, it is still unknown what employees expect to gain from startups, how they 
experience working in startups and experience failure consequences, and what they 
actually achieve. These issues are explored in Study 2 (see Chapter 3).  
1.2.3.2 Consequences of new venture failure on NVTs 
It is well established that many new ventures are not established by a single 
individual alone but by a team (Klotz et al., 2014; Lazar et al., 2019). So, besides 
understanding the implications of failure for a single entrepreneur, it only seems 
natural to broaden our understanding of the effect of new venture failure on the team 
responsible for the entrepreneurial activity. In this section, I review the implications 
of new venture dissolution on NVTs. First, I review different definitions of NVTs 
and the definition used in this dissertation. I also shed light on the critical role of 
NVTs in entrepreneurship. I then discuss the co-mobility of NVTs after new venture 
dissolution, which is the subject of Study 3.  
Defining new venture team (NVT) 
Scholars have employed various definitions for NVTs depending on who makes up 
those teams. Kamm et al. (1990) define these teams as consisting of individuals who 
have equity in financial interest in the venture and who have been present since the 
pre-startup phase of the business. This definition has two main criteria, ownership 
and the length of involvement. Other definitions include other aspects, such as non-
financial elements, participating in activities, and involvement in decision making 
(Cooney, 2005; Klotz et al., 2014; Ucbasaran et al., 2003), which makes the 
definition less static and more dynamic. Still other definitions include team-member 
entry and exit after new venture founding (Forbes et al., 2006; Vanaelst et al., 2006). 
Despite adding these criteria to Kamm et al. (1990)’s basic definition of NVTs, the 
focus is still on the role of individuals in the team, which might not fit with the 
existing team entrepreneurship in practice (Packalen, 2015). Therefore, a more 
inclusive approach is suggested. For example, Gartner et al. (1994) define NVTs as 
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the ones not only having ownership roles but also having the responsibility of 
acquiring resources, developing the venture’s concept, and operating the business. 
Koltz et al. (2014) argue that it is not only the investors but also the individuals who 
take the lead, should be taken into account in the NVT. Some other operationalized 
definitions extend the team member concept to other individuals in the new venture, 
such as first-year and early employees (Coad & Timmermans, 2014). Undoubtedly, 
NVT members change over time. Therefore, the more dynamic definition of NVTs 
and team-based entrepreneurship gives a clearer understanding of teams in reality. 
Scholars have used different terms for team-based entrepreneurship, including 
entrepreneurial team, new venture team, startup team, and founding team (Klotz et 
al., 2014). In this dissertation, I use the term NVT because it is frequently used in 
entrepreneurship research (Hellerstedt, 2009; Koltz et al., 2014).  
Definition of new venture team in this dissertation 
This dissertation follows Klotz et al. (2014) and uses the term NVT for an 
entrepreneurship-based team. In this thesis, a broad perspective of the NVT is taken 
whereby the people who participate in establishing a startup and those who joined 
the team in the first year after launching the firm are considered NVT members. 
This is because there is an assumption that founders build up their management and 
strategic members during the first year of a new venture. This definition is in line 
with how Gartner et al. (1994), Ruef (2010), and Coad and Timmermans (2014) 
describe entrepreneurship-based teams as founders and joiners of a startup. This 
definition is applied in this dissertation for various reasons. First, this dynamic 
definition of NVTs allows including other team aspects, such as strategic decision 
making rather than just financial equity. Second, it allows a pragmatic viewpoint 
about what a team is in reality. Finally, it best fits with the information in the 
database used in this dissertation.  
Importance of NVTs  
NVTs have the main role in new venture development. They are the heart of the firm 
(Cooper & Daily, 1996) because they comprise a combination of people with 
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different characteristics, knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience (Vesper, 1990; 
Vyakarnam et al., 1997). In addition, the business is less dependent on a single 
person and as a consequence the loss of one entrepreneur is less likely to damage the 
entire venture. From a psychological point of view, working as a team reduces 
entrepreneurial stress (Lechler, 2001), and team members are more likely to trust 
and support each other (Boyd & Gumpert, 1983). Furthermore, the team has the 
major role in innovation processes. Studies show that teamwork among 
entrepreneurs is crucial in ensuring a high-performance team, resulting in product, 
project, and innovation success (Ancona & Caldwell, 1990; Gladstein, 1984; 
Hackman, 1987). NVTs can provide a venture with access to valuable financial, 
social, and human capital resources (Kor & Mahoney, 2000). Each team member 
can add to the diversity of views, knowledge, and skills and may also enable the 
completion of complex tasks (Ucbasaran et al., 2003). NVTs play an important role 
in facilitating business development and business performance (Kamm & Shuman, 
1990; Roure & Madique, 1986; Westhead, 1995). A venture with a team has a more 
diverse array of human capital than a venture with a single entrepreneur. Due to the 
importance of teams in firm performance, there has been a variety of studies 
addressing team composition (e.g., Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Lazar et al., 2019; 
Ruef et al., 2003), team turnover (e.g., Chandler et al., 2005; Ucbasaran et al., 2003), 
team performance (e.g., Beckman et al., 2007; Chandler et al., 2005; Ensley, 1999; 
Wagner et al., 1984), and team passion (e.g., Santos & Cardon, 2019). However, 
there is a lack of research on the impact of startup dissolution on NVTs. In 
particular, there is still a need for research on how new venture dissolution can affect 
NVTs in terms of staying together. I elaborate on this in the following.  
NVT co-mobility after new venture (failure) 
The research shows that people who jointly move to a firm or establish a new 
business become rivals with the previous firm, thus it may increase the probability 
of higher performance (Wezel et al., 2006; Groysberg et al., 2008). From the 
perspective of the receiving firm, increasing performance by hiring a group of 
people with prior joint experience might be more effective than hiring individual 
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workers (Marx & Timmermans, 2017). Studies confirm that post-move performance 
is higher for those who move together than for those who move alone (Groysberg & 
Lee, 2009). 
From the movers’ perspective, people often prefer to continue working with their 
previous colleagues when changing jobs. First, they will avoid the integration 
process with a new team. Second, the risk of working with an ineffective team will 
be avoided. Third, the time it takes to acquire joint experience with a team will be 
minimized (Marx & Timmermans, 2017). In addition, the agreement in passion 
among joiners who founded a new venture may immediately impact the 
performance of the team and later new venture survival (Santos & Cardon, 2019). 
Generally, joint moves can be valuable because individuals are aware of the other 
members’ skills and knowledge and know they can work together to strengthen 
productivity and performance. Co-movement can encourage trust among individuals 
on the team (McEvily et al., 2003), which may lead to shared experience and tacit 
knowledge that helps in planning wisely and distributing tasks effectively.  
When a business dissolves due to bankruptcy, poor performance, or the decision to 
exit the firm, moving can be a positive part of the dynamic process of 
entrepreneurship in that individuals’ mobility may result in identifying new 
opportunities (Jenkins & McKelvie, 2017). NVTs are considered valuable resources 
with knowledge and capabilities that can be transferred and used in creating 
successful new ventures (Campbell et al., 2014). In the NVT context, the continuity 
of collaboration of the team members after new venture dissolution might be 
important, as the aggregate capabilities obtained through teamwork can be wasted 
with the separation of the teammates. NVT co-mobility can potentially be beneficial 
for entrepreneurial activities. First, being among team members can mediate the 
stigma of failure and facilitate coping and recovery processes. Second, the joint 
working experience provides the team members with sufficient information about 
each other’s skills and capabilities, which can be an important tool for restarting a 
new venture (Zheng et al., 2016). Furthermore, the established mutual trust and 
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strong ties among fellow teammates are essential components that can help in the 
timely establishment of a new team (McEvily et al., 2003). Therefore, it is important 
to understand the implications of new venture dissolution for NVTs. In particular, 
there is still a need for research on how new venture dissolution can affect NVTs in 
terms of staying together. This is addressed in Study 3.  
1.3 Methodology  
In the methodology section, I give an overview of research philosophy for this 
dissertation. I then present the overall research design that formed the basis for the 
papers. Here, I shed light on the different research strategies applied in this 
dissertation. First, I elaborate on the qualitative approach that forms the core of 
Chapters 2 and 3 where I present the sampling technique, data collection process, 
and subsequent data analysis. Then I present the strengths and weaknesses of 
qualitative approach. Finally, I explain the quantitative study and the strengths and 
weaknesses of this approach.  
1.3.1 Research philosophy  
In general, research philosophy is engaged with the systems, beliefs, and 
assumptions in the development of knowledge. These assumptions include human 
knowledge of a reality (i.e., epistemological assumptions) and realities encountered 
in the research (i.e., ontological assumptions) that shape the understanding of the 
research questions, the methods used, and the findings (Crotty, 1998; Saunders et al., 
2016).  
To understand the consequences of new venture failure and how different 
stakeholders are affected by this failure, this dissertation has used two philosophical 
stands—interpretivism and positivism. This resulted in two different research 
designs in the different studies in this dissertation.  
The dominant approach in the dissertation is interpretivism approach whereby the 
focus is on the interpretation of realities and social acts (Malhotra & Birks, 2007). In 
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the view of interpretivism, the social world is viewed based on the experience of 
social entities. From an interpretivist perspective, research aims to create a novel, 
rich understanding and interpretation of the social world (Saunders et al., 2016). To 
do so, there has to be detailed studies of the contexts in which social actors operate 
in order to understand what is happening and how realities (in this case the 
consequences of failure) are being experienced by the social actors. In 
interpretivism, reality is dynamic, and there may be a wide variety of interpretations 
of realities and social actors (Malhotra & Birks, 2007).  
In this dissertation, I also employ positivism in relation to the large register database 
in Study 3. Epistemologically, the focus of positivism is to look for causal 
relationships in the data and interpretations of reality in a large structure (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2015). In this approach, the interpretations and experiences of social 
actors (in this case the co-mobility of NVTs) do not affect the social world. 
Therefore, the truth about the social world is sought through observable, measurable 
facts relating to a particular aspect of organizations (in this case dissolved 
entrepreneurial firms) (Saunders et al., 2016).  
1.3.2 Research design 
Study 1 and Study 2 (Chapters 1 and 2) and the background study (Chapter 5) use a 
qualitative research design. Study 3 (Chapter 4) uses a quantitative research design 
with large-scale register data.  
The qualitative approach of Studies 1 and 2 is based on a large set of interviews with 
different stakeholders in a (failed) new venture (i.e., founders, employees, and 
investors), while the qualitative study of the background paper uses a case study 
approach. In this section, I discuss the details of the large scale interview study. The 
details of the case study can be found in Chapter 5. The source of the empirical 
study (Study 3) is “Integreret Database for Arbejdsmarkedsforskning” (IDA), which 
I discuss in Section 1.3.2.2.  
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1.3.2.1 Introducing the qualitative research design 
To develop Studies 1 and 2, I followed an inductive qualitative approach (Eisenhardt 
& Graebner, 2007). This was motivated by the fact that there is little knowledge 
about the consequences of new venture failure in general and the implications for a 
broader set of stakeholders in particular. An inductive research approach departs 
from identifying patterns, builds a theme using a collection of observations and 
participants’ views to achieve a deep understanding of the phenomenon in question, 
generating a theory or conceptual framework (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Cresswell & 
Plano Clark, 2007). Study 1 aims to understand the failure phenomenon by 
interviewing the main stakeholders in entrepreneurial activities, in this case 
founders, employees, and investors. Here, I explore how these different stakeholders 
perceive the failure of a new venture and how they have been affected by this 
failure. Study 2 explores how employees experience working for startups. The 
inductive research design allows the researcher, to acquire deep understanding, 
insight, and knowledge of the concept of failure (Study 1) and of the outcomes of 
startups for employees (Study 2) in the specific context of entrepreneurship. It is 
important to note that an inductive research design does not neglect existing theory, 
as these theories allow the researcher to acquire insight about the importance of the 
research topic (Saunders et al., 2016).  
Sampling and data collection 
The selection of a representative and meaningful sample is vital, as it reflects the 
purpose and requirements of the study (Davidsson, 2004). Consequently, the 
sampling was based on startups that obtained venture capital finance within high-
tech industries (i.e., software, hardware, biotech, and manufacturing). Because these 
startups have been supported and funded by investors that make them as the main 
and serious career for founders to establish formalized management and attract 
talented employees. As Study 2 argues, high-tech venture capital startups tend to 
work well in the market, which increases the likelihood of growth and success. This 
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makes venture capital high-tech startups important drivers of economic growth, 
which impacts employment and innovation growth (Wu & Atkinson, 2017). 
In this dissertation, the sampling was conducted in two regions in the US (the East 
Coast and the West Coast) and in Denmark. These places were selected to assure 
regional variation. Furthermore, the US East and West coasts are important regions 
for high-growth startups. Denmark has supportive rules for employees that make it 
significantly different from the US. For instance, in Denmark employees can benefit 
from unemployment insurance during periods of unemployment, which is not the 
case in the US. Sampling from different regions was done in order to obtain a deep 
understanding of the purpose of research (Mack et al., 2005).  
Different sampling strategies were applied in each country. In the US, we relied on 
snowball sampling. In this strategy, the research team relies on interview objects to 
point us to other potentially relevant interview objects that are part of the interview 
object’s social network (Mack et al., 2005). In applying this sampling strategy, we 
started with venture capitalists that were part of the social network of the research 
team. These venture capitalists introduced us to the different group of relevant 
stakeholders (i.e., founders, employees, and (other) investors).  
In Denmark, I identified relevant interview objects via a large venture capital 
database that contains required information about failed new ventures and 
information about the founders of these ventures. The aim was to identify as many 
contact evidence of the people from failed ventures. Because of the termination of 
the new venture, most contact information that was provided appeared to be no 
longer valid. Therefore, I expanded my search for the available information 
including through searching for the name of the founder and the new venture 
through LinkedIn and other social media sources. In this way, I not only identified 
the founders but also the employees and the investors involved in the failed new 
ventures. Based on this information, I contacted those individuals who seemed most 
suitable for the purpose of this study (Collingridge & Gantt, 2008).  
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We employed a semi-structured interview technique because it is a consistent 
method that allows for flexible discussions, which is desirable in our interpretive 
approach (Saunders et al., 2016). This also allowed us to go into detail about several 
issues relating to the ups and downs of new ventures. For the interviews, we 
developed a detailed guideline and protocol for different stakeholders. Each 
interview lasted 90 minutes on average. The interviews started with individuals’ 
work trajectory from the past up to their current position, as well as the story of their 
different positions and their joining or leaving a startup before their current role. 
Afterwards, they were asked about their experience working in startups in the 
context of risk and uncertainty. They were also asked about how they experienced 
failure and how they understood failure and success. The last part of the questions 
focused on the consequences of working in startups, the effect of failure on the 
participants’ career paths, what happened to the different resources (including 
technology, knowledge, and individuals), and their relationships after the 
failure/closure of a new venture. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. In 
case of the need for follow-up questions and clarification, we contacted interviewees 
by phone and email, which together with additional documents obtained by the 
interviewers and the interviewer’s notes were used as supporting data for analysis 
and triangulation (Creswell, 2007).  
All notes and reflections were written during the interviews, and some notes were 
added immediately after the interviews. This systematic approach and the recording 
of the interviews by two recorders were constructed to minimize the biases of data 
collection as much as possible. Establishing interview protocol, using a general 
structure of questions for conducting interviews, and using supplementary sources 
for understanding the purpose of the research (Creswell, 2009; Gioia et al., 2013), 
and triangulation were all developed as a means of ensuring the validity and 
reliability of the data collection (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Creswell, 2009).  
We conducted interviews until we reached a saturation point, which was identified 
for adequate and quality data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Saunders et al., 2018). My 
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collaborators in the US conducted the interviews there, while I conducted the 
interviews in Denmark. To assure a similar interview approach, the first interviews 
in Denmark were conducted together with my US colleagues. The data were 
collected between August 2014 and March 2016. In total, we conducted 86 
interviews, 37 in Denmark and 49 in the US, in four high-tech industries—software, 
hardware, biotech, and manufacturing. Because some individuals had more than one 
role at their startups, they were asked to respond to the questions from the viewpoint 
of each role they had in the new venture. 
Data analysis 
The interviews were coded based on the different roles where I reached a total of 
130 role-based interviews, 46 from Denmark and 84 from the US. All transcribed 
interviews and the supporting data were reviewed and coded. Codes are labels or 
tags involving related words or phrases from interviews, documents, notes, etc. 
(Hilal & Alabri, 2013). The analysis started with recognizing initial concepts and 
placing them into categories. In this first-order analysis, a large number of categories 
were identified, as in the first- order coding the aim is to code in simple descriptive 
phrases (Gioia et al., 2013). In the following step, similarities and relationships 
among these categories were identified, as it is usual in axial coding (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). This process facilitated assembling a large number of categories into 
manageable higher-order themes. In this second-order coding, themes emerged 
based on asking whether they explain the phenomenon explored in this study. 
Finally, similar themes were gathered into aggregate dimensions that built an 
emergent structure of the data (Gioia et al., 2013). This process was overseen by two 
other experienced researchers in order to ensure the conclusion of the analysis is 
reasonable and reliable vis-à-vis the interview protocol, interview transcripts, notes, 
documents, and coding orders. Based on the overall research question, the purpose 
of the research, and the emergent aggregate dimensions, analytical memos were 
written. The memos were developed within different themes, including joining a 
new venture, the outcomes of working for a new venture (employee perspective), 
perceptions of failure (founders’, employees’, and investors’ definition of failure), 
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learning from failure, the value of a network, the team after failure, and feelings 
after failure. Memoing is a technique that helps the researcher gain a clear view on 
the research topic by providing a systematic mechanism through which to formulate 
assumptions and subjective perspectives about the research area. This approach is a 
useful technique that helps in developing the study design (Birks, Chapman & 
Francis, 2008; Glaser, 1978). The analysis and review of the memos led to the 
development of Study 1 and Study 2. I also benefited from the results of the analysis 
in developing the theoretical framework for Study 3.  
Given that the data was collected in two different countries (the US and Denmark), 
cultural differences relating to the failure of new ventures might be an issue. 
According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Project (GEM) in 2019, there is 
some variation in specific year (2019). However, there are not noticed any 
systematic differences between the two countries in the analysis. This may be 
because the aim of the study, the design of the research, the interview protocol, and 
the interview questions were developed with individuals’ experiences and their 
understanding of a phenomenon (i.e., failure) in mind rather than being based on an 
institutional or national level. Furthermore, gender differences for outcomes of 
failure were not observed; this is because the aim was not to explore such 
differences, and the researchers paid little attention to gender in the interviews.  
Strengths and limitations of the qualitative study 
The inductive research used for this dissertation has several strengths. First, a 
sufficient amount of data was collected, providing an adequate foundation for 
reliable results. Second, different groups of relevant stakeholders engaged in 
entrepreneurial activity are addressed, which provided deep insight for 
understanding the failure and the outcomes of failure. Third, geographical variation 
was considered in order to ensure that the findings are not the result of the 
characteristics of a specific region. The analysis of the data was conducted by four 
main researchers, and the whole process was overseen and guided by an experienced 
qualitative researcher, thus ensuring the reliability of the study and the study results.  
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However, there are some limitations. As the aim of the research was to explore the 
outcomes of new ventures and the consequences of failure, reaching people was a 
challenge. Failure is not an interesting topic for people engaged in entrepreneurial 
activity, so it was challenging to get them to talk about their experience of failure. 
The sample is limited to venture capital-backed startups in high-tech industries. 
However, there is room for a comparison of venture capital and independent startups 
or high-tech and low-tech industries.  
1.3.2.2 Data source for the quantitative study  
Study 3 was developed using a quantitative approach. The source for this empirical 
study is the “Integreret Database for Arbejdsmarkedsforskning” often better known 
by its Danish acronym IDA. IDA is a longitudinal register data administered by 
Statistics Denmark that contains detailed information about all firms and individuals 
in Denmark from 1980 onwards (see Timmermans, 2010). For individuals, 
information such as age, work experience, education, salary, wealth, residence, and 
cohabitation can be extracted. On the firm level, IDA provides information on 
ownership, start-up year, industry, sales, and return on the firm’s investment. 
Information on firms and individuals can be merged together so that employee–
employer relationships can be traced. Furthermore, this linked register can be 
merged with other databases, including the Danish entrepreneurship database. The 
Danish entrepreneurship database provides detailed information, including the main 
founder, of newly established firms in Denmark. The merger of these databases 
formed the basis for the empirical analysis in Study 3, which allowed an overview of 
all new ventures, founders, and early employees (our definition of new venture 
teams). Due to break in the data and limited access, we relied on data for the period 
2001to 2006.  
Strengths and limitations of IDA  
IDA is a comprehensive database that provides all information on employees, firms, 
and entrepreneurs over a long time period. For the analysis of Study 3, it provided 
all the information needed to follow people’s career trajectories and their 
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relationships with their co-workers (i.e., if they co-moved, where they moved, or 
whether they moved and returned to entrepreneurship or not). The advantage of 
linking IDA to the entrepreneurship database is that this provides all the information 
needed to identify new ventures, the year they were established, the year of 
termination, turnover, and sales. Furthermore, the register data include a wide range 
of industries and organizations, which makes it possible to exploit co-mobility in the 
knowledge-intensive industry focused on in Study 3.  
There are a number of limitations with IDA in relation to developing Study 3. 
Because of the breaks in several variables in the data, the analysis in Study 3 is 
limited to the period 2001–2006. Nevertheless, this period provides a sufficient 
sample for Study 3. There is no reason to assume we cannot draw generalizable 
conclusions based on this time period. Another drawback of the register data is that 
we do not know the reason why a new venture dissolves, although we can exclude 
exits as a result of mergers and acquisitions or as a result of going public, which are 
relatively rare events. However, to give some indication of new venture failure, the 
study includes the turnover of the year prior to the exit to give an indication of 
performance prior to the dissolution. 
Another drawback is in creating the NVT variable. To identify the NVT, Study 3 
uses a general definition of NVT, where the early employees and founders who 
joined a new venture in the first year of establishment are identified as NVT 
members. NVT members who have no formalized role in the new venture are not 
included. Otherwise, we also lack data on the contributions the team members make 
to the team and the interactions within the new venture. Nevertheless, I consider the 
type of data and the methodological approach in this paper valuable in terms of the 
qualitative research design in the other papers of this dissertation. 
1.4 Conclusions 
Despite the pivotal role of entrepreneurial activities in economic growth and job 
creation (e.g., Lee et al., 2011), a large number of new ventures close down or fail 
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after a short period of time (e.g., Wiklund et al., 2010). The act of entrepreneurship 
involves many stakeholders besides the entrepreneurs, which means that failure 
affects a larger group of individuals. However, the existing research has mainly 
focused on the impact on the entrepreneur. Yet, other groups of actors (i.e., 
employees, investors, and NVTs) potentially play critical roles in recognizing new 
opportunities. This dissertation aims to shed more light on the outcomes of new 
ventures and new venture failures from the perspectives of the different actors 
involved in entrepreneurship activities. In doing so, three main studies have been 
undertaken. In the following, I describe the studies and their main findings.  
Study 1 investigates the concept of new venture failure from the perspective of 
different stakeholder groups in entrepreneurial firms. I argue that it is important to 
understand how the individuals involved perceive failure, as they are the ones who 
experience the outcomes. I also argue that founders are not the only ones who 
experience the ups and downs of entrepreneurial activity. Investors, who take great 
financial risks, and employees, who have a critical role in product development, are 
also very important actors in startups. I found that people describe failure based on 
what they expect to get out of a new venture and what they (do not) gain. Because 
actors have different expectations from joining a startup, perceptions vary among 
founders, investors, and employees. Furthermore, actors do not describe failure the 
same way as scholars do; instead, it is described as a multidimensional concept 
where there is not a true failure unless there is team failure, which is coded as an 
element of the adverse consequences leading to eventual financial issues. In 
addition, the results of this study show there is a great deal of tension among the 
different stakeholders (i.e., investors and founders) in terms of their misaligned 
expectations about joining a startup and about the outcomes, which might be the 
initial cause of true failure, which investors have described as team failure.  
Study 2 investigates the outcomes of new ventures with a specific focus on 
employees. We addressed employees because, despite their pivotal role in product 
development and startup growth, employees’ experiences and outcomes of working 
in startups have not been examined previously. First, we found that employees 
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recognize the high risk and costs of working in a startup; however, their evaluation 
of risk, costs, and rewards are biased. Second, they expect that risk can be mitigated 
by other achievements in the startup, including autonomy, learning opportunities, 
and professional advancement. Third, these biased expectations may result from the 
structural characteristics of new ventures. In particular, as investors and founders 
need skilled employees they sustain these myths and unrealistic expectations and 
conceal real information from employees. On the other side, employees are 
continually faced with conflicting situations because they are restricted by the 
startups’ norms.  
Study 3 addresses the perspectives of NVTs in entrepreneurial firms. The aim is to 
investigate team co-mobility after the dissolution of a new venture. There is a 
growing trend to form team-based startups, as these can achieve better performance 
than startups run by one individual (Klotz et al., 2014). This study explores team co-
mobility after new venture dissolution because it is valuable to understand the extent 
to which team-based human capital (i.e., shared experiences, skills, and knowledge) 
can be pursued which in turn is valuable for effective collaboration and 
communication in establishing a new startup or working in other organizational 
settings. Our results show that co-mobility among people with prior joint work 
experience is frequent and may indicate that communication is easier if there is prior 
shared work experience. Furthermore, technical people co-move more than those in 
other occupations. This may indicate the complexity and nature of the technical and 
engineering fields and that they require close collaboration among people. As prior 
team members may have a better understanding of each other, they may prefer a 
joint move. Additionally, our findings show that this team mobility is more frequent 
in knowledge-intensive startups. Other results show that team members who move 
together are more inclined to re-enter entrepreneurship and start a new venture 
together. Re-entry to entrepreneurship with former teammates can be beneficial, 
particularly when a business fails. Given that failure may adversely affect continuing 
entrepreneurship (Ucbasaran et al., 2013), being on a team might compensate for the 
fear of failure and the humiliation after a failure (Cope, 2011; Shepherd, 2003). This 
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may be because the shared skills, knowledge, and experiences of team members who 
move together is associated with more learning from failure and more resources 
(i.e., social, human and financial resources) required to return to entrepreneurship 
(Kor & Mahoney, 2000). Finally, our results confirm that co-movement is more 
frequent among people with homogenous human capital (i.e., in terms of age, 
experience, occupation, and gender), which is in line with previous studies that 
argue team composition takes place among people with similar characteristics 
(Aldrich, 1999; Louch, 2000; Ruef et al., 2003). These similarities may be pivotal to 
improve the performance of not only individuals but also of newly established firms 
(Boselie et al., 2001).  
The background paper “Open for entrepreneurship: How open innovation can foster 
new venture creation”, takes a different approach to the topic. Drawing on the 
entrepreneurship failure literature, this study addresses the importance of open 
ecosystems for actors engaged in entrepreneurial activities with respect to the high 
risk of failure. In particular, in this study we explore how the open approach affects 
a new venture’s short-term survival. Given that a high proportion of new ventures 
fail, entrepreneurship actors should make potential plans to increase the probability 
of survival. The findings of this study shed more light on understanding the main 
challenges of entrepreneurs and how they can benefit from an open ecosystem to 
decrease the likelihood of failure. An inductive multiple case study approach was 
employed to investigate the mechanisms by which those engaged in 
entrepreneurship can benefit in order to survive. We found that ecosystem 
collaboration, user involvement, and an open environment are the open mechanisms 
that impact new venture survival. Moreover, we found that entrepreneurs’ ways of 
thinking have a moderating role in these three mechanisms. An open mindset may 
boost the impact of ecosystem collaboration, user involvement, and an open 
environment on new venture survival. The findings of this study regarding how 
individuals’ mindsets can play a critical role in entrepreneurship were the basis for 
the development of Study 1.  
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1.5 Contributions 
The findings of this dissertation provide a range of implications for both theory and 
practice with regard to future implications of working at a failed startup not only 
from the perspective of the entrepreneur but also from that of employees and 
investors. In the following, I highlight numerous implications for theory and 
practice.  
1.5.1 Implications for entrepreneurship theory 
This dissertation contributes to entrepreneurship theory in different ways. First, it 
investigates the outcomes of new venture failure and how individuals are affected by 
such failure. Given the increasing amount of research on entrepreneurial failure, it is 
vital to understand that after the failure of a new venture the main resources (i.e., 
human capital) are not liquidated; rather, they are valuable assets that can be used in 
other organizational settings or in recognizing new opportunities. 
Second, I show that entrepreneurs are not the only critical actors in entrepreneurship 
and that employees are critical actors in entrepreneurial activities who are also 
affected by the ups and downs of startups. As critical actors in entrepreneurial 
activities, employees may have different motivations, expectations, and perspectives 
of startup activities than the founders (Roach & Sauermann, 2015). Furthermore, 
new ventures are becoming an attractive workplace for employees to start off their 
careers. However, there is little research on the dynamics and experiences of these 
actors in entrepreneurship. This thesis adds to the entrepreneurship literature by 
exploring employees’ experiences of new ventures. This implies to the 
entrepreneurship research for a need to understand the realities of working for a new 
venture and that these may lead to unexpected outcomes for employees. This may 
require a more in-depth qualitative study and a larger sample.  
Third, I explore the team as another important actor in new ventures. This adds to 
entrepreneurship research by showing how NVTs post-exit can be crucial for 
entrepreneurship activities, meaning that the frequency of co-mobility among NVTs 
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after the dissolution of a startup and re-entry into entrepreneurship are important 
factors because having prior experience working together may enhance the 
performance, the likelihood of growth, and the success of the new business (Klotz et 
al., 2014). 
Fourth, I address an important gap in the entrepreneurship literature by approaching 
the concept of failure from the perspective of individuals involved in entrepreneurial 
activities. It is important to understand the concept of failure from the main actors’ 
point of view for several reasons. First, the main actors’ point of view can provide 
insights regarding the concept of failure that may not have been previously noticed 
by scholars. As the actors have experienced failure, they can see it from a practical 
perspective that may have been ignored by academics. Second, understanding 
different actors’ perceptions of entrepreneurial failure helps in comprehending 
hidden relationships (i.e., tensions) among different players in startups. This can 
help researchers understand the social constructions of entrepreneurial activities in 
order to see the hidden elements of failure. Finally, understanding the concept of 
failure from the main players’ perspectives can decrease the likelihood of failure, as 
there may be educational benefits.  
1.5.2 Implications for entrepreneurship practice 
The findings of this dissertation prompt some suggestions for entrepreneurial 
practitioners. The results show the outcomes of working for new ventures and the 
effects of failure are based on the expectation of benefitting from entrepreneurial 
activities for both personal and professional purposes. As the findings of Study 1 
and Study 2 reveal, there is significant misalignment among different groups of 
actors, which might be why they are adversely affected by failure. These issues can 
be resolved through clear conversations, negotiations, and close relationships among 
different stakeholders, particularly between investors and founders. Such discussion 
can be beneficial for all parties as it might clarify each group’s expectations, what 
the actual reality is, and how actors might be affected by unsystematic assumptions 
of new ventures.  
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Among the entrepreneurial actors, employees typically join startups for personal 
purposes (based on the results of Study 1). This might be the basis of the negative 
consequences of working for startups, i.e. actual learning in new ventures and (un) 
employment issues after failure (results of Study 2). Employees can join startups 
with sufficient information about development path in new ventures, actual risks, 
outcomes, learning of working for startup. These can be in some extent achieved 
through searching in the extensive networks, negotiating, and discussing with 
founders and investors. The emphasis on negotiation with both founders and 
investors can be beneficial for employees because of the misalignment mentioned 
above and because of the potential biased evaluation of new venture uncertainties 
and risks.  
Another implication for practitioners is the importance of entrepreneurial teams after 
new venture failures or exits. From the perspective of investors, team failure is the 
true failure. Study 1 shows how the close collaboration among team members could 
be critical in benefiting from the outcomes of working in new ventures and how 
tensions might lead to negative consequences of failure. In addition, the findings of 
Study 3 confirms that due to close collaboration, previous team members are more 
willing to keep their ties and that team members who move together are the ones 
that potentially continue entrepreneurship activities after new venture failure. These 
results can be a lesson for entrepreneurial practitioners in order to benefit from the 
outcomes of working for new ventures or from new venture failure by maintaining 
strong social ties and thus improving performance and new venture growth (Boselie 
et al., 2001).  
1.5.3 Implications for policymakers 
Policymakers have attempted to make entrepreneurship attractive as a career choice 
by lowering tax rates for creating new venture (Lundström & Stevenson, 2006; 
Wennberg, 2009). However, there is a need for specific research on failed ventures 
and the different stakeholders after new venture failure. The findings of this 
dissertation suggest some critical points for policymakers. First, startup employees 
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are one of the most important assets in entrepreneurship that can help create 
successful ventures. However, there is no systematic mechanism for startup 
employees affected by failure. For example, employees can be supported through 
sufficient counselling services (financial and psychological) in order to mitigate the 
potential stigma of failure and unemployment and to encourage making use of 
experience in further entrepreneurship activities (i.e., recognizing new opportunities 
for creating new ventures).  
Despite the contribution of entrepreneurial activities to economic and employment 
growth (e.g., Neumark et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2011), Study 1 shows there is high 
tension and misalignment among different stakeholders in new ventures, often due 
to financial problems. These issues may be mitigated by the support of policymakers 
through, for example, public financing, consulting tools, and facilitating legal 
obstacles for new ventures.  
According to the results of Study 3, the important role of co-movers with prior 
experience and the willingness of co-movers to re-start entrepreneurial ventures are 
the signals for policymakers to pay specific attention to promoting team 
entrepreneurship by providing subsidies for starting or re-starting team-based 
ventures. Other measures to promote serial team-based entrepreneurship include 
special low tax rates and other kinds of financial support. Providing support for 
failed founders and entrepreneurial teams can help decrease the fear of failure that 
prevents many founders from starting new entrepreneurial firms. 
As I found in this dissertation, founders are biased in identifying the critical 
situations that result in major financial costs that can adversely affect their 
motivation and psychological costs (Ucbasaran et al., 2013). This suggests that 
public policy should focus on revealing the major financial issues of new ventures to 
encourage closure or reconstruction before causing critical financial issues for 
different groups of stakeholders. 
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Abstract 
This exploratory study investigates new venture failure from the viewpoints of 
founders, investors, and employees. Findings assert that the perception of failure 
among these individuals is built upon what they expect to gain from new ventures. 
Individuals have multifaceted approaches in understanding failure/success; however, 
they do not generally believe in “true failure”, as long as learning is a result of the 
experience. The only kind of failure mentioned by investors that resonate with 
founders and employees refers to team failure. Findings also point to misalignment 
of incentives and critical tensions among these groups, in particular founders and 
investors.    
   
                                                          
1
 Earlier versions of this paper were presented in DRUID academy conference, 2016 
and accepted in DRUID society conference, 2017.  
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2.1 Introduction 
Despite the value of entrepreneurship in economic development, job creation, and 
innovation (Carree & Thurik, 2010), the fact that entrepreneurship involves lots of 
vulnerability and uncertainty is indubitable (Alvarez & Barney, 2005; Diebold et al., 
2008). Failure is the outcome of such uncertainty that gets the most attention 
in entrepreneurship research (Jenkins & McKelvie, 2016; Jenkins & McKelvie, 
2017; Lin, Yamakawa & Li, 2019; Wiklund et al., 2010). The term “failure” has 
been described in different ways among entrepreneurship scholars, from closure 
(Balcaen et al., 2012; Singh et al., 2007) to poor performance (Coelho & McClure, 
2005) and to bankruptcy (Shepherd & Haynie, 2011; Zacharakis et al., 1999). 
Because individuals carry the consequences of failure in their careers, they might 
approach it differently than researchers. For instance, as there might be learning 
outcomes (Dahlin et al., 2018; Madsen & Desai, 2010; Nielsen & Sarasvathy, 2016) 
or successes in the future career or some other achievements, individuals might not 
count the closing of a new venture as a failure, whereas from the researchers’ point 
of view the same event is indeed so. On the other hand, social, physiological and 
financial costs (Ucbasaran et al., 2013) are the deleterious consequences for 
individuals of closing-down a new venture, which makes them having another view 
of failure. These make it necessary to study new venture failure from the 
individuals’ viewpoint.  
Founders are not the only ones who suffer from the outcomes of failure; so do 
investors - as they are the ones who make investment decisions under uncertainties 
(Aldrich, 1999) - and employees, especially those who have the main roles in 
product development and managerial decisions. Given that those individuals 
experience the upsides and downsides of new venture failure, it is pivotal to 
understand its perceived features from the context of founders, investors, and 
employees. Such is the aim of this article. In particular, this study investigates how 
different actors in an entrepreneurial process understand the concept of new venture 
Chapter 2. Entrepreneurial failure: Distinct perceptions among founders, employees, and investors 
59 
failure and its features with regard to their own failures and experiences enduring its 
consequences. 
This article presents findings from an inductive study of these groups perspectives 
on failure and identifies the underlying dimensions of the concept in an 
entrepreneurship context. The findings show that no group considers a low-
performing, closed new venture as a failure, as long as there were benefits from the 
learning that comes with it. Even though all three groups understand failure in 
multidimensional ways, they do not consider closing a business venture as true 
failure. The way each group understands failure is connected to what they have 
expected and what they could gain out of a new venture. The only circumstance 
accepted as true failure by investors is team failure, as it leads to many other 
negative consequences, such as fiasco in launching a product to the market, and 
ultimately financial collapse. An underexplored question refers to what each group 
assumes others will perceive as failure. Data show there is misunderstanding across 
these groups about their incentives for joining a new venture, and this follows a 
certain lack of interest in the other groups’ objectives as well. The result is 
misalignment and tensions among them, particularly between founders and 
investors, which can be the reason why investors perceive true failure as inability to 
work in a team.  
Understanding new venture failure through the eyes of entrepreneurs yields various 
implications in entrepreneurship studies. First, it gives a clear picture of the potential 
elements of new venture failure that might have been neglected in academia. 
Second, understanding how different groups of practitioners perceive failure could 
facilitate relationships between different groups of actors, as well as form and 
reform the social structures that were built for entrepreneurship activities (Ucbasaran 
et al., 2013). Third, understanding the mindset of practitioners on failure would be 
pivotal in promoting learning for minimizing errors and maximizing learning 
benefits of failure experience (Rerup, 2005).  
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2.2 New venture failure and its features  
Most of entrepreneurship research is focused on success rather than failure. There 
are several reasons for this preference. First, there is a lack of data about failed new 
ventures. Second, gathering information from failed ventures is challenging, as 
people might not be willing to talk about their failure experiences and, even when 
they decide to discuss it, they may not articulate it objectively or even truthfully. 
However, people who are involved in the entrepreneurial process can have detailed 
insight of failure, as they are the ones who experienced all the ups and downs of the 
new venture and suffered the consequences of its termination (Zacharakis et al., 
1999).  
In this research stream, however, most studies have focused on the causes of 
survival and success in the perspective of individuals. Focusing on determinants of 
survival, Clute and Garman (1980) found that founders consider external policies as 
the main cause influencing their survival because they affect the supply of resources 
to be invested in the firm. However, some studies show the managerial skills of 
entrepreneurs to be the major reason for new venture survival, which illustrates 
internal causes of failure (Flamholtz, 1986; Hambrick & Crozier, 1985). Moreover, 
Rogoff et al. (2004) look at the factors that contribute to or impede success through 
comparison of the viewpoint of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship experts. Their 
results show that entrepreneurs predominantly mention environmental factors, such 
as policies and competitors as the major impeding factors for their success. On the 
other hand, experts point to poor management and marketing as impediments to 
success.  
On the topic of causes for failure, some studies investigated failure by only focusing 
on entrepreneurs’ perspectives. For instance, a study by Bruno et al. (1986) shows 
that entrepreneurs list low quality products, lack of revenues and poor management 
as the main factors for new venture failure. Other research has examined failure 
from both VCs’ and entrepreneurs’ viewpoints. Ruhnka et al. (1992) have focused 
on the venture capital firms that have neither failed nor provide the expected return, 
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naming them as “living dead” ventures. They found poor management and difficult 
markets can be the main factors of new venture failure. In another study, Zacharakis 
et al. (1999) show that entrepreneurs acknowledge poor management strategy and 
market conditions as the key causes to their venture failure. On the other hand, VCs 
attribute new venture failure to external factors, namely poor market conditions. 
Based on the literature, most noticeably entrepreneurs and VCs view causes of 
failure differently, which can have an effect on misapplication of scarce 
entrepreneurial resources (Zacharakis et al., 1999).  
Founders are the creators, owners, and top decision-makers of new ventures (Roach 
& Sauermann, 2015), with specific knowledge and expertise that motivates them to 
exploit their ideas through entrepreneurship. In order to implement new ideas, new 
high-tech ventures, are often dependent on venture capitalists, who are initially 
motivated to help founders develop their innovations and boost the long-term value 
(Park & Tzabbar, 2016). There is also a third overlooked group in entrepreneurship 
literature, which is that of employees. Employees play an important role in 
entrepreneurial process, as evidence shows new ventures attract highly skilled 
individuals (Roach & Sauermann, 2015). However, their responsibilities and 
commitment differ inherently from those of both founders and investors with respect 
to work activities, ownership, and risk taking (Roach & Sauermann, 2015). Since 
these groups have distinct motivations for joining a new venture, and different 
expectations of it, it is interesting to explore how they understand the concept of 
failure in light of their motivations for joining the new venture, and how they 
experience failure and its consequences.  
2.3 Methods 
Given the aim of this study is to understand the individuals’ experience and 
realization of a specific phenomenon, i.e. failure; it relies upon interview data, and 
grounded theory as an inductive approach to data analysis and theory-building 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Qualitative data not only provides a rich illustration for 
micro-level research that facilitates the induction analysis of patterns for further 
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testing with large data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009), but it also has 
been suggested for entrepreneurship studies (Endres & Woods, 2007; Venkataraman 
et al., 2013).  
This study was part of a broader project, which mostly focused on the ups and 
downs of the entrepreneurial process from the viewpoints of different actors, 
including the question of entrepreneurial failure
2
. The project focused on 
entrepreneurs in Denmark, where entrepreneurship activities are growing, which 
offers an interesting comparison with entrepreneurs from the US, where 
entrepreneurship is mature.  
To shed light on different perceptions on the concept of new venture failure, three 
main stakeholders who hold an important role in new venture longevity were 
selected. The first concerns founders, whose mindset about success and failure 
affects entrepreneurship processes. The second refers to employees, who have a 
major role in producing, delivering, and managing products or services. The third 
group regards investors who have the important role of providing resources to 
enable the entrepreneurial process. Different positions of individuals in new 
ventures are selected and compared in order to highlight the main contrasts and 
similarities that provide new insight into the concept of new venture failure. 
2.3.1 Sampling 
Finding the right people for interview was a challenge, as identifying and getting in 
touch with people who have experienced failure was not easy, and convincing such 
individuals to talk about their failure experience was another difficult issue in the 
process. The sample consists of founders, investors, and employees of existing and 
failed startups; people from existing startups had prior experience of closing down a 
venture. We approached around 200 individuals for interview and ultimately, 86 
individuals agreed to participate.  
                                                          
2
 For this reason the procedures for data collection and analysis are described in the first-person plural, 
although this is a single-authored article. 
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Interviewees in Denmark were identified through a venture capital firm dataset that 
contained the information of the firms that had been liquidated. Then we searched 
for the people belonging to that company through the contact information in the 
dataset and LinkedIn. The snowballing approach did not work well in Denmark, as 
we did not get replies from the people who were recommended by their friends or 
prior colleagues. In total, 37 interviews were conducted in Denmark. 
For interviewees in the US, we used the snowballing technique. We initially 
approached venture capitalists. Then we asked them to identify firms in which they 
had invested and that had either succeeded or failed–we especially asked them about 
investments that they thought were comparable to their successes when they 
invested in them but that then proved not to work out. We then interviewed those 
founders and we asked them for contacts of former employees. Ultimately, we ended 
up with 49 interviews in the US.  
We coded the interviewees according to their roles: founder, employee, or investor. 
For people who had played more than one role, we attributed more than one node, 
based on their different roles. Thus, the sample amounted to 130 people, including 
46 from Denmark and 84 from the US. Table 1 shows the summary of the sampling 
of the data. In Table 2, the detailed distribution of interviews based on the roles 
discussed by individuals is shown. 
The sample was limited to venture capital firms in high-tech industries, namely 
biotech, software, hardware, and manufacturing development firms. We chose 
venture capital firms in high-tech industries for several reasons. First, these new 
ventures are provided with financing for developing a technology that gives them 
valuable resources that can help with a variety of business decisions. Second, the 
strong financial backing makes founders and other stakeholders consider the 
business as their main career commitment. Furthermore, these types of startups 
should be of the highest quality, where the highest levels of learning and 
sophistication would occur, so it could be expected that they have a clear 
understanding and characterization of failure. In essence, these constitute critical 
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cases within the population of startups. Thus, for the purpose of this study, the 
experience of failure is supposed to be more intense in these types of startups than 
by routine startups.  
“Insert Table 1 here” 
“Insert Table 2 here” 
2.3.2 Data collection  
The interview is the typical method for data collection in qualitative research (Elliot, 
2005; Creswell, 2007). Interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions, 
where the participant could tell the story of previous experiences based upon the 
context of failure. Other data were collected as background information that played a 
supportive role in the analysis and triangulation (Creswell, 2007; Kanter, 1977; Yin, 
2009). The background data consisted of complementary documents mentioned by 
the interviewees, in-depth notes during and after the interview, e-mail 
communication and further telephone communication with participants. Data were 
collected in the period between August 2014 and March 2016. Interviews lasted 90 
minutes on average. The interview protocol was slightly customized for each type of 
actor. The interviews involved questions about interviewees’ current job and 
position, prior job experiences, failure experience, prior colleagues, the feeling of 
the failure, definition of failure, ups and downs of failure, consequences after failure 
and success—if they have had any. Interviewees were asked to narrate the sequence 
of their experiences, going deeper especially on themes of (partial or total) success 
and (partial or total) failure as these elements emerged in their stories.  
2.3.3 Data analysis 
While we collected the data, we inductively analyzed it as well. This approach 
provided us with a meticulous collection and analysis of qualitative data, and it 
supported in shaping the sampling and content focus of later data collection. 
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Moreover, it provided us the basis for designating themes and aggregate dimensions 
(Gioia et al., 2013) through investigation and comparison of key events.  
Interviews were transcribed, and the software package NVivo11 was used to store, 
categorize, code, and analyze the data, including notes and other background 
documents. The approach to coding consisted of identifying relevant systematic 
concepts as nodes in NVivo. Following the grounded-theory baseline, nodes were 
established during the coding process, in which nodes were created, removed, and 
merged as needed. The texts with similar indications were grouped under the same 
node. Some pieces of text were coded under multiple nodes. After cleaning through 
the nodes by removing and merging, we extracted second-order themes related to 
entrepreneurial failure. To do so, we contrasted the first-order categories with 
existing literature to identify gaps and define second-order codes and themes. Each 
of these themes was then expanded in lengthy memos that were then re-coded, 
analyzed, and modified in the iterative process of nodes–themes–theory–memos. 
The first stage of analysis involved looking into each group of actors’ perception of 
new venture failure. Then, the analysis moved to see how perceptions of failure are 
similar or different across the groups. This approach provided a detailed 
understanding of different features of failure among different groups, and how such 
differences and similarities may arise.  
After detailed study of the excerpt texts of the failure nodes, we found that the 
definition of success is systematically connected to the definition of failure in each 
group. Interviewees define success as obtaining what they had been expecting from 
the startup (from here on this will be termed success definition). Accordingly, 
interviewees define and experience failure when their expectations have not been 
fulfilled by the startup. So, the analysis was separated into success and failure 
definitions. Then each group’s definition was categorized into personal and 
professional factors, as they talk both about their personal goals and the goals of the 
startup.  
The aftermath of new venture failure 
66 
 
Analysis was also conducted within cases in which people have played different 
roles. For example, some people have had the experience as both a founder and 
employee, or as a founder and investor. We coded the perceptions of these people as 
well to see if there is any variation in how people with only one position perceive 
failure, in comparison with people who had more than one position (e.g. founder 
alone vs. founder and investor or founder and employee). We did not find systematic 
differences in these people’s perception of failure.  
Although the entire set of participants are from high-tech industries, the specific 
branch was also taken into account during the process of analysis to see if there were 
significant differences of failure and success definition across software, hardware, 
and biotech industries. No such variation was found.  
2.4 Findings 
As mentioned above, the analyses of employees, founders, and investors show that 
two main spheres (i.e. personal and professional) frame the actors’ definitions of 
success and failure. Furthermore, elements that individuals point to as indicators of 
success or failure are multidimensional. These elements are prioritized based on the 
degree of importance and number of individuals mentioning them, and (see Table 3). 
Description of each group’s definition is as follows.  
Founders’ Perspective 
Whether or not a founder considers his company a personal or professional success 
appears to be independent of the fate of the enterprise. Founders hesitate to interpret 
their ventures as total failures, since the entrepreneurial experience allowed them to 
develop a marketable skillset and to cultivate learning with long-term career effects. 
Having the time to dedicate to their passion projects is a success in and of itself for 
many entrepreneurs. “I feel like I have learned so much and that we have come so 
far to the point where we are up. That is more success than more entrepreneurs will 
ever see. But as far as I am concerned, if it is successful, no matter what I do in the 
future, I have learned so much here that I know that I am going to go forward as a 
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much stronger person. A stronger entrepreneur”. Such a positive attitude toward 
failure could be a prerequisite for coping effectively with hardship. It can also 
enhance the willingness to learn that helps to gain insights and change mindsets, in 
order to not repeat mistakes (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005; Politis & Gabrielsson, 
2009).  
For founders, a personal failure means giving up, being rejected, leaving a negative 
impact, or letting others down. Ultimately, failure is making choices that result in a 
feeling of regret. Alternatively, professional failure means having a bad product, 
ending the company, running out of money, or losing it. Founders have a unique 
concept of failure because of their understanding of uncertainty. The presence of 
risks in their daily choices shapes their view of failure into something that has more 
to do with their own actions, and less to do with outside influences that they cannot 
control. 
How founders understand success 
Personal objectives have a small role in founders’ expectation of how they will 
benefit from starting a new venture. Skillset improvement and autonomy are two 
aspects founders consider personal success, although they do not prioritize these. 
Entrepreneurial experience allows founders to develop different skills other than 
those in which they are specialized. One example is an entrepreneur with a technical 
background, who gains from developing marketing skills. Personal development is 
valuable for founders aimed toward building relationships through the process of 
establishing the company. Several founders derive value from the personal 
development they underwent during the journey of building a company and from the 
relationships that they gained through the process. “I took it from nothing and built 
an actual company, including investment, including the tremendous network 
established, the whole knowledge base gained. The relationships established. I could 
not imagine a better step. I think it is a tremendous personal success”.  
Autonomy is another aspect that founders state they value in startups. They value 
having flexibility and being able to spend their time doing what they like. “I think 
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money has not been a big driving force in many of the entrepreneurs I have met. As 
you know, why not just get a job at a big company and get paid 50 thousand a 
month, 60 thousand a month? Why do you live on smaller salary and stress and 
work all the time, stuff like that? It is the freedom to do what I want”. It is important 
for founders to work on things about which they really care, and starting a new 
venture could give them such freedom. “For me, the most important thing is 
somehow getting enough time to build that thing that you really care about building 
on your own. With me it was not about getting a huge salary or fantastic acquisition 
bonus, it was mostly about actually making it reasonable for me to spend a couple of 
years working on something that I really care about”. This is consistent with the 
study by Roach and Sauermann (2015) where autonomy was shown to be one of the 
main factors motivating founders to join new ventures.  
Most success factors for founders center on what they expect to get from their 
venture (professional factors), rather than personal preferences. These elements 
include quality of product or technology, impact to the world, and financial 
measures.  
The quality of the product or technology was a high priority for founders, with close 
to half of them incorporating it into their success definition. “[My company] in its 
own way was very successful. Financially it was certainly not. But it had a well-
regarded product and helped a lot of people, well-regarded technology before its 
time. So, across the board, very positive for me”.  
Following the importance of the quality of the technology/product, some founders 
evaluate the success of their companies based on the impact their venture has on the 
world. They might measure this by the reach of the company (number of customers), 
or by the nature of the work (e.g. creating lifesaving drugs), or technology that 
makes life easier. “I really evaluate [success] based on how many patients’ lives we 
are impacting, because if I wanted to make a quick flip, I would go make a photo-
sharing app or something. That is where you make a lot of money real fast. If you 
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want to actually impact the world, you have got to do something hard, and hard 
things are not necessarily as profitable, and they take a hell of a lot longer”. 
Similar to what they code consider in their definition of personal success, founders 
wish to work with what they really care about, to make an innovative 
technology/product that has an effective positive impact in the world.  
Even though financial attributes are considered less important to founders than 
product quality or the reach of the company, many founders mentioned it as one of 
the elements of success. The concern for a positive financial outcome is motivated 
by three main factors: a sense of responsibility to investors, the need to sustain the 
company, and desire for personal wealth.  
Although founders do desire increased personal wealth, they are willing to overlook 
a lack of monetary gains in favor of personal growth or impact in their 
understanding of success. More commonly mentioned than personal finances was 
concern for positive finances in order to sustain the company. The founders’ main 
focus is the status, sustainability, and growth of the company, and a positive 
monetary turnout is important for that. Founders expressed more concern for the 
company's finances than that of their own, and a dramatic loss in the company's 
financial position is seen by founders as a professional failure.  
Along the same lines, founders have a harder time reconciling with eventual losses 
of investors’ money than that of their own. “It is simply letting the folks around you 
down. Not losing your own money, but losing somebody else’s money”. A reason for 
this could be that founders feel responsible for the losses of others, which causes 
feelings of fault and guilt. 
What failure means to founders 
In line with a traditional view, where failure is defined as the discontinued 
ownership of the business by the entrepreneur (Singh et al., 2007; Watson & Everett, 
1996), giving up is one of the ways in which founders understand personal failure. 
There are many obstacles that they must overcome during the entrepreneurial 
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process; failure is interpreted as the result of not having brought one’s own best 
effort. “Entrepreneurs are wired for struggle. They are wired for hard work. They 
are wired for going that extra distance, and it is not a failure to fail, if you can say it 
like that. But it is a failure if you do not give it all you have, all you have got”.  
Founders take their personal effort in the business seriously. Under the many 
circumstances that founders cannot control - e.g. competition, new government 
regulations etc. - the one thing they can control is their own effort in the business. 
Founders are “wired for going that extra distance”. This mindset translates into the 
idea that the founder's job is actively to try all the options available, even if it means 
sticking to it until bankruptcy. Choosing to let go before all the options are 
exhausted goes against this mindset. “If you fail to actually spend your time on the 
reasons why you really want to do it in the first place, then that is worst kind of 
failure that you can have. Basically, you are doing it for all the wrong reasons at 
that point. To me, that is real failure”.  
Losing sight of the reasons one began in the first place, can also be considered a 
failure. In this respect, it follows that there are right reasons for building a business, 
and there are wrong reasons. Along the entrepreneurial process, the goals or reasons 
behind the startup could evolve into something new. And if the business evolves into 
something the entrepreneur considers negative, he or she may identify it as failure.  
These two factors lead into another sign of founders’ personal dimension of failure 
perception: regret. Failure is where there is a wish for different circumstances or 
different decisions. “Failure would be if we did not give it our all. And that we had 
regrets. I want to make sure I do not have any regrets, no matter what it is that… no 
matter what the outcome is”. So, a key for founders in business is to do their job in a 
way they consider to be right, to work in a way that they will look back on their 
efforts without misgivings.  
Besides the personal dimension, professional elements (the factors relating with the 
business perspective) also have a major role in founders’ perception of failure. 
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Founders' view of failure is unlike the traditional definitions found in the literature. 
Traditionally, failure is described as a poor performance (Coelho & McClure, 2005) 
due to financial measures (i.e. bankruptcy, in Zacharakis et al., 1999) and in broader 
view as termination of the business (i.e., failure as closure, in Bruno et al., 1992). 
However, findings show that the founders' views on failure and success are greatly 
shaped by the role uncertainty plays in their work life. In founding a company, 
founders take significant risks. Thus, true failure is usually not associated with risks 
materializing into an undesired outcome. Rather, failure is seen in a narrower set of 
factors as mentioned previously: in their personal evaluation of efforts, in how their 
expectations from the new venture are unfulfilled, or by negatively impacting others' 
lives.  
To some founders, there is a desire to positively impact the lives of as many 
customers, employees, and investors as possible with their product or technology. 
This means that negatively impacting these stakeholders or experiencing rejection 
from them has the power to determine whether or not a company is a failure in the 
eyes of the founder. “I do not think it was a total failure either. We did not leave a 
debt to anybody. We did not leave a lot people unemployed. We did not leave a lot of 
customers behind who had paid and did not get what they had paid for. So I do not 
think it was a failure either”. 
This measure is related to what founders look for in their success definition for 
positive impact. To a founder, failure means having a negative effect on the people 
involved in the business.  
Several founders define failure as having a product that no one would buy. This 
relates to founders' understanding of success as having a quality product. 
“Entrepreneurial failure to me, that is, if I am not able to come out with the product 
which can be sold directly to the market. I cannot see that it is a success if we, after 
some years of development, only come out with the prototype which works in the 
laboratory but will never work in real life. So, it is crucial that we come out with this 
working system, ready for market”. 
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Similar to markers of success, poor financial return is one of the signs founders 
assign to failure, even though its importance is lower than that of high-quality 
product/technology. Founders define financial failure as running out of money 
without anything new to offer. Interestingly, founders' concern about financial return 
is commonly for the sake of investors’ satisfaction. “The failure is, of course, that 
we are not making as much money as we would have liked to. We are not growing as 
fast as especially our investors would have liked to see, so that is a failure, of 
course”. This concern for losing investors' money also stems from importance 
founders' place on using others' money well. A founder takes the position of a 
steward when he accepts support to build the business, and it is understandable to 
assume he/she feels responsible for taking care of that money. With it, comes a 
certain amount of trust from not only the investors, but also the employees; a 
founder may feel responsible for not letting them down; for employees, that could be 
by losing their jobs; and for an investor, that could be by losing his/her money.  
Employees’ Perspective 
Findings show that employees define success and failure differently from founders. 
Although employees did acknowledge the importance of financial success in the 
overall success of a company, many of them gave more weigh to learning and 
skillset development into their definition of success. Employees’ lack of emphasis 
on financial outcomes could be the result of more tempered expectations when it 
comes to the potential rewards of working at a startup. “If I were interested in the 
purely financial approach, I would not be working at a startup. I would be working 
somewhere else making a lot more money”.  
While employees commonly consider having a stable salary to be the baseline for 
success, many specified that success is not just about being employed, but it is about 
working for a company in which they can have impact, even though it is not their 
priority.  
How employees understand success 
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Unlike founders, whose focus is evenly divided between the personal and the 
professional, employees focus mostly on the personal sphere to define success and 
failure. They join startups with the assumption of gaining experience and developing 
skills through learning which may lead to future career opportunities. That is, hoping 
to improve their skills, as a stepping-stone toward their future career path. They 
think there would be more to learn when working in a new venture than in a large 
company. They might be assigned to a broader set of tasks, as there are generally 
fewer people hired in startups, and all employees must be flexible in the scope of 
their work. “That is the real value in joining a startup—the learning and experience 
that you gain. Why would I want to choose the first path when that learning had an 
opportunity to be false? I would want to join an opportunity where I could actually 
validate that learning that I had, so that the next time that I do it, I know exactly 
what I need to do”. 
In explaining their expectations from the business (i.e. professional dimension for 
defining success), employees showed concern for the goals of the company and for 
achieving product–market fit. Employees are less concerned with long-term exit 
opportunities than founders, and appear to place greater emphasis on short-term 
goals and reaching sales targets. This may be due to their roles within startups, 
considering that they have less responsibility to think of the long-term of the 
business than do founders and investors, and are tasked to accomplish the short-
term, daily goals.  
Furthermore, employees specified that they care about impact. “It feels good if you 
can personally make that happen. When you get those moments when you get 
affirmation on something that you basically you created from zero, there is no better 
feeling, it is success”. In a larger, more mature firm, employees would generally 
have less personal impact on the company than they would in a startup, where their 
roles and tasks entail more responsibility. Still, employees value learning and skill 
improvement more than they value both reaching short-term goals and long-term 
impact.  
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What failure means to employees 
Employees hesitate to interpret entrepreneurial experience as failures because they 
derive value from both learning and the effect it has on their career paths. So, to 
them, failure occurs when they do not gain any learning or experience out of 
working at a startup. This is what they expect to gain from a startup: developing 
different skillsets, and having more autonomy to do so. However, if reality turns out 
not to be as they anticipated, and they are unable to acquire new and valuable skills, 
then employees interpret the experience as a failure. “If I did not learn… If I was not 
challenged or I was not learning”. 
Another important element in employees’ failure definition is when they do not 
pursue what they believe is their path. “I also have this picture of the future where 
the costs of doing your own thing become low enough that there is no such thing as 
failure. I think the only way you could really fail is to not pursue what you see as the 
path”. In particular, some employees think there have been lots of wasted moments 
that could have been spent on the process of building their future career path. So, 
working at a startup that is not in line with their idea of their own future is 
considered a failure. When what they expected to gain from the startup toward their 
career path is not what they actually gained, then some employees interpret it as 
taking the wrong path.  
Similarly to founders, giving up on their goals is seen as failure by many employees. 
“When you start to think creatively about what does failure really mean? And failure 
only truly is failure if you give up”. This element is in line with their concern for the 
outcome of their efforts in a startup. Some employees believe in not giving up when 
developing an innovative technology, without insight about financial issues of which 
investors are aware. 
Failure in employees’ professional point of view is not being able to take the product 
to market. Reasons could be, for instance, having a plan to enter the market that does 
not work out or is not realistic. For employees, if they work closely with the product, 
they would have a direct interest in its success or failure. If they feel their own work 
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is linked to how the produce arrives to market, then a product failure is seen as a 
professional failure for the employee as well. This is similar to how founders 
perceive failure as taking a poor product to market. One employee saw the 
importance of understanding the customer in order to having the product do well in 
the market and stated that failure would be to misunderstand the customer. “You 
need to get it out fast and get your value measurements back. Do people want to use 
it. So that is what to me failure is. Failure is thinking you know what people want 
without really knowing it”. 
In line with the way they value short-term goals in their success description, 
employees described failure as not making daily goals and as living without any 
purpose. “Failure: if it does not make sense anymore to do what you are doing, even 
if funding does not run out, it is a failure if you do not change what you are doing. 
Failure is when you keep going in a direction that does not make sense”. 
Not making a profit is also one of the ways employees perceive failure, even though 
its priority is very low in their evaluation. What is highlighted is that monetary 
success has not been the employees’ concern, yet financial return has been 
accounted for in their failure realization. Employees want the company to do well, 
as it is the company that supports their jobs. If the business has a poor financial 
return, employees will naturally be concerned with layoffs. “Certainly, having a 
company that goes under or has a major layoff because money has run out would be 
a candidate for failure”. So, employees view a company financial failure as a 
professional failure, as it can also directly influence their own monetary returns. 
Investors’ Perspective 
Unlike employees and founders, investors’ definition of success and failure is much 
less diversified. What is clear is that, first, investors value success and failure mostly 
by professional standards. They also pay attention to the learning perspective of 
failure, as do founders and employees. However, investors’ emphasis lies on 
economic measures. From their point of view, true failure is team failure, meaning 
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that the inability to work together in new venture results in other consequences such 
as financial failure and market failure.  
How investors understand success 
The clearest paradigm to emerge from the data was the significance of financial 
returns in investors’ definitions of success. While there is not a universal threshold 
that successful companies must surpass, recouping investment appeared to be the 
bare minimum for investors to deem a company successful. Another element for 
investors in defining success is what they describe as when a good team of workers 
develop an idea into a well-working business. Investors prefer to choose the team of 
the startup, rather than giving the responsibility to founders. “Success for us is 
return... In our documents, information documents, the terms of capital to provide 
an abnormal alpha return to our limited partners, that is success for us. Success is 
really well-defined in our operating agreement”.  
To investors, working with who they consider are right people is one of the major 
elements in both personal and professional perception of success. “It is all about 
people, a great team can make something out of a mediocre idea but not the other 
way around. If a team struggles to explain an idea, gather a strong team, tell a story 
that is convincing to raise enough funds, and articulate their competitive advantage 
they are likely to struggle at every other important stage and they are unlikely to 
succeed. So, if a good team finds money, normally, they will figure it out somehow”. 
Similarly to founders and employees, the product and its market potential, is one of 
the factors investors’ consider when choosing to invest in a new venture. Investors 
typically would like to see the tangible outcome of the startup, i.e. the return of their 
investment. “Realizing the potential of the investment, and the company itself, is a 
big element to whether I consider it a successful venture. To have something 
tangible out, to see its effect in the market, like a bridge, that you can see people use 
that is a big factor of satisfaction… If failure is a spectrum, it was somewhere on 
that spectrum. But there has got to be a threshold somewhere—3 times or less is 
probably a failure”. 
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What failure means to investors 
Investors describe personal failure as making mistakes in selecting people they 
eventually consider as inadequate. One investor states how important a good team of 
people can be, and how the lack of a good team leads to failure. In this regard, 
investors fail when they misread people and ultimately choose to invest in a founder 
(or a group) that disappoints them. “The team issue is the most painful one to watch, 
that is the one that we really do not have justification for, it is kind of an investor 
failure—we picked the wrong team. But as good psychologists as we think we are, 
and we guess with people, we never know what is going to happen”.  
Putting this in perspective though, one investor said that there are so many reasons 
for a founder to start a company that it is difficult to find one who does it for reasons 
that are in line with the investor’s. “Every founder that we have ever invested in, 
even if they were a failed founder, has somehow landed in some pretty cool position 
post-failure. So that is also hard on the investor’s side, because you do not know the 
true reasons why people are doing what they are doing”. 
From the professional dimension of failure perception, a company that is still 
functioning is not technically a success just because it still runs. If it is losing 
money, then failure would be choosing to continue with it, rather than killing the 
project for the right reasons. These are the so-called “zombie companies”, and by 
making enough money to survive but not enough to produce a large return, they are 
strongly disliked by most by investors. This is one of the major differences between 
investors and founders/employees in their views of failure.  
Misunderstanding the competition or misreading the market is another element of 
investors’ failure definition; however, they do not consider it as true failure. They 
interpret it as commercial and market failure, as investors are aware of the uncertain 
nature of markets. “Something is a commercial failure if the product is right, but it is 
just a little too early to market and does not catch the wave at the exact moment that 
the market is ready to go”. Many investors mention that a failure made by 
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misreading the market is due to not reacting quickly and critically enough to market 
changes, good ideas or changed circumstances.  
Investors take part in startups for the promise of financial return, and they view a 
successful business as one that delivers it. They take large risks and understand that 
the risk comes with an even larger amount of uncertainty; therefore, many investors 
see some investments not as a failure, but as non-successes. In this sense, a failure in 
the true sense of the word is not measured by monetary valuations.  
 “Insert Table 3 here” 
Perspectives across groups 
The data also supplied insights into how each group views other’s perceptions of 
failure. This analysis could facilitate understanding of what motivates different 
actors to join startups, as well as help to clarify alignments and misalignments across 
groups.  
Results are classified in three main areas: (i) alignment, which shows similarities 
between the groups’ perceptions of failure/success; (ii) misalignment, which shows 
aspects about which actors are mistaken on other groups understanding of 
failure/success; and (iii) overlooked, which shows how groups are unaware of 
incentives of other groups, as well as definitions of failure. A summary of key 
elements is shown in Table 4. An immediate point of tension was clear in the way 
the different stakeholders (investors, founders, employees) conceptualized success 
and failure, their perception of what other groups defined as success and failure, and 
the consequences of these misalignments and misperceptions.  
Founders’ view of how employees and investors define success and failure 
Founders believe that investors and employees have different definitions for failure 
than they do. They believe employees experience failure differently than founders 
because they do not own failure to the same extent—i.e. the product was not “their 
baby”.  
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There is only partial alignment between how founders think employees would view 
success and failure and how employees do indeed perceive the issue. Where there is 
resonance is in respect to freedom and career path. Founders speculate that 
employees experience failure as backtrack in the road to their future career 
opportunities. Founders also believe success to certain employees is simply holding 
down a stimulating job that allows them to have some level of agency. In this case, 
failure would be perceived by the employee as losing the freedom or ability to make 
a change in their daily work life.  
However, founders think employees are mostly concerned with their paychecks, at 
the expense of his or her commitment to the startup. Yet, this is not aligned with 
employees’ concern and with how they interpret failure in light of their reasons for 
joining a startup. As employees mentioned in various ways, their reasons for joining 
a startup are beyond the salary; employees care about developing skillsets and being 
part of implementing the idea or product into the market.  
Furthermore, the results show founders are not completely aware of, or perhaps 
underplay, employees’ incentives for joining startups. An important factor is how 
employees want to have an immediate impact on the startup and its environment. It 
could be that founders do not recognize, or do not capitalize, on how employees feel 
co-responsible for the impact of delivering the technology/product to the market. 
When it comes to investors, founders rightly believe that poor financial return is the 
primary indication for success and failure. However, most founders have the 
impression that investors would disqualify any company that did not make money 
from being described as a success  
Founders go further and believe that investors blindly weigh profits and return of the 
investment. However, investors also account for team aspects, and put forth a 
nuanced view of non-success companies, as described earlier. So, founders are 
pushed by investors’ desire for success to launch the technology or the product to 
the market for fast growth. Founders have a difficult time identifying when the 
startup is about to fail.  
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In this regard, what founders do not realize but investors are aware of is identifying 
the proper time to stop. Founders may not see that the business is failing; they may 
do it in the last minute once they finally run into a wall, or they may even find hope 
and use it to keep the business running. On the other hand, investors could see the 
end and even pull the plug.  
Employees’ view of how founders and investors define success and failure 
Employees believe that founders place less emphasis on making money and more 
emphasis on having an impact and fulfilling the vision they set out to pursue. Thus, 
employees see that failure to founders would not be measured by monetary 
standards, but by their impact on the world. What employees did not consider is that 
improvement of their personal skillset is also one of the important components of 
founders’ definition of failure/success.  
Similarly to founders, employees believe that investors quantify success, and 
ultimately failure, based on the return on investment. What employees describe as 
investors’ definitions of failure and success is in terms of a black and white 
approach, where investors want the investment back with profits and nothing else. 
Like founders, employees could not identify the low performance and falling-down 
threshold. Due to the fewer responsibilities and detailed involvements in the startup, 
it is understandable that employees may disagree with the investors’ point of view.  
Investors’ view of how founders and employees define success and failure  
Investors have sometimes described founders as “delusional”. So, it is no surprise 
that investors are aware that founders have very different ideas about what 
constitutes failure. While many of them assumed that founders too are out to make 
money, some believed that founders seek notoriety, influence, to create jobs and to 
grow fast. The divergence between how investors perceive founder satisfaction and 
how founders experience it indicates that investors are not attuned to what founders 
are hoping to achieve. Entrepreneurs are seen as dreamers. Similarly to employees, 
investors are oblivious to the personal aspects of success in the eyes of founders.  
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Investors believe that employees’ definitions of failure are tied to employment. 
Holding down an interesting job with upward mobility is employee’s most valued 
benefit, according to investors. This perception of success may change if employees 
hold stock options in the company, in which case they cease to be mere employees. 
Investors believe that some employees want to join and work for a startup for the 
fun of it, they are not interested in the product or the success of the company per se. 
However, failure to them still is expected to be the end of the company, and 
therefore the end of their jobs. What is clear is that investors are completely 
misaligned with employees’ definitions. Furthermore, they do not realize the 
importance of freedom to employees in joining a startup and the impact they would 
like to have inside the company.  
“Insert Table 4 here” 
2.5 Discussion  
Drawing on an inductive study, this research contributes to our understanding of 
how main actors in the entrepreneurial process understand failure, how their 
perceptions are similar or different from those of other actors, as well as how 
scholars interpreted it as a new venture failure.  
Findings show that the concept of failure is contingent upon what people look to 
take from startups. It embeds both personal and professional dimensions that differ 
among different groups of individuals. That is, people have different incentives for 
joining a startup and their definition of failure is formed based on what they expect 
to get from a startup and what the startup demanded from them. The most common 
incentives for founders center on the professional dimension, including the quality 
of the technology/product and the impact the technology could have in the world. 
Then, if the technology is not accepted by the market as expected, they interpret 
their business as failure.  
Unlike founders, employees’ incentives center mostly around the personal 
dimension, which aims towards learning and skillset development. Their perception 
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of failure is formed as they encounter challenges for their future career path and lack 
of growth and learning. Surprisingly, having the immediate impact through 
development of technology/product is also something employees hope to obtain 
from the startup, even though the impact they look for is different from that of 
founders.  
The incentives of investors are less diversified and as a result, their perception of 
failure focuses on the financial performance, which is to be expected since investors 
base their investment decisions on financial data (Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998; Huang 
& Pearce, 2015). Even though investors interpret failure according to return of 
investment, they do qualify it as financial failure. The “true” failure in investors’ 
eyes is that of an ineffective team that could not work together. They believe an 
unsuitable team working together will lead to a failed product/technology and 
ultimately no return on their investment. Although financial return is one of the 
elements of failure definition for founders and employees, the interpretation is 
completely different by each group, which shows how people have different goals in 
the entrepreneurial process. For example, the way founders weigh making money 
and growing expectation in a startup process is different from investors. So they lose 
investors’ support at certain points, which makes them stop developing the 
company. 
Findings of the second stage of the study show some hidden features of new venture 
failure. This includes tensions among groups during the lifespan of the new venture, 
different or even opposite incentives of people, and how people are misinformed 
about other groups’ incentives in entrepreneurial activity. Founders believe that 
investors would disqualify any new venture that did not make the amount of money 
within their success threshold, which, in reality is most likely true. This makes it 
difficult to continue as new ventures, particularly for high-tech startups that rely 
heavily on investors as one of the main sources of survival.  
Finally, findings of this study show the concept of failure is beyond just the 
termination of the new venture (Bruno et al., 1992; Wennberg & DeTienne, 2014; 
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Wennberg et al., 2010), bankruptcy (Zacharakis et al., 1999), and poor performance 
(Coelho & McClure, 2005). This article finds evidence for a different approach from 
what literature defines as failure and how people understand it. People engaged in 
startups and entrepreneurship are more careful to label a situation as a failure, as 
they tend to be well aware of the uncertainty surrounding startups. An exception is 
found in extreme circumstances, such as team/managerial conflicts, in which case 
failure is an accepted term. Besides, they hesitate to label the new venture a failure, 
although they are well aware of poor performance issues, since they believe that as 
long as there is learning coming out of the experience, it could not truly be a case of 
failure. This might come from a positive attitude toward the act of failing where it 
can enhance the willingness to learn from the situation and help changing mindsets 
for future functions (Politis & Gabrielsson, 2009). 
2.6 Limitations and future research  
This study has mainly focused on high-tech industries. Future study could expand on 
low-tech industries with detailed understanding of the concept of failure by different 
groups, and how tensions and consequences would be similar or different from those 
of high-tech industries. This paper has focused on three main groups of individuals; 
it would be valuable to take other stakeholders into account. For example, future 
research could investigate the concept of failure and its features from policy makers’ 
and consultants’ perspectives to see if there are other dimensions of new venture 
failure that could be valuable in entrepreneurial firm survival. Finally, it would be 
valuable to investigate how the perception of angel investors would be different or 
similar to that of venture capitalists.  
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Table 1: Quantitative detail of interviews 
 US Denmark Total 
Individuals interviewed  49 37 86 
Roles discussed by individuals 84 46 130 
 
 
Table 2: Detailed distribution based on the roles  
 
Roles discussed by individuals 
Country Employees Founders Investors 
Denmark 18 24 4 
US 20 35 29 
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Table 3: Categorization of key elements in success and failure definition by 
founders, employees, and investors 
 Type Founders Employees Investors 
S
u
cc
es
s 
d
ef
in
it
io
n
 
P
e
r
so
n
a
l  
- Gaining personal 
experience and skills 
- Doing what you like, 
autonomy 
 
Learning and skillset development 
Not mentioned 
P
r
o
fe
ss
io
n
a
l 
- Quality of the product 
- Making a World Impact 
 
 
- Reaching short term goals; sale 
targets 
- Having impact 
 
 
 
- Success is a good team 
- Realizing the potential of the 
product 
Monetary success 
Success is profit; it is return on 
investment 
F
a
il
u
re
 D
ef
in
it
io
n
 P
e
r
so
n
a
l 
- Giving up to the obstacles 
- Regret 
- Empty Experiences and learning 
- Pursuing the wrong path, sampling 
time on the wrong thing in personal 
path 
- Giving up 
 
Mistake (by investor), picking 
the wrong people 
P
r
o
fe
ss
io
n
a
l 
 - Rejection / Negative impact 
- Product quality: product that 
does not fit the market 
- Not getting the product to the 
market 
- Missing daily goals; continuing 
without purpose 
- Keeping the zombie alive 
- Commercial failure/misreading the 
market 
- Slow response 
Monetary: the complete lack or 
loss of significant monetary 
amounts 
Shutting down with monetary 
issues 
Failed to get investment/funding 
 
Priority Level 
High Pointed out by large number of individuals 
Medium Pointed out by a number of individuals 
Low Pointed out by very few individuals 
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Table 4: How each group describes other group’s views on failure and success  
 
 
Founders think of: 
Investors’ definition Employees’ definition 
Aligned Misaligned Overlooked Aligned Misaligned Overlooked 
success vs. 
Failure 
Financial return 
Blind care of 
financial return 
 
Hitting-the-
wall point 
 
- Career path 
effects 
- (Losing) 
freedom 
Paycheck 
Having 
impact 
 
Employees think of: 
Founders’ definition Investors’ definition 
Aligned Misaligned Overlooked Aligned Misaligned Overlooked 
success vs. 
Failure 
 
(not) Having the 
impact 
 
Financial return 
Skillset 
development 
and growth 
Return of 
investment/ 
(No) profit 
Black and white 
approach 
Hitting-the-
wall point 
 
Investors think of: 
Founders’ definition Employees’ definition 
Aligned Misaligned Overlooked Aligned Misaligned Overlooked 
success vs. 
Failure 
Financial return 
 
Blind think of 
fast growth 
 
 
Personal 
experience 
and skillset 
development 
 
Career path 
(Loosing job) 
 
 
- Tied into 
employment 
- Do not care about 
the company 
improvement and 
product 
- Freedom 
- Having 
impact 
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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the experiences and outcomes of entrepreneurship for startup 
employees, whose perspective is rarely studied. Our inductive study argues that 
individuals join startups expecting greater professional growth, personal fulfillment, 
and financial rewards than in more established firms, but that these expectations are 
rarely met. We identify a series of structural factors that make it unlikely if not 
impossible for startups to deliver on the generalized expectations of startup 
employees. We find that unrealistic expectations persist nonetheless due to 
misaligned interests between investors, founders, and employees that create 
incentives for investors and founders to perpetuate existing narratives regarding the 
benefits of startup employment. Surprisingly, we find that a complementary set of 
incentives lead startup employees to also perpetuate unrealistic generalized 
expectations. The study uncovers a previously unrecognized cost associated with 
startup ecosystems disproportionately borne by startup employees and highlights an 
additional mechanism by which myths and unpopular social norms can persist. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Startups are widely believed to have a substantial impact on a region’s economic 
performance and growth (e.g., Hart, 2003). In the U.S., for example, few issues 
receive as much bipartisan support as the promotion of entrepreneurial activity (e.g., 
Clifford, 2016; Kasperowicz, 2012). For the most part, research has supported a 
positive view of entrepreneurship (Van Praag and Versloot, 2007). Startups are 
argued to play a disproportionate role in innovation and economic development 
(Baumol, 1990; Wong et al., 2005; Baum and Silverman, 2004). A large body of 
work also suggests that startups contribute substantially to job creation and account 
for a significant share of employment growth. In some countries, for example, 
startups have been shown to account for as much as 70 percent of all job creation 
(Birch, 1987; Davis et al., 1996, 1998; Neumark et al., 2011). Prior research has 
predominantly focused on the experiences of founders, such as the motivation for 
launching a startup, the typical traits of entrepreneurs (Elfenbein et al., 2010; 
Gompers et al., 2005; Hamilton, 2000; Lazear, 2005; Stuart and Ding, 2006), and 
contextual influences on founders (Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; Freeman, 1986; 
Halaby, 2003; Sørensen, 2007). The experiences of startup employees, in contrast, 
are not well understood. To the extent that research has considered employees, it has 
mostly equated their experience with that of startup founders (Politis and 
Gabrielsson, 2009; Singh et al., 2007; Zacharakis et al., 1999) or focused on 
predicting which employees will ultimately become founders themselves (e.g., 
Nanda and Sørensen, 2010; Sørensen and Fassiotto, 2011). While research has 
shown that startup employees are much more likely to later become entrepreneurs, 
the fact remains that the vast majority of them will remain as employees (Dobrev 
and Barnett, 2005; Freeman, 1986; Halaby, 2003; Sørensen, 2007). Further, recent 
work that focuses explicitly on startup employees indicates that the motivations, 
perspectives, and experiences of these individuals are distinct from those of founders 
and thus constitute a critical perspective for understanding the dynamics of 
entrepreneurial firms (Neff, 2012; Roach and Sauermann, 2015). 
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Young firms are increasingly seen as attractive employment options for job seekers. 
For example, recent research has shown that skilled university graduates, especially 
those with a science and engineering background, are increasingly choosing startup 
jobs as promising places to launch their careers (Greenberg and Fernandez, 2015; 
National Science Board, 2012; Roach and Sauermann, 2015). This is reflected, 
among other things, in the demand for entrepreneurship education pro-grams, which 
has steadily increased (e.g., Katz, 2003; Kuratko, 2005). It is also consistent with the 
emphasis that is routinely placed on entrepreneurship as an engine for employment. 
Yet, while a growing number of skilled workers seem to view startup employment 
as an attractive employment option, existing research offers somewhat conflicting 
evidence about the characteristics, experience, and quality of such jobs relative to 
work in more established firms. 
Although little work has directly examined the experience of startup employees, 
scholars have theorized that three types of benefits disproportionately accrue in 
startup employment (Camp-bell, 2013; Hamilton, 2000): (1) professional 
development and growth (e.g., acquisition of broad human capital, progression of 
professional rank); (2) subjective expectations about the individual day-to-day 
experience from working in a startup (e.g., expected job satisfaction, impact, and 
independence); and (3) objective financial benefits (i.e., salaries and the value of 
stock options). Yet, research also demonstrates that there are potential costs or risks 
associated with each of these possible benefits. With respect to personal growth, 
startup employment has been theorized to have both short- and mid-term positive 
impacts on an employee’s accumulation of human capital through various 
mechanisms, which should translate to improved long-term labor market prospects 
(Campbell, 2013; Lazear, 2004). However, there is also evidence that workers can 
more reliably develop valuable, transferable skills and knowledge in larger, more 
established organizations (Bidwell and Briscoe, 2010). With respect to job 
satisfaction, several studies have suggested that startup employment is associated 
with greater personal satisfaction (Benz and Frey, 2008; Shane et al., 2003), but we 
also know entrepreneurship is associated with long hours and high levels of stress 
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(Neff, 2012). Finally, from a financial perspective, some research suggests startup 
experiences have a positive effect on earnings versus working in established firms, 
especially for skilled workers (e.g. Campbell, 2013; Roach and Sauermann, 2015,), 
but recent work has shown that startup employees actually experience lower 
earnings in the short term that seem to also persist in the long run (Sorenson et al., 
2018; Burton et al., 2018). In general, therefore, there is increasing evidence that 
challenges the theorized benefits of startup employment. 
This raises questions about the increasing popularity of startup jobs among skilled 
employees. In particular, we know little about how employees understand, assess, 
and experience the (potential) risks, benefits, and costs of joining or remaining at a 
startup. Through an inductive, qualitative research design, we explore these issues 
through three guiding questions: 1) How do employees define, understand, and 
evaluate the potential costs, risks, and rewards of joining a startup? 2) How do 
employees reconcile their actual startup experience within with generalized 
expectations and recruiting narratives? and 3) What factors determine and maintain 
these generalized expectations? We explore these questions through 86 interviews 
with investors, founders, and employees of venture capital-backed startups. We find 
that even in this critical case – where the potential benefits of startup employment 
are most likely to manifest employees’ expectations are known to be rarely met. 
Further, we find that these unfulfilled expectations are not the result of idiosyncratic 
differences across individuals or firms, but stem from structural features of venture 
capital-backed entrepreneurship. 
The study offers three key insights. First, we find that employees do, to an extent, 
recognize that startup jobs represent higher risks, and that the potential rewards are 
accompanied by potentially high costs. However, we also find that employees’ 
evaluation of risks, costs, and rewards is often biased: they tend to overestimate the 
likelihood of obtaining certain benefits, and fail to recognize the likelihood and 
extent of associated costs. In particular, employees generally comprehend the 
financial risks of startups and recognize that they are unlikely to experience windfall 
earnings gains. Yet, they expect that this risk will be offset by autonomy, learning 
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opportunities, and professional advancement, without properly adjusting for the 
extent to which all risks and benefits inside a startup are interdependent and are 
equally affected by uncertainty. Third, we find that employees’ biased expectations 
and beliefs result, in large part, from structural features of venture capital-backed 
entrepreneurship. Specifically, the need to recruit and retain skilled employees 
encourages founders and investors to sustain myths about the benefits of startup 
jobs, which they do both by perpetuating unrealistic narratives and by withholding 
information from employees. We find that employees also willingly perpetuate the 
narratives (even in the face of conflicting personal experiences), because they find 
themselves bound to the startup labor market and its norms. 
These findings have a number of important theoretical and practical implications. 
Theoretically, we build on research about social myths and unpopular norms, 
uncovering additional reasons such myths emerge and mechanisms by which they 
are perpetuated. We also contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of 
entrepreneurship, suggesting that many of the benefits of entrepreneurial activity 
that have been identified in academic research, policy circles, and the popular press 
may be accompanied by previously unrecognized costs which may be 
disproportionately borne by startup employees. These theoretical insights have clear 
implications for practitioners, who can better support employees to avoid or mitigate 
unanticipated costs of their startup experience. Our findings also suggest the need to 
inform job seekers about the realities of startup work in order to better inform their 
career decisions. 
3.2 Startup Employment 
Entrepreneurship is often cited as a key driver of economic and employment growth, 
yet we have relatively little knowledge about the experiences and trajectories of 
startup employees. If employment growth is a key benefit associated with 
entrepreneurial activity (Birch, 1987; Davis et al., 1996, 1998; Neumark et al., 
2011), then understanding the nature and quality of startup jobs seems critical. 
Recent work has begun to explore these issues, focusing in particular on four 
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aspects: the characteristics and motivations of startup employees, their compensation 
and economic outcomes, their professional trajectory and growth, and the non-
pecuniary benefits of startup jobs such as increased autonomy and impact. Although 
such work has begun to uncover valuable insights about startup employment, 
important questions remain about each aspect. 
First, a wealth of research has explored the traits, experiences, and preferences 
associated with startup founders (for good reviews see Sorenson and Stuart, 2008; 
Parker, 2018; Shane, 2008). More recently, research has also explored the 
characteristics of startup employees, showing that young firms tend to hire younger, 
less experienced, and less qualified employees on average (Nystrom and Elvung, 
2014; Ouimet and Zarutskie, 2014). In fact, it has become clear that there are large 
sorting effects, mostly driven by firm size, where startups (as small firms) hire 
employees from mostly different employee pools than established firms (Burton et 
al., 2018; Sorenson et al., 2018). But even after matching on observable employee 
characteristics, startup employees who choose to join startups tend to have 
systematically different preferences and expectations than both startup founders and 
employees of established firms, with an emphasis on autonomy, impact, and 
challenging work (Ouimet and Zarutskie, 2014; Roach and Sauermann, 2015; 
Sauermann, 2017). 
Differences in observable employee characteristics may partially explain the widely-
replicated finding that startups, on average, pay less than established firms (Davis 
and Haltiwanger, 1991; Villemez and Bridges, 1988; Oi and Idson, 1999; Hollister, 
2004). Indeed, given their youth and lack of experience, most startup employees 
would probably earn less in any organization (Nystrom and Elvung, 2014; Ouimet 
and Zarutskie, 2014). However, startup employees seem to earn less even after 
carefully controlling for their characteristics and qualifications (Brown and Medoff, 
2003; Troske, 1999; Burton et al., 2018). Notably, these pay differentials persist in 
the long term, as joining a startup seems to put employees on a separate labor market 
with a different – and disadvantaged – earnings trajectory than the one they would 
follow in an established firm (Sorenson et al., 2018). Most of the effect seems to be 
Chapter 3. Falling off the unicorn: The structural shortcomings of startup employment 
99 
driven by firm size and instability rather than age, as (the minority of) startups that 
manage to grow rapidly seem to actually pay employees a short-term premium that 
nonetheless dissipates as the startup ages (Burton et al., 2018; Sorenson et al., 2018). 
That employees who choose (i.e. are not sorted into) startup employment should 
expect to earn significantly less in the long-term is puzzling, as individuals choose 
their job in large part based on expectations about how it is likely to impact their 
career trajectory and compensation over the long run (Bidwell and Briscoe, 2010). It 
also runs counter to the theorized benefits of joining a startup. Entrepreneurial firms 
are expected to grow at faster rates, allowing early employees to grow with them 
(Haltiwanger et al., 2013; Barron et al., 1994). Startup employees are also expected 
to have less role differentiation (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971), which should translate 
to wider responsibilities and the development of a broader set of skills (Sørensen, 
2007; Campbell, 2013). This type of human capital could provide attractive 
opportunities for startup employees, both as more seasoned and balanced managers 
and as entrepreneurs themselves (Lazear, 2005; Luzzi and Sasson, 2016; Campbell, 
2013; Sørensen, 2007; Gompers et al., 2005). That these purported benefits are not 
reflected in the earnings potential of startup employees – not even the ones who join 
the most successful firms raises interesting questions about the expectations that 
lead employees to join startups and the experiences that lead them to remain in 
them.
1
 Put differently, if working for a startup places employees in a separate labor 
market, with fewer and worse available career trajectories, why would they willingly 
choose it? 
Researchers have long recognized that a key motivator for founding a business is 
autonomy and independence (Douglas and Shepherd, 2000; Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1998). They have suggested such autonomy is also attractive and available, 
at least to a certain degree, to startup employees (Baron et al., 1996; Neff, 2012). 
Individuals may thus join and remain in startups in search of work flexibility and 
autonomy (Roach and Sauermann, 2015; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Sauermann, 
2017) and may be willing to forgo higher pay in more established organizations in 
exchange (Stern, 2004; Sauermann, 2017). Yet, whatever autonomy exists for 
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startup employees, it may come at a significant cost. Entrepreneurs and their 
employees tend to report higher levels of job satisfaction (Idson, 1990; Roach and 
Sauermann, 2015), but startup life also comes with significant personal and 
economic stress for both founders and their workers (Pollack et al., 2012; Neff, 
2012; Brennan and McHugh, 1993). Individuals may enter startups anticipating 
flexibility and independence, but instead face long hours, uncertainty, and role 
conflict. 
In summary, while we have increasing clarity on the characteristics, expectations, 
and career outcomes of startup employees, we have little insight into how they 
actually choose and experience their jobs. In particular, we know little about their 
actual reasons for joining a startup, how they developed expectations about startup 
employment, the extent to which they are aware of the potential risks and tradeoffs 
of their choice, or whether they ultimately feel the tradeoffs and risks were 
worthwhile. For example, employees are surely aware that startups have a higher 
risk of failure, so they probably adjust their short-term economic expectations 
accordingly. What is less clear is the extent to which they consider firm instability 
and how it might mitigate or eliminate other expected benefits. Put differently, 
career growth, organizational and personal learning, subsequent job opportunities, 
and the day-to-day experience of autonomy or meaning are likely to be impacted by 
a startup’s level and rapidity of success. But if employees are making choices 
accounting for certain types of risk and not others – or underestimating the extent to 
which these risks can interact with or amplify each other – then their experiences 
and outcomes may fall far short of their expectations. 
This study explores the experience of employees, founders, and investors in venture 
capital-backed startups in order to develop insights about how and why employees 
decide to join such firms, whether their jobs live up to their expectations, and how 
they reconcile their lived experiences with generalized expectations about startup 
work. 
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3.3 Data and Methods 
3.3.1 Sampling Strategy and Data 
Given the relatively sparse and conflicting knowledge we currently have about the 
experience of startup employees, we conducted an inductive, qualitative exploration 
of the views, expectations, and experiences surrounding work in emerging firms. 
During the period of August 2014 to March 2016, we collected qualitative data from 
venture capitalists, founders, and employees of existing and failed startups in high-
tech industries. Interviewing founders and venture capitalists in addition to 
employees was critical to our study because we were interested, for example, not 
only in how employees interpreted information and experienced their work, but also 
in how founders and investors might control that information or otherwise influence 
the work experience. In addition, while employees could only speak from their 
personal experience, founders and especially investors have recruited, promoted, 
recommended, and fired hundreds of employees, so can also speak from their 
observation of the startup labor market. 
We focus on VC-backed startups for a number of reasons. First, venture-backed 
firms have been shown to be better funded, start at a larger scale, pay higher salaries, 
attract better talent, and grow at a more rapid pace (Davila et al., 2003). These 
characteristics have been shown to be good predictors of startup quality and survival 
(Arora and Nandkumar, 2011; Bengtsson and Hand, 2011, 2013). Second, VCs 
demand more rapid formalization and professionalization of the startups they invest 
in, including the establishment of formal management and corporate governance 
practices (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). Third, VCs tend to focus their investments in 
more promising and faster-growing industries (Hall and Hofer, 1993), which also 
tend to systematically attract higher-quality employees (Braguinsky et al., 2012; 
Campbell, 2013; Sauermann, 2017). Fourth, VCs have been theorized to be 
especially good at leveraging their status and social networks to secure better 
outcomes for their investments (and the people they invest in) (Pollock et al., 2015; 
Wal et al., 2016; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). This should both increase the 
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probability of success and lower the downside risks for a given startup. It should 
also provide a status signal for startup founders and employees, which may translate 
to labor market benefits (Davila et al., 2003). Finally, we expect employees of these 
firms to be especially informed when making decisions. Put differently, it is widely 
known that small firms provide worse jobs. But high-growth startups are supposed 
to be different, if riskier, because of their dynamism (Sorenson et al., 2018; Baron 
and Hannan, 2002). Qualified employees look past a startup’s size to focus on its 
potential trajectory. VC-backed startups thus constitute a critical case regarding 
outcomes for startup employees (George and Bennett, 2005): any expected benefits 
of startup employment should be particularly evident in these firms. In contrast, if 
the expected benefits of startup employment are not realized in VC-backed startups, 
it is difficult to imagine better outcomes for employees in other startups, which are 
more likely to follow the typical dynamics of small firms (Burton et al., 2018). 
We also wanted to make sure that any negative outcomes related to less successful 
firms could not be attributed to ex-ante lower firm quality. To address this issue, we 
first interviewed partners in venture capital firms with an above-average return 
performance. During the interview, we asked them to identify successful, surviving, 
and failed startups that they had evaluated as equally promising at the time of 
investment.
2
 We then contacted founders and employees from startups in each of 
those categories through snowball sampling (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
We explored other sources of variance to better capture the range of prototypical 
experiences for startup employees across settings and outcomes. In addition to 
sampling successful, surviving, and failed firms, we also sought geographic variance 
to ensure that our findings were not an artifact of a particular investment region. We 
thus followed a similar sampling strategy in two different regions of the U.S. (the 
East Coast and the West Coast) and in Denmark. This variance is significant 
because, while both the East and West coast are associated with vibrant startup 
environments, they are known to vary across cultural, economic, legal, and 
institutional dimensions (e.g. prototypical industries, non-compete laws, etc.) that 
can also have an effect on employment outcomes (e.g., Marx, 2011; Marx et al., 
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2015; Saxenian, 1994). For its part, Denmark also displays significant VC-backed 
entrepreneurial activity (e.g., Dahl and Sorenson, 2012) but with important structural 
differences, where public financing plays a more prominent role and where the legal 
and institutional framework is more protective of employees (e.g., through 
unemployment insurance). 
We collected a total of 86 in-depth, ethnographic, semi-structured interviews. This 
final number was determined by the point where we reached sampling saturation, or 
where no interview revealed themes that had not been covered by several others 
before. The distribution of interviews according to actor roles is shown in Table 1. 
Naturally, several individuals had performed more than one role throughout their 
career (employee vs. founder vs. investor). In those cases, we were careful to specify 
the role-perspective that informed each statement in the interview. They were 
particularly informative, as we also asked interviewees for a contrast between the 
different roles they had played for a given topic. As a result, we ended up with data 
from 130 different role perspectives. It is worth highlighting that, since we 
purposefully sampled across sources of meaningful variance, we expected the 
themes of this paper to vary across our observed industries and settings. Yet, aside 
from some differences between managerial and technical employees (discussed in 
our findings), we were surprised to find no discernible difference across categories 
in the general distribution of subjects’ motivations, expectations, and experiences. 
This is not to suggest that all our interviewees had identical perspectives. Rather, the 
range of perspectives and the overarching themes expressed by subjects across 
categories were remarkably similar across contexts. 
Interviews lasted an average of 90 minutes and consisted of three broad sections. 
The first focused on the individuals’ background, trajectory, and the path that had 
led them to their current role. This allowed us to explore the motivations behind 
their career decisions and the expectations that influenced their choices. The second 
focused on their conceptualizations of risk, uncertainty, success, and failure in the 
context of entrepreneurial firms. This was a central component of the interviews, as 
it allowed us to explore how individuals understood and experienced the risk, 
The aftermath of new venture failure 
104 
 
uncertainty, and unavoidable failures of their startup experiences. The third delved 
deeper into some of the specific startup experiences identified in the first two 
sections to explore how individuals – especially employees – navigated and were 
affected by a startup’s founding, development, and success or failure. We placed 
special emphasis on the trajectory of a startup’s assets, including technologies, 
knowledge, relationships and, most important, its employees as the firm succeeded, 
survived, or failed. As mentioned, this is where including the perspective of 
founders and investors was particularly informative, as they could reflect on patterns 
of employee experiences across startups and firm stages that, while consistent with 
the lived experiences discussed by the employees in our sample, also provided a 
description of the backstage that employees could not access. Every interview was 
recorded and transcribed, resulting in more than 1,400 pages of interview data. We 
asked follow-up questions via phone or e-mail when clarifications or additional 
information was required. We interviewed key informants as many as three times to 
review our initial findings and explore certain themes with additional depth. Finally, 
we shared earlier drafts of the paper with informants from each group, who further 
refined and validated our findings. 
Table 1: Interviews by Country and Role 
Country Employee Founder Investor 
Denmark 18 24 4 
United States 20 35 29 
Total 38 59 33 
Reflecting the investment focus of the investors we sampled, our interviews covered 
four high-tech industries: software, hardware, biotech, and manufacturing. Some 
interviewees had experience in more than one industry. For instance, an individual 
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could have experience as an employee, founder, and investor in two different 
industries. We did not find any systematic differences in the dynamics described in 
the paper across these industries. Experience in their role ranged from a couple of 
years for younger employees to several decades for experienced investors. Most of 
our interviewees, however, had at least five years of experience in each particular 
role. 
3.3.2 Data Analysis 
We followed an iterative, three-stage content analysis process. First, the transcribed 
interviews were analyzed on a sentence-by-sentence basis, following an open coding 
approach (Corbin and Strauss, 2014; Gioia et al., 2013), identifying key themes such 
as “joining a startup,” “initial team composition,” “learning from partners,” or “team 
after (firm) failure.” Practically every sentence in each interview received a code. To 
minimize coding bias, we coded the interviews as a team, where we randomly split 
the interviews between three coders and, once an interview had been coded by one 
member, the other two members reviewed and modified the code to resolve 
inconsistencies or differences in coding approaches across interviews. In the second 
stage, we organized these initial codes into a series of categories and sub-categories 
according to their properties, also identifying the connections between categories 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2014). The third step, selective coding, involved grouping 
categories and sub categories with similar properties and based on the frequency 
with which they were mentioned. We refined and regrouped these categories until 
we settled on a small number of overarching themes, including “employees (or 
investors, or founders) after failure,” “investor expectations,” “value of network,” or 
“definition of success.” After these three stages of coding, we wrote memos for each 
of the major themes, iterating back and forth between the themes, our underlying 
data, and existing theory. The research team revised these initial memos extensively, 
leading to the study’s key findings. 
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3.4 Findings 
The findings are split into three sections. First, we discuss our subjects’ expectations 
about startup employment. This includes both the expectations of individuals 
choosing to take a startup job, as well as the extent to which founders and investors 
understand (and encourage) those expectations. In general, we find that, consistent 
with extant research, individuals’ expectations primarily relate to issues of 
professional growth, autonomy, and to a lesser extent compensation. Our data 
suggests that, to some degree, individuals recognize the potential tradeoffs between 
the benefits, costs, and risks associated with startup employment. However, we also 
find that startup employees’ evaluation of the risks, costs, and benefits are often 
unrealistic, biased, and underestimate interrelations between them. We focus on this 
issue in the second part of our findings. Finally, in the third section, we consider 
why these unrealistic evaluations emerge and persist over time. Specifically, we 
discuss how misaligned interests between investors, founders, and employees, 
oversampling of positive outcomes in startup networks, and the difficulty of exiting 
startup employment encourage the establishment and perpetuation of myths about 
startup jobs. 
Why Individuals Join Startups 
Our findings about why individuals join startups are broadly consistent with prior 
research on startup employment. Specifically, our data suggest that startup 
employees hope to learn and grow professionally, experience autonomy and control 
over their work, and, to a lesser extent, benefit financially from their jobs. We also 
found that founders and investors – particularly those who had previously worked in 
startups themselves – recognized these expectations and used them to ‘market’ 
positions to potential employees: 
I think the promise for employees is threefold: you’re going to be exposed to a lot 
more things and have a lot more autonomy and independence to try to have an 
impact at a small company than you would at a small box in a large company. So 
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the job will be more fun because you’ll have more autonomy and agency. I think 
there is a promise that you might be able to have a big impact and if we really do 
grow quickly, you’ll have a much more important role even in a few years than if 
you were at a much larger company. I think the third one is, and, if we’re right, 
you’ll get wealthy. - JE: Investor
3
 
Financial Rewards 
Employees mentioned the potential financial windfall they would experience if the 
startup was successful. They generally realized that joining a startup meant 
accepting a lower base salary; however, if the startup was successful they expected 
to more than make up the difference by cashing in their stock options. This promise 
was a central negotiation point for founders and investors seeking to lower the cash 
impact of new talent: 
Startups normally offer equity and they offer less cash. So if you meet someone 
who’s optimizing simply based on salary,“Well I have this offer for $120,000 and 
you’re only offering me $110, and I don’t really value the equity.” They’re not 
really in the same mindset [which makes them unattractive hires]. - BR: Founder 
Employees were also aware that the job would come with additional economic 
instability: 
I was looking for flexibility for sure and I was looking for something that was…I 
guess it was out of my comfort zone, it just sounded really exciting. I believed in his 
idea from the get go and I was financially in a position where I could do that, 
because my husband could support our family financially. So I was in a position to 
take a career risk. - VP: Employee 
It also became clear that, for most employees, short-term financial considerations 
were not the main reason they joined a startup. Instead, they tended to focus on the 
experience itself. For example, a critical source of meaning was the idea of creating 
something and watching it grow: 
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We all just like to see the company growing. It is fun. Of course you hope that some 
time you will be able to sell it and get money out of it but it is not something that 
drives us, not at all. - FE: Founder 
Our data also made clear that investors and founders recognized and actively 
leveraged these non-pecuniary motivations to attract and retain employees: 
He ended up joining the company and he is coding for us. He had to take a huge 
salary cut, from $120k to $80k. We do give him health insurance but it is nowhere 
near as good as what he had before. Do I think this was a good financial decision 
for him? Probably not. But I have to hire what is best for my company. Plus, there 
are all these non-pecuniary things that he cares about that he is getting now…he 
can go to (sports events related to business), he can work in his underwear from 
home, he has a computer that he loves. Huge financial cost, but he is not thinking of 
it that way. - KJ: Founder 
Professional Growth 
With respect to learning and professional development, employees expected two 
types of benefits. First, they believed startup employment would allow them to 
develop wide-ranging knowledge and skills. The expectation stemmed from 
employees’ recognition that startups are small, resource-constrained, and faced with 
a constant stream of new challenges. Employees believed they would be responsible 
for navigating many of these challenges to a greater degree than they would in an 
established firm: 
So I think with [startup] a lot of the ownership is on me to find the different 
marketing programs and make that call if we’re going to move forward or not. And 
when I did need [the CEO’s] input say, on a budget that I’m not comfortable moving 
forward with, it’s literally a one-minute conversation – here’s what it is, okay, yes 
or no. And the turnaround times are so quick for us. Just because I don’t have to get 
five people’s input on if we continue “X” or not. - WK: Employee 
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Employees believed these responsibilities would translate to unique learning 
opportunities: 
There’s certainly environments that are very resource-constrained that force you to 
learn and force you to engage in a very deep meaningful way. And that’s the thing 
that I need to optimize, right? That’s the real value in joining a startup. - EN: 
Employee 
A particularly attractive feature seemed to be the experience of entrepreneurship 
without the full risks of actually starting a firm: 
More often than not, what these people are looking for is an education. They want to 
work on something, they want to learn, they want to see, they want to have the 
startup experience without taking the startup risk…They want to be part of an 
entrepreneurial experience. - SI: Founder 
Employees especially valued learning from the entrepreneurial experience through 
founders whom they admired: 
It had nothing to do with my research and had nothing to do with my training to that 
point, but it was a very interesting technical area that I was interested in learning 
about. A lot of the founders were people that I really respected and enjoyed learning 
from and spending time with. - BB: Employee 
Employees believed the skills and knowledge they developed would allow them to 
pursue new opportunities and advance their careers: 
The first business I joined after graduating was a …product management, 
development, regulatory, all that…So I came back to what I really liked, just 
managing the whole bunch of different activities within the company …Managing all 
those different issues at the same time would make me a stronger manager, a better 
manager, a quicker manager. - JH: Employee 
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They also anticipated that the startup itself could be a source of career growth. 
Specifically, because successful startups – particularly those with VC investment – 
on average, grow faster than established firms (Davila et al., 2003), employees 
expected that firm growth would generate new managerial positions that early 
employees would fill. This would allow them to rise through the ranks at a faster 
pace than would be possible in an established firm. Such expectations were 
particularly common in our sample of VC-backed startups, where investors were 
actively pushing for aggressive growth targets. 
Learning and professional growth were also seen as a hedge to, or a direct benefit of, 
startup risk, because employees often believed they would learn valuable lessons 
even (or especially) if their firm failed. Part of the attractiveness for employees was 
that they would get to observe and participate in the learning and growth without 
taking the personal and financial risks of founders or investors: 
That’s one of the good things that is big of not being financially involved in the same 
way as if you used your own money to start a company. Like I wasn’t one of the 
founders, and I didn’t spend my own money to start this company. So it was a really 
fun job and we could learn a lot (even) from its failure. - MC: Employee 
In that sense, employees seem to be aware that startups are risky, but they normally 
frame startup risk only around firm failure: 
They aren’t people who shy away from the fact that the company may not be here a 
year or two from now, but they also believe that there’s a risk-reward profile. So 
those risk-taking employees I think often believe therefore that working harder, 
faster, and putting the extra hours and time in could result in that risk-reward 
profile being what they were looking for. The other thing is those employees, I said 
they’re not afraid to lose their job but at the same time, more often than not, they 
believe they can grow with the company. - DW: Investor 
A fundamental underlying assumption is that, should a startup fail, other jobs will be 
available that will value the employee’s experience: 
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The startup community is just like a big industry and so you can go from startup to 
startup to startup and always be pretty gainfully employed. And I think if you’re a 
good quality person, you’re not going to have a hard time finding a job. - MR: 
Employee 
Autonomy 
With respect to autonomy, employees in our sample expected to gain greater control 
over their work than they would have in a corporate setting. They expected 
“freedom to try shit.” Amplified by popular media images (e.g., Koloc, 2013), 
startup employees pictured themselves not only working in an informal 
environment, full of fun perks, but also autonomously deciding on work structures, 
processes, and timelines, consistent with the startup’s necessary fluidity and lack of 
formality: 
I’ve been at big companies for way too long and I don’t particularly like the 
structure, I don’t particularly like the way that they, this whole part of control, 
trying to control employees. - JL: Employee 
Founders and investors know that autonomy can be a critical factor to attract high-
quality employees at a discount: 
I can get a senior coder with 15-20 years of experience and if I offer them a pretty 
good role at a start-up where they get to have fun and they own the code base and 
they know the drill and they get to stay home in New Hampshire and don’t have to 
commute to Boston, I could pay them $95,000. - GM: Founder 
Employees expected to derive satisfaction from their autonomy, not only because of 
the control it would give them over their own work, but also because they believed 
their choices would have much greater impact in the startup than they would in a 
larger, more established firm: 
I decided, if I were going to be in the plane when it crashes into the mountain, I 
would rather be in the front of the plane. At least have a chance to either push or 
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pull or do something, rather than sitting in the back of the plane and just going into 
the mountains. - JF: Employee 
Employees often contrasted this, explicitly or implicitly, to an imagined bureaucracy 
where they would be a tiny cog in the machine: 
I’ve worked in medium companies, like this one. I’ve worked in smallish companies 
like 9 to 10 people or less. And I really like working in companies where people 
listen to what you’re saying. And that you have a chance to make a difference. 
Because if you [have] fifty thousand people, you know, [you’re] probably not gonna 
make a difference in the destiny of that company. - MC: Employee 
Employees’ Unfulfilled Expectations 
With respect to the rewards they hoped to obtain, our data on why individuals 
choose to join startups is largely consistent with prior research. Our inductive 
approach, however, allows us to delve further. We also examined whether these 
same individuals’ expectations about compensation, professional growth, and 
autonomy were generally met. Surprisingly, we found employees rarely believed 
they had obtained the benefits they had anticipated. Even more surprisingly, 
founders and investors consistently suggested that, given the nature of their startups, 
most of the expected benefits could not be obtained. 
Financial Rewards 
As discussed above, employees largely recognized the chances of obtaining a large 
financial windfall were slim due to startups’ high failure rates; however our data 
also suggested that such benefits often did not materialize even for employees of 
extremely successful startups. 
Investors and founders were well aware that employees were unlikely to experience 
significant financial returns; however, employees often did not realize this until they 
were well into their startup career. We identified three causes for the incongruity 
between expectations and reality. 
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First, employees did not consider or fully grasp the dilution effects of multiple 
rounds of financing. This was especially true in the common cases when initial 
(unrealistic) milestones were not met and startups had to raise additional financing 
under less favorable terms: 
They literally slashed the pre-money valuation down 70%, and raised money on the 
most unfair terms possible to anyone in any market. So I took it and I moved 
forward, I didn’t think twice because it was my only option. - AR: Employee 
As a result of such dilution, even if the startup was eventually successful, by that 
point the employees’ shares were worth relatively little. 
Second, it became clear that employees simply did not know how to value options, 
so they systematically overestimated their worth – not a single employee in our 
sample had a specific value in mind – resulting in severe discrepancies between 
expected and actual value: 
They don’t understand how common stock is valued and how options are priced and 
you know, what percentage their options represent. We tell them that and I still 
don’t think they have a good appreciation for it …They’re like, “Yeah, yeah options, 
okay.” But they often don’t value those the way they should. Which is too bad, 
because unlike at most large companies, there’s a lot more flexibility to negotiate 
and kind of customize your deal. And very few do. So they don’t fully understand 
how it all fits together and they don’t make totally rational choices. - MR: Founder 
Finally, even as employees indicated that they recognized the low odds of startup 
success in general, we also found that they were mostly bought into narratives about 
the potential of the startup they were joining. Indeed, they were supposed to be 
optimistic in their evaluations: 
I really, really, really wanted to be a part of it. And I was willing to commit myself 
to, like, no salary if he would give me equity. And I asked for I think it was 1%, 
because I was like the 4th person there. So even though I was the “intern for the 
intern,” I was like, “Hey, you’re really not paying me and that’s cool because I 
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believe in this, and I think it’s actually going to take off. You give me 1% and I’ll 
make it work.” - DS: Employee 
This reality is so widespread that, across our interviews, investors used remarkably 
similar language to describe how, often, it was the employees of the most successful 
liquidity events who ended up the most disappointed, because “they are expecting to 
get retirement money, but instead they get nice car money.” As a result, although 
employees’ often did receive equity stakes, their expectations regarding the option 
value were typically not met, even in the unlikely cases when startups reached a 
liquidity event. 
Professional Growth 
As described earlier, expectations about learning and professional growth were, 
arguably, the most important motivators for joining startup employment, a 
motivation that was not lost on founders and investors: 
I think because we were just such a small team he expected that if it had worked out 
that he would have become an equity hustler and an upper management position in 
our company at the very least. So I think that was really what was attractive to him. 
-MM: Founder 
Employees believed the learning and growth tradeoff would be between moving up 
the organizational ladder rapidly if the firm succeeded vs. learning invaluable 
lessons – that would allow them to move into higher level positions in other 
organizations – if the startup failed or survived without growth. Our data revealed, 
however, that expectations on both sides of this imagined tradeoff were misplaced. 
Opportunities to quickly move up the organizational ladder rarely materialized, 
partly because most startups do not experience rapid growth or create enough new 
positions. But even in successful, fast-growing companies, early employees failed to 
rise through the ranks. Investors rarely allowed early startup employees to fill new 
positions because these individuals lacked demonstrable managerial experience. 
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Because (startup employees) are all young they’ve really never managed people. So, 
when they start to build a team they don’t understand how to motivate and manage 
people either. Which is why usually when a company really gets going, people that 
do managing for a living usually come in and run the company. Managing is 
normally seen as an “old person’s job.” - AM: Investor 
Independent of any assessment of an employee’s (potential) managerial talent, a key 
concern for investors was ‘dressing up the company’ for the next stages of growth 
and investment. Thus, while VC engagement certainly drove faster growth, it also 
led to a quicker formalization of the startup, including the professionalization of its 
structure and the recruitment of external professionals, often seasoned managers 
from established firms: 
They did all of that work and they got nothing to show for it. Why? Because their 
early dreams didn’t match up to the reality and eventually the investors put bullets 
in them and put people in for the next stage of work. - TK: Investor 
On the learning side, even though employees expected the pace of startup life to 
prove ideal for rapid learning, interviewees mostly described a world in which it was 
practically impossible to actually learn. Severe resource constraints, the large 
number of uncertainties, and the constant possibility of failure meant that decisions 
were often improvised, reactive, or made by elimination, rather than through the 
evaluation or testing of different alternatives. As a result, it was often unclear what 
the causal links were or if better outcomes were possible: 
Every day, most startups face forks in the road where you can go down the right 
route or the wrong route. The second you step down the wrong route, all of a 
sudden, the entire thing unravels. But it’s impossible to know exactly why it is 
unraveling, as so many factors are at play. - EB: Founder 
It is not just the number of moving parts that made actual learning practically 
impossible, it was also the amount of uncertainty surrounding each of those moving 
parts: 
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Randomness is the largest defining force for what will happen to you. That doesn’t 
mean that you take your hands off the steering wheel. Imagine yourself just driving 
in a very bumpy kind of road and you’re never quite sure whether the car is going to 
lurch to the right or to the left, and the random nature of the potholes that you’re 
driving through define to a greater extent where you will go than your own steering, 
so you step on the accelerator and you see what happens. - BC: Founder 
This was compounded by the length and ambiguity of the information cycles: 
What’s really challenging about entrepreneurship, if you take, let’s say boxing…We 
really value someone who steps up to a fight, and gives it their best. But we don’t 
value idiots. Like if you just kept yourself in the ring and you have no skills and 
you’re swinging wildly and you’re just getting knocked down every time and you 
should know – you just don’t belong in there. The same way a soldier who wasn’t 
prepared for war…the challenge is not immersion, because the cycles are so long. 
Starting (startup 1), took 8 years. Starting (startup 2), has already taken 2 years and 
will likely take many more. So whereas a boxer jumps in the ring again and again 
and again, you get a pretty quick feedback cycle and you know sort of who should be 
in the ring and who shouldn’t be in the ring. With entrepreneurship, it’s impossible 
to tell. - BR: Investor 
As a result, to the extent that employees could articulate any learning, the lessons 
were typically abstract, obvious insights that often bordered on truisms: 
I learned the hard way that there’s a very long way between something being top of 
the world technology, in the technological sense, and then filling a need. And you 
have to start ... the easier way to do business is to start filling a need for a customer. 
Because nobody will buy anything if it doesn’t fill a need for them. - MM: Employee 
When the learning was more concrete, it was often overly specific to the startup 
which, the employees recognized, had limited transferability to other settings: 
It doesn’t mean that you can do it again – because everything around you needs to 
be right, the timing needs to be right, the people around you need to be right, the 
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customers, everything needs to be right to make it happen. So what you learn is 
basically impossible to replicate. - MP: Employee 
As a result, employees found it difficult to communicate the value of their startup 
experience to subsequent employers and found it difficult to secure new jobs, 
especially in more established organizations: 
When I left (startup), I thought I was going to be with the CFO of a large company 
somewhere, but it was very difficult at least at that point in time. So I ended up 
working here (another startup), and I said, “Okay, I’ll come and join you, and I’ll 
just be there for a couple of months, and then I will find something else” – but I just 
have not found that something else. - LG: Employee 
Given their initial expectations, former startup employees were unprepared for the 
skepticism they encountered in the labor market. Entrepreneurs and investors, in 
contrast, were not surprised: 
They’ve invested, sometimes several years, in a project that did not take off, so now 
they have fallen behind in those few years to some peers (in established firms) and 
they sort of don’t catch up. Essentially that time invested in a startup is wasted…If 
we have to move to a more traditional firm, we have to change our expectations, we 
have to take sort of lower salaries and responsibilities than where we think we 
should be and then we have to try to catch up. - AH: Investor 
Furthermore, employees (and founders) seemed to systematically underestimate 
certain risks and the speed with which uncertainties would be resolved. A commonly 
mentioned surprise, for example, was the frequency with which startups could not 
meet payroll but still expected employees to remain committed: 
So I like that, but ultimately it’s very hard for me to not make any money, because I 
got kids, I got a mortgage, and the pressure. It’s the 25th of the month, and you 
don’t have any money, and you’re like, “Ahhh shit! What am I gonna do?” It really 
can be very difficult, very stressful. - JF: Employee 
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So it is morally devastating. (But) Yeah, actually it’s financially devastating too. I 
mean it’s not only just professionally that the pretty girl at the dance no longer 
wants me, it’s that the pretty girl at the dance no longer wants me and they stole my 
car. Because you’re not getting any money for it. You know, and that happens a lot. 
- TK: Founder 
These labor market challenges seemed especially salient for the generalist 
employees who were supposed to benefit the most. They seemed less acute for more 
technical employees, who were better able to articulate and provide evidence of their 
capabilities: 
Marketing, kind of startup marketing, startup operations type of people, they have a 
much harder time. The skills are less discrete and less rare, so when you’ve been 
through startups you eventually build skills that are much less applicable to other 
companies – your startup experience does not transfer well, people cannot know 
how good you actually are, you know? – Whereas if you’re a good engineer, you’re 
a good engineer and you just need to be on a different problem. - MJ: Founder 
At the same time, even with respect to technical employees, it is not clear that they 
actually benefited from being part of a startup. On the one hand, intense workloads 
and long hours might lead to a higher level of skill simply because the employee 
gains more practice over a shorter period of time than they would in a more 
established organization. They may also work on more novel problems. But on the 
other hand, the lack of structure, mentorship, and feedback in startups may cause 
technical employees to write inefficient code, fail to follow accepted protocols and 
standards, or pick up other bad habits. More broadly, technical employees seemed to 
find it easier to find subsequent jobs not because they had worked at a startup but 
because they did technical work (i.e., their value seemed to lie in their baseline 
skills, not in their startup experience). Ultimately, our data did not allow us to parse 
these possibilities, but they are important issues to examine in future work. 
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Autonomy 
With respect to autonomy, employees generally felt their expectations about having 
control over substantive decisions were met, and that they had significant impact on 
their organizations: 
In a very big company you cannot really influence things so that tomorrow there will 
be a different world than today. Here, we are twenty-five people. If I have an idea I 
can tell my boss and we can decide to start doing that in a week or in two weeks or 
today. You cannot do that in a big company, you won’t have that influence, there’s a 
million other things and people who have to be asked before you can change things 
and …it’s a waste of life. - IK: Employee 
Yet, employees also experienced this control as a “double-edged sword,” as it meant 
there was a great deal of pressure with few sources of support or experienced advice: 
I guess [my control over decisions] is a blessing and a curse…the curse is that it’s 
all on me to decide what works and when it doesn’t work, why didn’t it work. - WK: 
Employee 
Employees also quickly discovered that working in a startup meant sacrificing other 
types of control. First, while the smallness of the startup could provide fewer 
structural constraints, the flipside was much less structural support, so workers 
actually experienced intense workloads, often driven by the menial, administrative 
tasks they had to perform on top of their ‘actual’ work. This turned into a de facto 
constraint on individuals’ working hours. Second, the number of moving parts in the 
early stages of the startup and the amount of uncertainty surrounding each decision 
increased the stakes of every potential action and ultimately impaired employees’ 
ability to thoughtfully exercise autonomy and discretion: 
The interesting part about being in this business is that it’s always moving, it’s 
always changing. And reality can be so wide, that it’s kind of pointless talking about 
it, because there could be so many things going wrong, or maybe the company’s not 
The aftermath of new venture failure 
120 
 
going right, but it’s not necessarily the company’s fault. There are too many things 
moving too quickly to know. - AH: Investor 
In consequence, the work rhythm and the sequence of decisions ended up being 
determined more by the fast-moving pace of the context than by the employees 
themselves: 
It was really great at first and then you felt kind of all this freedom and energy and 
you just kind of did whatever you wanted. But I think pretty quickly I realized how 
hard it is to actually have that freedom because nobody’s giving you a structure for 
your day…So that initial excitement and freedom, the down side of that came on 
pretty fast and furious and that was really hard to deal with. - JH: Employee 
Third, investor expectations constrained employee autonomy in several ways: 
aggressive growth targets put constant pressure on the startup, which, combined 
with the small team and lack of structure, created a situation where it was always 
“all hands on deck’’ and employees were expected to exercise extraordinary effort. 
Investors, founders, and employees consistently emphasized that VCs expected 
nothing short of total commitment from employees: 
What it means to be in a VC-funded business is your entire life as you knew it is no 
longer…When I say “your entire life,” I truthfully mean “your entire life.” Your 
relationship with your family will change, you just won’t see them. Your relationship 
with your spouse will change. Your relationship with your friends will be 
nonexistent. There will be a consistent gray area between what is work and what is 
personal because work is personal and personal is work at that point. Even if you’re 
not in the office you’re working. When you’re in the office, you’re living. People 
don’t realize what that means. So I’ll tell you! It means that I’ve had to be on the 
phone with girlfriends telling them “I promise you that after we get through the next 
three week sprint, they can go on a weekend trip with you. Please don’t break up 
with him. He cannot afford to have that risk in his life right now. Just stick it out and 
I promise you.” It means a wife of one of my founders wrote a book called The Start 
Up Widow. - EB: Investor 
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The Establishment and Maintenance of Startup Employment Myths 
The fact that startup jobs rarely provided the financial rewards, professional growth, 
or autonomy anticipated by employees presents an empirical and theoretical puzzle. 
Specifically, why have these expectations become so strongly associated with 
startup jobs? Further, why have expectations persisted over time, given that few 
employees seem to obtain anticipated benefits? If founders and investors in our 
sample explicitly referred to these expectations as exaggerated or false, why do 
employees continue to believe in them? 
Part of the answer seems to be that employees are often optimistic and somewhat 
naïve – sometimes admittedly so. This can result in a biased search and 
interpretation of information that can lead to an unrealistic or incomplete assessment 
of benefits and risks: 
We were spending money like drunken sailors, like nobody’s business. Huge run-up 
with the bubble. It completely failed for whole host of reasons, and I got laid off 
there, that was actually the first time I ever got laid off…Both of those opportunities 
were can’t miss (because of the funders and partners). Intel, SAP, can’t miss. My 
mom would worry. I was like, “Mom, it’s Intel and SAP.” I mean we were rated with 
IBM and Microsoft as a top three in e-commerce. And the next one, (elite VC fund)! 
Can’t miss, can’t miss! Turns out, everything is can miss. - JF: Employee 
Beyond individual characteristics and interpretations, however, we found that there 
are several structural features of venture capital-backed entrepreneurship that 
systematically create and maintain certain myths about startup jobs. 
Misaligned Incentives 
Venture capitalists often claim to seek alignment of incentives between founders, 
employees, and themselves. There is much to be said about the joint enterprise of 
creating ‘epic’ investment value from nothing, to then distribute it fairly between 
stakeholders. Yet, while all parties share a common goal in the startup’s success, the 
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structural characteristics of each role create inherent tensions and often 
contradictions that can systematically produce unfulfilled promises to employees. 
The key tension is that although VC funding might lead to higher survival and 
growth rates on average, these outcomes depend on – often unrecognized – 
sacrifices on the part of employees. At an initial, fundamental level, investors and 
startup teams diverge on their ideal risk and growth profiles. VCs push for 
aggressive growth strategies and risky innovations at early stages of the startup, 
whereas startup founders and employees typically prefer to trade accelerated growth 
for a more iterative approach that explores different alternatives, creates more 
validated learning, and provides greater chances of firm survival: 
The two different strategies are going for the home run vs. hitting singles. But I 
don’t think for most startup teams the main goal is to hit a financial home run. I 
think that’s a nice thing if it comes, I think the goal is to create something from 
zero…Investors, on the other hand, only care about home runs. - JF: Employee 
The challenge faced by founding teams is that outside funding is critical to support 
even moderate growth, yet is scarce for startups that seek innovation at a more stable 
pace: 
Venture capital really limits what you can do with your business. Ultimately, I’m 
actually pretty interested in setting up a stable business that pays everybody and 
maybe generates a reasonable amount of cash at the end of the day. You can work 
really hard at it, but the fact is that once you take that first dollar [from VCs], you 
basically owe the person that gave it to you $10. That actually shuts down a lot of 
interesting business possibilities and, in my experience, that zone in the conceptual 
landscape doesn’t get populated because there’s no money for it. - KJ: Founder 
The underlying structural limitation – which was repeatedly confirmed during our 
interviews – is a fundamental misalignment in risk diversification strategies: For 
founders and especially for employees, the first goal is firm survival. They are thus 
inclined to pursue multiple applications simultaneously and pivot their business plan 
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to diversify their risk and improve their odds. In contrast, investors are looking for 
above-market returns and diversify their risk across investments, so they often push 
individual startups to de-diversify and pursue higher-potential alternatives 
aggressively. A scientist at a biotech startup that, early on, was forced to concentrate 
only on one of several potential applications of its technology explained: 
Investors keep pushing for increasingly aggressive milestones (and timelines) and 
ask you to zero in only on the avenues with the most potential, leaving other 
alternatives behind…From the perspective of a starting entrepreneur you look at the 
milestones and you ask, are they 10 to 20% achievable? If they’re 10% achievable, 
let’s go for it. Only if there’s no way to achieve it, then I’m not going to agree to 
it…The tension is that as an entrepreneur you have a consortium of investors. It’s no 
longer about your preferences. You’re not in the driver’s seat. - KB: Founder 
Interviews highlighted how investors’ diversification strategies drove this ‘big bet’ 
approach: 
If you’re the VC, it’s just one of your hands on the table. You really don’t care. As 
long as one of the ten pays, you really don’t care about which one…And that’s 
where I think it’s just, I don’t know if conflict of interest is the right word, but it’s 
such a different point of view to have a portfolio strategy than it is to have the 
startup’s strategy. As a startup, you’re usually vested in that one thing and I don’t 
think that VCs have that perspective at all. Or can’t. - JF: Employee 
In addition to exposing employees to much higher levels of risk, de-diversification 
likely minimizes the learning opportunities the startup may present. Specifically, 
academic and practitioner-oriented literature often argues that startups provide 
valuable learning opportunities because they are constantly experimenting and 
“pivoting,” which allows employees to see the results of different actions and 
strategies (Ries, 2011; Maurya, 2012; Gans et al., 2016). Yet, investors made it clear 
that such redirections – often aimed at minimizing risk – were contrary to their 
interests: 
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A surviving, somewhat successful startup isn’t very interesting to [investors]. Why 
bother? We don’t actually care to just get our money back. We care to have big 
wins. And so if there is a chance for a win, a big win if you keep going, we’ll say 
keep going [with a given strategy, even if less risky approaches are available]. - BL: 
Investor 
Startup teams are usually unaware of how the drive to de-diversify impacts their 
potential to learn, or the actual risks they bear. Investors have no incentive to 
explicitly acknowledge these effects, as doing so may negatively impact their ability 
to attract and retain talented employees. As a result, those involved – particularly 
current or potential employees – are often shielded from decision-making processes 
and kept largely in the dark: 
Employees are like mushrooms, they’re fed bullshit and kept in the dark. They don’t 
necessarily get a chance to see from 20,000 feet…For the most part I think that the 
relationship between investors and companies is unhealthy at best. - BC: Investor 
This was confirmed, in particular, by individuals who had experienced startups from 
multiple roles: 
How aware are [employees] of the fact that they have a portfolio of one and that in 
joining this company they are becoming less diversified in their risk? You know, you 
start a company and at the beginning you might have five potential products or 
applications or ideas, and the VC will tell you, “No, focus on one and swing really 
hard.” They want to diversify, they don’t want the company to diversify because they 
want it to swing for the fences. But that will necessarily make the company less 
likely to survive. The VC does not necessarily care, because, one, it is a cleaner 
experiment if the company only goes after one idea, and two, the fund is diversified 
in its investments. Now is that the best idea for the entrepreneurs or the employees? 
Of course not, they just increased their risk and they probably are not even aware. 
Certainly not the employees, and certainly not the employees who join after the 
decision to focus on fewer ideas. So it is a really big misalignment, because once the 
company fails the VC will be fine, the entrepreneur will probably just launch 
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something else, but the employees might carry a stigma that they are not aware of 
when they join. - KJ: Investor 
Even when employees become aware of the risks of de-diversification, the 
extraordinary commitment demanded by investors and the startup culture limit the 
extent to which they can pursue additional personal or professional interests that 
could expand their future options and enhance their career potential: 
In a startup, you can’t ask others to work on an equity basis for them to find out that 
you’re dickin’ around with something else, regardless of how cool that something 
else is. It really is a problem…People expect you to throw yourself into it single-
mindedly. - KJ: Founder 
Normalization of Unrealistic Goals and Startup Work 
The ideas behind a startup are often unconventional, ambitious, and are typically 
based on one or several unusual and untested assumptions. This means that, 
naturally, a startup will attract individuals who subscribe to that interpretation of the 
world: 
Conveniently, six of my other co-workers felt similarly, so a few left a few months in 
advance of me and another four of us left when I did, to all go start this startup. So it 
was six of us, we hired one person over the course of the next year, but that was the 
real traditional start-up experience. - JG: Employee 
Like-minded viewpoints also extend beyond a particular startup to the employees’ 
broader social network. In part, this is because employees, founders, and investors 
tend to see the establishment of personal networks within the startup ecosystem as 
instrumental to their goals: for investors to source deals, for founders to secure 
financing, and for employees to move into new startups or launch their own 
ventures: 
The smart employees are defining success as, “My stated end goal is XYZ.” 
Probably not financial, but smart ones know that they don’t have a huge ability to 
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impact (the startup’s) financial outcomes. Not like a founder or investor. And they 
should know that they probably won’t stay long enough to vest a majority of their 
shares. So the smart ones are defining success as building a network of people who 
they can then leverage to go into their next network of people, who they can then 
leverage to go into their next network and then one day start their own thing. - EB: 
Investor 
As they grow their personal network, employees are exposed mostly to others who 
are in equally ambitious pursuits, built on equally unconventional assumptions. 
Behind each unconventional idea, however, there is a validating analogy, 
comparable model, or success story: 
There’s hubris and naiveté, and sometimes you want that. If the company really has 
the potential to be truly great, it’s really non-intuitive. There were a lot of people 
who didn’t invest in Uber because they said there would be so many regulatory 
challenges, it just can’t be done, you’re running 100 mph into a brick wall. And 
Travis Kalanick said, “I don’t care.” Sometimes, it’s darkest before the 
dawn…What it boils down to is, are there any little green shoots of growth 
anywhere that we can use as a basis for optimism? - CM: Investor 
Put differently, high tech startups generate investment value through the creation of 
new realities. This requires convincing customers, suppliers, commercial partners, 
and investors of a story that can only become true if they all believe it (and even 
then might still fail). It is precisely be-cause these new realities are unconventional 
and unlikely that they can translate to outsize returns. In this environment, optimism 
in the face of adverse information is not just accepted, it is seen as necessary. 
They write a business plan at a time they have no idea how a company might grow. 
And there’s no product yet. It’s all just make believe and there’s nothing wrong with 
that. …they wind up building this imaginary story, almost out of a sense of 
…obligation the entrepreneur keeps trying to push the dream forward and it 
becomes like a magic trip. You say watch my left hand while your right hand picks 
the pocket and the entrepreneur says “now we’ve made our sales number (but our 
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profit number sucked), but our sales number was really great (but our profit 
numbers sucked).” And what the entrepreneur is really saying is this isn’t a business 
…But that’s not the conversation that occurs. - BC: Investor 
What employees find in their networks, therefore, is reciprocal reinforcement of 
their firm’s unconventional approach as consistent with the ethos of high tech 
entrepreneurship. Within their networks, employees’ extraordinary commitment to a 
startup is the norm. Optimism and excitement about an unlikely idea is the 
expectation. Both because they seek them but also because their network constantly 
disseminates them, startup employees are disproportionately exposed (and receptive) 
to the rags-to-riches stories of unlikely or tremendous successes, or “unicorns:” 
People are over-influenced by the publicity around the big stories. They talk about 
Facebook and what was the other one, started with an S, the big social network 
before Facebook. No one even remembers it anymore. MySpace! Nobody talks about 
MySpace anymore, but it influenced things pretty significantly. - JF: Employee 
Since startup employees mostly interact with other startup employees, they rarely 
access information to calibrate their perspective or job experience. It is not that they 
are isolated. If anything, they belong to hyperactive, vibrating social networks that 
emphasize speed in the diffusion of in-formation. But the information that is 
collectively deemed valuable revolves around the (factors of) success of startups. 
Employees seldom observe alternative career paths and levels of fulfillment 
(especially relative to similar amounts of effort) in established organizations. As a 
result, they often become unable to make appropriate and realistic comparisons 
between their experience and a corporate job. This contributes to the acceptance of 
statistically unlikely success stories as appropriate goals, as well as the 
normalization of the realities of startup work. Indeed, our data suggest that (the 
relatively rare) employees with more diverse networks (e.g., containing corporate 
employees) are better able to build realistic comparisons. They are more grounded 
about the startup’s chances for success, the risk/reward profile they face, and what 
they are learning. They are also more likely to leave a startup before many of the 
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negative aspects of the work begin to manifest or irreversibly constrain their career 
paths: 
When those employees [who did not “drink the Kool Aid”] start to quiet down, call 
in sick, take more vacations, things like that, that is your indication there. Before 
anything, that’s like the fastest indicator that things are not as good as you think 
they are. Because those guys are the ones living in the trenches and with more 
balanced information. - EB: Investor 
The most committed employees, in contrast, stand to lose the most: 
Then there’s the stupid employees, they’re like, cattle, right? They are excited to be 
at a startup, and it’s a cool technology or some product that they’re working on, and 
they’re just gonna be there through the rise and fall of this thing, because they 
haven’t really, strategically thought of their career except that “Oh! I have 3,000 
options in XYZ company, and it’s gonna be the next huge thing!” And they don’t 
even conceptualize what that means. Okay, 3,000 options in a company that maybe 
IPOs at a price of, like, $40, let’s call it GoPro, 40 bucks post 1st day IPO, so great, 
you just made $120,000 and you’re the 4th employee at this company. And that’s 
when they did fantastic. Yeah, great, you had a very wonderful ride, and a cool 
technology. But they’re just not strategic enough to think through the next step and 
what would have been better for them. - EB: Investor 
Not surprisingly, it is precisely this type of “stupidity” that founders and investors 
valued most in employees. They recognized that their ventures were unlikely to 
succeed, would face constant uncertainty, and would have to develop rapidly under 
resource constraints and on constantly shifting ground. Facing such circumstances, 
they placed a high value on recruiting employees committed not only to their 
specific venture but also to the startup lifestyle in general: 
I want to hire people who are going to stick around for a while, are going to do a 
job and do a job really well and they’re going to want to advance at the company, 
they’re going to want to do new things, but not too fast. I honestly can’t afford to 
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hire a whole bunch of entrepreneurs, I mean real entrepreneurs, people like me who 
are agitated if they’re not doing something new. I mean I wouldn’t like too many of 
me around in a company. - TP: Employee 
Limited Opportunities to Exit Startup Employment 
Employees were expected to remain intensely committed to their ventures. But as 
discussed above, even if they chose to leave, (non-technical) employees often found 
it difficult to exit startup employment. In part, this was because their networks were 
mostly constrained to the startup environment. But our interviewees also described a 
discount to their entrepreneurial experience. Part of the challenge is that it is often 
impossible for employees to articulate what, if anything, they learned from their 
startup experience: 
When we sold [startup] to Facebook, they took over the patent and the key guy, but 
not our other programmer nor our CEO. [Investor] worked hard to get the other 
programmer a job and he’s doing well. I gave a reference for [Employee], but he 
struggled. It was extremely hard for him to explain what he had done and to find a 
job at the level that he felt he deserved and he needed. - RB: Founder 
This is true even when a startup has succeeded: 
There’s an over-credit given to people who have had some success. If you are 
moving rapidly through different options, trying to identify glimmers of hope and 
then quickly reacting to them, you are steering the ship, for sure, but it’s really hard 
to say, and harder to show, that you will be better at it next time, there is so much 
noise and luck in that. - JE: Investor 
It thus becomes difficult for potential employers to evaluate how the startup 
experience prepared employees for work in more established organizations: 
Some people go through a failed start up and do that for 5 or 10 years and that 
becomes their experience base and they don’t really know anything about how to be 
a middle manager in a corporation so they end up doing more startups. I think after 
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a certain point it’s pretty hard to go into an established company and maintain 
one’s salary. Reverse is easier. - BB: Investor 
Somewhat surprisingly, given how aware all stakeholders seemed to be of failure 
rates in young firms, the potential discount on an employee’s experience seemed 
particularly acute when the startup had not succeeded, or was not well known: 
If I look at a resume and I see names where I know the companies did terribly or I 
see names that I have not heard before and they lasted two years there, I just feel 
that the person is a bad picker. They have bad intuition about places to go or people 
to work with. At least from an investment standpoint I would rather bet on a person 
who is really good at choosing. It is like the person who has hung around Yahoo! for 
too long…At some point you have to say that they had a choice to leave and you 
have to wonder why they did not make that choice sooner…There are some people 
who are good at getting lucky and there are other people who seem to make a career 
of making bad choices. - AM: Investor 
Note that such narratives were voiced by the same investors or founders who, earlier 
in the same interview, had discussed the randomness of entrepreneurial success and 
failure with remarkable sophistication. They are also the same individuals who said 
they expect and demand unflinching commitment to a venture. The change in tone 
occurred when prompted to shift from a broad discussion of the definition of success 
or failure in entrepreneurship to specific thoughts on finding and recruiting talent. It 
is also worth noting that, to the extent that some recognized these inconsistencies, 
investors and founders acknowledged that they benefit from perpetuating the 
narrative that failure in entrepreneurship does not carry a stigma to continuously 
attract talent. They also acknowledged that, even though it is not entirely consistent, 
selecting based on past performance feels more rational than ignoring that 
information, particularly given that others are likely to do the same.  
And it’s not necessarily logical, but I’ve seen that almost kind of a herd mentality, 
I’m gonna follow, I’m going to invest in the people that have been successful before 
without evaluating their talents, necessarily. I’m gonna look at what they’ve done 
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and I’m gonna back the successful horse. Gonna back the winning horses.- BW: 
Investor 
It is troubling that an employee’s startup experience is discounted by future 
employers, particularly given that 50% of new firms fail within the first five years 
(thus forcing all employees to search for jobs) (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). The 
result is that employees seem to have a hard time moving from a startup to a more 
established firm. To complicate matters, our data suggest that it may also become 
increasingly difficult for employees to find positions in startups as they age: 
Ageism has become such a prevalent factor in the startup world. You know, my 
brother in law is turning 48, he’s gonna be 50. And my wife can’t understand why 
he’s ready to make massive changes to his life. He’s been a startup guy forever. It’s 
like, well, he has to. Nobody wants him anymore. And so all of the skills he’s learned 
for the last 30 years of his career, are gone…And you know what? I play into it. I 
don’t think I could see myself understanding why a startup would want a 55-year old 
VP of Engineering. It’s hard to imagine a 20-something founder hiring a 55-year 
old engineer…The startup career is a very short career, both on burnout and also 
on actual, just, how quick, how long you are a hot commodity inside that world…By 
40, forget it. Think about it, a person who graduated in like 1995 from college is no 
longer employable in a startup. And there is that negative perception of like, “How 
come you’re not wealthy enough to go be an investor? Maybe you’re not good.” - 
EB: Investor 
These factors amplify employees’ access and tendency to repeat mythical narratives 
about startup employment by limiting the extent to which they can openly discuss 
their true experiences and opinions of startup jobs. In fact, this is true for all parties 
involved. Founders and investors have an incentive to perpetuate false or misleading 
narratives because startups depend, at least in part, on their ability to attract cheap, 
talented employees willing to bear intense workloads. Once employees have joined a 
startup, they are also compelled to perpetuate the narratives, as their career prospects 
depend on the success of the startup or on their ability to convince potential 
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employers that they have, in fact, learned a great deal through their experience and 
are willing and able to do it again. This requires employees to express full 
commitment to narratives put forth by the organization and about startup life more 
generally: 
You can’t have a Plan B in [a startup]. You can only have a Plan A and you have to 
put all-in, all the time. - MP: Employee 
It’s hard to know with your friends who are in startups because you have to be in 
this constant sales mode. Even when I’m speaking with my best friends about their 
ventures it’s impossible to know the full truth of health of the venture because even 
your closest friends will be, they must be in sales mode. They cannot speak to you 
truthfully about it, the picture is always rosy. It has to be.- KJ: Founder 
3.5 Discussion 
Most research on the startup experience has focused on founders and investors. Our 
study elucidates an important additional piece: the experience of startup employees. 
Prior research has provided conflicting evidence about the quality of startup jobs, 
(Stenard and Sauermann, 2016; Sauermann, 2017; Campbell, 2013), but more recent 
work increasingly suggests that, even after carefully controlling for individual 
quality and self-selection, working for a startup carries negative and long-lasting 
consequences for employees relative to joining a more established firm (Burton et 
al., 2018; Sorenson et al., 2018). Yet, high potential employees increasingly join 
startups, and they maintain a consistent set of positive expectations (e.g. Roach and 
Sauermann, 2015). These include personal fulfillment, the accumulation of valuable 
human capital, and financial gains. Our research suggests that, for a number of 
structural reasons, these expectations may be misplaced. 
The Structural Shortcomings of Startup Employment 
The key reason that startup employee expectations cannot be met is a fundamental 
misalignment in incentives and risk profiles between investors, founders, and 
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employees, which is reflected in and amplified by the structural configuration of the 
startup environment. Indeed, prior work has shown that investors push for more 
aggressive growth strategies (Goldfarb et al., 2007) and riskier innovations at early 
stages of the startup (Park and Tzabbar, 2016) than founders (and employees) would 
prefer (Arora and Nandkumar, 2011; Park and Tzabbar, 2016). Investors’ preference 
to professionalize startups in preparation for subsequent rounds of financing has also 
been documented (Hellmann and Puri, 2002) as a strategy to achieve market 
legitimation (Davila et al., 2003) and aggressive growth targets (Hellmann, 2000). 
However, prior research has not focused on the effects of these tendencies on startup 
employees. We find that these factors not only make it virtually impossible for 
startups to meet the expectations of the employees they recruit, but also end up 
relatively concentrating the downside risks of entrepreneurship on those individuals. 
This is not because investors or founders bear no risk, but because the structural 
configuration of the startup environment is such that their risks are diversified or 
mitigated, while those of employees are not. 
VCs are structurally protected against entrepreneurial risk by staged investments, 
diversified portfolios, and selective deal flow (Gompers and Lerner, 2004; Park and 
Tzabbar, 2016; Nanda et al., 2017). Founders, in turn, can forge strong relationships 
to VCs, which mitigate the costs of startup failure and allow for a rapid comeback, 
usually through a new venture (Bengtsson, 2013; Bengtsson and Hsu, 2010; 
Gompers et al., 2010; Hochberg et al., 2010; Wal et al., 2016). Employees, in 
contrast, have limited access to investor networks and have difficulty pursuing 
subsequent work opportunities, especially beyond the startup ecosystem. As a result, 
employees find few of the expected benefits in cases of startup success and can fare 
much worse in cases of startup failure. 
Expectations and Startup Employment 
There are structural factors that limit the extent to which employee expectations can 
be met, which raises questions about why individuals continue to hold such 
consistent and positive outlooks, with-out incorporating information about likely 
The aftermath of new venture failure 
134 
 
potential downsides. Our findings suggest that the same structural features that 
constrain the employee experience partly generate and sustain unrealistic narratives 
about startup employment. In particular, generalized positive expectations are 
required to attract high-quality workers to startups, so investors and founders have 
little incentive to challenge existing narratives. This is true even in cases when they 
know a narrative to be misleading, which made many of our interviewees 
uncomfortable. But we also find that employees play an active role in the 
perpetuation of inaccurate generalized expectations, both purposefully and 
accidentally, through four series of related and interlinked mechanisms. These 
insights build on prior theory about the social construction of valuations and 
unpopular norms. 
High-tech startups generate value by creating new realities. It is only by convincing 
investors, employees, customers, and other critical stakeholders of the plausibility 
and attractiveness of a yet nonexistent (and statistically unlikely) reality that startup 
teams can bring that reality to life (e.g. Kidder, 2011). This has several implications. 
First, the startup ecosystem is supposed to be optimistic. It was very common for our 
interviewees to express that, without being “at least a little bit crazy” a startup team 
does not have a chance to succeed. The downside is that when optimism is 
normative, it can severely constrain learning from personal experiences or from 
available data, even when there are clear incentives to learn (Armor et al., 2008; 
Massey et al., 2011). Second, and related, even when actors become less optimistic 
about a venture’s prospects, they are constrained from publicly expressing 
skepticism in any of its underlying assumptions, lest that get in the way of an 
already unlikely success. As a result, even though employees actively seek and share 
information through their professional networks (Neff, 2012; Ruef et al., 2003), they 
‘over-sample’ positive narratives, both because they are statistically more available 
to them and because they are motivated to seek them for personal reassurance. This 
creates an environment where, mechanically and merely through sampling 
mechanisms, biased narratives are more likely to persist (Denrell and LeMens, 2017; 
Denrell and Le Mens, 2011; Le Mens and Denrell, 2011). 
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In addition, even after employees have exited a startup (voluntarily or due to firm 
failure), they are unlikely to challenge prevailing narratives. In our setting, precisely 
because the expected growth, learning, and experience from startup employment 
was at best difficult for employees to articulate and often completely absent, it was 
costly or difficult for them to exit the entrepreneurial labor market (Sorenson et al., 
2018). The relative scarcity of exit options means that employees must frame their 
value in terms consistent with the entrepreneurial ethos, which entails demonstrating 
enthusiasm for and conviction in the value proposition of startup jobs. Indeed, from 
the recognition that startups are unlikely to succeed and will face significant 
uncertainty, founders and investors have learned to seek committed and enthusiastic 
employees. This results in an environment where, irrespective of their personal 
beliefs, investors, founders, and employees end up following similar scripts to match 
what they know is expected and valued by others. 
These mechanisms share some similarities to those proposed in the literature on the 
perpetuation of unpopular norms or regimes. In general terms, while an actor may 
privately disagree with a generalized norm – and may even suspect that many others 
also disagree – she can only observe public behavior, which makes it impossible to 
assess how many others actually disagree with the status quo and how many of those 
would actually be willing to publicly express their disagreement. Such pluralistic 
ignorance (Allport, 1937) can lead actors to follow and even actively endorse norms 
they disagree with out of fear that they will be the lone voice of dissent and face 
reprisals or exclusion (Heckathorn, 1988; Kuran, 1995; Centola et al., 2005). This is 
especially true in situations where knowledge of widespread dissent is not enough to 
invalidate a norm (c.f. Prentice and Miller, 1993) but overcoming an unpopular 
arrangement actually requires risky collective action (Kuran, 1995; Canales, 2016). 
While this need for collective action was clearly absent in our setting, individuals 
may still actively endorse a norm they disagree with if they have reason to fear that 
their actions will be interpreted as an active offense or a lack of commitment to a 
group, leading to unintended transgressions or social sanctions (Heckathorn, 1988; 
Centola et al., 2005). Swidler (1995) provides an early example of this dynamic in 
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her discussion of Christmas gift-giving, which individuals dislike but continue to 
engage in to avoid offending others. 
In our setting, however, we found that actors were driven less by the fear of 
sanctions than by their pursuit of market value. Indeed, recent theories of social 
valuation and the dynamics of market bubbles highlight that social valuations and 
objective conditions frequently diverge. Such a divergence can persist even if 
individuals understand objective conditions, as long as sufficient rewards exist for 
adhering to the socially constructed valuation. A classic example is Keynes (1960, 
1960) comparison of the stock market to a newspaper beauty contest, where the 
winner is determined not based on her ability to objectively evaluate beauty, but to 
accurately predict how others will evaluate it. Actors may thus have an incentive to 
act as if socially prevalent views are accurate, even if they privately disagree with 
them (Zuckerman, 2012; Turco and Zuckerman, 2014). 
The dynamics described in our paper add a mechanism to and consequence of such 
processes, as startup employees are not the beneficiaries or creators of this social 
dynamic, but its involuntary performers. Another contrast is that, in our setting, 
there is little incentive for actors to correct the myths, as there is no outstanding 
benefit to doing so. Given the inherent risks and uncertainty of high-tech startups, 
the pursuit of ‘home-runs’ has proven to be a dominant strategy (e.g. Baron and 
Hannan, 2002; Baron et al., 1996). 
Constraints to Learning in Startups 
A final, unexpected finding from our study is that the structural features of startup 
employment constrain the speed and quality of learning available to employees. This 
challenges what is perhaps the most widely cited benefit of startup jobs: the 
opportunity to learn more and faster than in comparable corporate settings (e.g. 
Campbell, 2013). Instead, we find that uncertainty and ambiguity – which are often 
believed to accelerate learning in startups – actually hinder individuals’ ability to 
learn. Specifically, uncertainty and ambiguity force startups to respond to 
unexpected challenges and opportunities as they arise (Baker, 1995; Baker et al., 
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2003; Miner et al., 2001), creating the need for improvisation, or the “deliberate and 
substantive fusion of the design and execution of a novel production” (Miner et al., 
2001, p.314). Learning from improvisation is possible, but it tends to be short-term 
and context-specific. This is especially true compared to more deliberate, 
experimental learning, which is more common in established organizations (Miner 
et al., 2001). 
In the case of startups, even short-term learning is rare. This is in part because there 
are so many variables moving at the same time that most outcomes are over-
determined. Most important, once improvisation solves the problem at hand, there is 
rarely the post-hoc reflection about (theoretical) counterfactuals, or the linkages 
between actions and outcomes that would distill learning. This opportunity for 
reflection is further limited by the need to quickly converge on a single narrative of 
the startup’s development and subsequent focus. The construction of convincing, 
consistent, and simple narratives about the organization’s development is a key way 
for startups to seek legitimacy and overcome the liabilities of newness and smallness 
(Freeman et al., 1983; Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001; Stinchcombe, 1965). These 
strong narratives not only limit the consideration of the broader distribution of 
potential outcomes, but also reinforce employees’ beliefs that they are learning from 
their experience by providing a deceivingly coherent, but mostly inaccurate, account 
of the organization’s development and performance. 
“Learning” in startups, therefore, is typically based on at best incomplete and more 
frequently absent counterfactuals, which often generates false beliefs about means-
ends connections. This is further reinforced by the mechanics described above, 
where startup teams are personally motivated and structurally constrained to ‘over-
sample’ on positive outcomes. This combination of factors creates a perfect 
environment for biased and superstitious learning (March et al., 1991; Denrell and 
LeMens, 2017; Denrell and Le Mens, 2011; Puranam and Swamy, 2016). 
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3.6 Implications and Conclusion 
Our findings highlight several structural shortcomings of startup employment that 
could systematically undermine the value and outcomes of working for a young 
firm. Given the importance and increasing prevalence of startup jobs, these findings 
have several practical and academic implications. 
Implications for Practitioners 
Our data suggest that employees join startups with a remarkably consistent set of 
expected personal and professional benefits that rarely, if ever, materialize. This 
starts, naturally, with the limited – and often biased – information they use to seek 
and choose jobs. 
Although there is relatively complete information on salary, lifestyle, and the career 
trajectory employees can expect when joining established companies, there is no 
comparable information to evaluate a startup job. The little information available 
suffers from extreme selection (and availability) bias, as it tends to come from only 
the most successful and public of startups, reinforced by a public narrative that 
lionizes ‘unicorns.’ Partly because of this, employees seem to consistently under-
invest in the negotiation of their work arrangements and compensation – including 
their potential professional development opportunities and career progression – 
before joining a startup. They certainly don’t invest enough time and effort to 
understand, negotiate, and value their equity packages. This is unfortunate, as 
startups have more flexibility in the arrangements they can reach with their 
employees (e.g., Turco, 2016). Employees could also seek, promote, and join 
broader information networks to avoid the insularity and bias of the self-contained 
startup community (Neff, 2012). This would allow employees to access a wider set 
of opportunities and, most important, to have more complete information. In that 
sense, it would benefit startup employees to also invest in sharing and seeking 
information about the salaries, stock packages, developmental paths, and especially 
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of actual outcomes of other startup employees, so they can collectively form more 
realistic expectations. 
To the extent that founders are aware of the relative vulnerability of startup 
employees, they have the ability (and, arguably, responsibility) to keep employees 
informed of the risk profile of the startup, to help them understand the actual value 
of their stock options, and to build opportunities for actual learning (more on this 
below). It is clear from our interviews that startup employees are willing to take 
significant risks in exchange for particular professional opportunities, such as the 
personal meaning they derive from having a more direct impact, so this transparency 
would likely only generate a stronger commitment from them (Grant, 2008; Turco, 
2016). 
More broadly, founders are often overly optimistic about their ventures (Cassar, 
2010), so they are not necessarily hiding information from employees. Rather, their 
own evaluation of the situation is often biased. Founders also often seem to 
underestimate the wider, longer-term implications of VC involvement in their 
ventures. This is true both with respect to the risk profile they sign up for when they 
accept VC investment (i.e., de-diversification, steeper growth curve, rapid 
professionalization, equity dilution, etc.) and the effects that VC involvement can 
have on their founding teams and employees (i.e., incorporation of professional 
managers, bureaucratization of the firm, high reporting burden). Given their often 
sincere concern for employees, increased awareness could help founders negotiate 
better financing terms on items that they might not otherwise consider important 
(i.e., development and retention guidelines, reporting mechanisms, employee voice, 
etc.). Yet, founders invest most of their energy negotiating on valuations, which 
have enormous uncertainty surrounding them, rather than establishing alignment on 
how to better develop the firm and distribute value should the firm succeed and 
grow (e.g., Goldman and Nalebuff, 2013). For some founders, increased awareness 
may signal the need to seek alternative, less intrusive sources of funding – even if 
accompanied by a more conservative growth profile. 
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The implications for investors are less clear. The structural features we describe in 
the paper are a fundamental part and consequence of the VC business model. This is 
especially true for the risk and diversification profiles, the information asymmetries, 
and the compensation structures. In our data, for example, employees exercised 
extraordinary effort expecting a set of benefits in return that, for the most part, 
investors seemed to know were not realistic. There remain issues, such as the 
excessive weight that is put on both success and failure of previous startups for 
employee hires and the relatively short duration of startup careers, where investors 
could do much to challenge their biases, which they all seem to know are not 
grounded in truth. Investors could also do much more to change the structural 
conditions that impede effective learning in startups. While this is another issue 
where employees are the most affected, as VCs are better able to learn across their 
different investments, all stakeholders would benefit from better learning within the 
organization. To achieve actual, effective learning, startups would need to establish 
specific capabilities – and bandwidth – for employees to learn from their improvised 
actions. This requires time, skill, and resources to construct appropriate 
counterfactuals and draw accurate cause-effect inferences (March et al., 1991; Miner 
et al., 2001). 
Implications for Policy 
Entrepreneurship’s role in shaping economic outcomes has been well documented 
across academic disciplines (e.g., Baumol, 1990; Hart, 2003). In particular, we have 
clear evidence that entrepreneurial activity contributes to broader innovation and 
economic growth (Samila and Soren-son, 2011), employment (Birch, 1987; Davis et 
al., 1996; Neumark et al., 2011), and aggregate learning (Acs et al., 2009). Recent 
research, however, has also shown that entrepreneurial activity can correlate with 
negative social outcomes (Cobb and Stevens, 2016; Sørensen, 2007; Dahl et al., 
2010; Sorenson et al., 2018). More specifically, to the extent that we believe that job 
creation and learning are two of the most important benefits associated with 
entrepreneurship, our study would suggest the need for a more balanced 
consideration of the consequences of startup employment. 
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Policies often promote risk-taking by startup founders and especially investors (e.g., 
the U.S. taxes investment gains at lower rates than other income sources, limits 
founder liabilities if startups fail, and gives founders tax breaks and other incentives 
to encourage firm creation). Yet, there are no policies to mitigate risks for 
employees. Rather, and perhaps as a result of other policies, there seems to be a 
systematic transfer of the risks of entrepreneurship from investors and founders to 
startup employees. Several policies could help. First, startup workers could be better 
shielded from the downsides of startup failure through better unemployment, health, 
and retirement insurance schemes. Second, startup employees do not have accurate 
information to make employment decisions. We hail successful entrepreneurs as 
heroes, but we have limited information on the risk profiles of the jobs they create. 
We thus need better data on startup employee career paths and out-comes to allow 
for better, more informed job choices. Third, significant public funds are expended 
to promote and support startups via tax incentives, university programs, and other 
means, yet the benefits are mostly concentrated in a small set of stakeholders. For 
some of these stakeholders, the benefits only accrue with startup success. When a 
startup fails, however, all its assets (people, technology, relationships, learning) tend 
to dissipate. We need better mechanisms to identify and allocate assets (including 
startup employees) when startups fail. 
Implications for Research 
Our study highlights the fact that we still need more research on startup employment 
to understand its effects on career trajectories, health, and personal fulfillment. This 
covers a wide range of questions, but an issue common across topics is the need to 
separate selection effects from treatment effects. This means collecting and 
analyzing longitudinal data on career progression, economic returns, life outcomes, 
and health effects of employment in different types of firms. There is also need for 
more qualitative data on young firms to better understand what it is truly like to 
work in a startup. The realities of startup employment described in our study stand 
in stark contrast to common depictions. Additional research is also needed to better 
understand the incentive misalignments we described. In particular, we need a better 
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understanding of the distribution of risks and rewards across different stakeholders 
in a startup. This is especially true with respect to the concentration of returns vs. the 
concentration of relative risks. 
3.7 Limitations 
This study makes several contributions to our understanding of startup employment, 
but it has several limitations. First, we only considered the experience of employees 
at VC-backed firms. On the one hand, we believe such firms represent a critical 
case, as there was no a priori reason to expect that employment outcomes would be 
systematically better in non-VC-backed firms. We know, for example, that larger, 
better funded, and faster-growing firms attract better talent, pay people better, and 
have a much higher likelihood of survival and success. We also know that small 
firms systematically provide worse jobs than larger, more established firms. The 
theorized benefits of startup employment are thought to accrue through the firm’s 
dynamism and despite its size. Thus, for most employee outcomes (career growth, 
employment prospects, personal wealth) we would expect our findings to be 
amplified in startups without VC investment. On the other hand, it is less clear how 
personal satisfaction, health, and learning outcomes may vary. For example, our 
findings suggest that VC involvement may exacerbate de-diversification and 
constrain learning. Compensation and equity outcomes could also be quite different. 
Firms without VC investment are less likely to grant employees an equity share. But 
they are also likely to pay lower salaries and thereby attract less talented individuals 
who would earn less in any firm. It thus remains unclear what a comparison of the 
outcomes of established firms, VC-backed startups, and independent startups would 
reveal, holding employee ability constant. The (limited) existing research suggests 
that VC-backed firms are indeed the best case scenario for employees (Sorenson et 
al., 2018), but more research is needed. Although our methods are well-suited for 
the type of exploration pursued by this paper, some of the questions that remain will 
require different types of data and methods, including longitudinal analyses of career 
outcomes for comparable employees across different types of firms and industries. 
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We end with the clarification that we do not intend to suggest that startup 
employment is necessarily a terrible experience only pursued by uninformed, naïve, 
or masochistic individuals. Much like free divers, freestyle skiers, and free rock 
climbers, our interviewees often described a unique or even addictive level of 
meaning, exhilaration, and flow from their startup work. Yet, there are two 
fundamental (and mutually amplifying) differences. Participants in extreme sports 
are not promised and do not expect unrealistic benefits beyond the experience itself. 
They are also conscious of the risks. In contrast to startup employees, they are 
keenly aware that they are diving without a tank or climbing without a rope. 
 
 
Notes 
1
Once individuals join a startup, they seem to be significantly more likely to remain 
in the startup labor market, see (Sorenson et al., 2018). 
2
Relying on retrospective interviews can create the possibility of bias. In this case, to 
the extent that such bias exists, we believe it would operate against our findings. 
Specifically, bias would likely have led VCs to point us towards their most 
impressive failed firms, which would have been less likely to have negatively 
impacted their members.
 
3
Initials in quotes refer to the identifying codes we used for each individual in our 
sample. The words “founder”, “investor”, and “employee” refer to the individual’s 
role perspective for the quote. 
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Chapter 4. Till death do us part? New venture 
dissolution and enduring work relationships
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Abstract 
Using the Danish Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDA), we explore 
the persistence of cofounders and early employees to continue their work 
relationships after the dissolution of the new venture. We investigate where these 
team-members continue their career and whether they pursue entrepreneurship 
together in another new venture. Overall, over 14% move jointly, and co-mobility is 
more prevalent among NVT members who worked jointly prior to founding the new 
venture and among those NVTs demonstrating high levels of homogeneity. 
Moreover, co-movers tend toward small firms and the private sector, and co-
mobility occurs largely in similar industry. A large co-move to new ventures, which 
is indicative of serial new venture teams. This also raises further question on team-
level dimension of learning from failure. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Each year, many entrepreneurs are confronted with the often-bitter reality of having 
to close down the business they only recently established. Given that new ventures 
face challenges associated with liabilities of newness (Bruderl, & Schussler, 1990; 
Stinchcombe, 1965), smallness, and adolescence (Bruderl, & Schussler, 1990), the 
universal rule is that only a minority of these new ventures survive. This makes new 
venture dissolution one of the most prominent events in any countries’ 
organizational landscape (Drucker, 1985; Knott & Posen, 2005; Shane, 2008). While 
there is a strong research tradition in understanding determinants of entry, survival, 
and growth (Santarelli & Vivarelli, 2007), the interest in understanding new venture 
dissolution, and its implications, has been more recent. 
In investigating the implications of the closure of the new venture, particular its 
close association with failure, existing research has mainly focused on 
understanding the financial, psychological, and social consequences for the 
entrepreneur, as well as processes of learning and sense-making (see Ucabasaran et 
al. (2013) for a review). More recently, Jenkins & McKelvie (2017) noted that this 
research treats such events with a sense of finality and expressed the need to 
understand what happens to entrepreneurs and their resources in the aftermath of a 
dissolution. In doing so, they demonstrated that the vast majority of entrepreneurs 
remain active on the labor market following the closure of the new venture, either as 
wage earners or as entrepreneurs. For those who re-enter, the dissolution might thus 
be merely a stepping-stone towards an ongoing entrepreneurial career (Sarasvathy et 
al., 2013). 
While these studies have investigated implications for individuals, consequences for 
teams have received far less attention. However, a significant share of new ventures 
are founded and run by teams. Furthermore, team-based entrepreneurship is often 
associated with superior performance (see Klotz et al. (2014) for a review). This 
type of entrepreneurship is also common among the growth oriented and is more 
knowledge intensive and, therefore, might be argued as being potentially more 
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valuable. As new venture dissolution is also common for this form of 
entrepreneurship, despite its association with superior performance, it might be 
valuable to understand team-based implications, particularly how some of the 
(perceived) value can be retained. 
In this paper, we investigate the mobility of NVT members following the dissolution 
in more detail. Focus on the NVT not only takes the perspective on what happens to 
the team following the dissolution, but also allows us to capture the transfer of one 
of the most intangible assets of former venture: the shared experience and team-
based human capital of NVT members. In case a new venture closes, shared human 
capital might evaporate whenever NVT members go their separate ways. However, 
NVT members might be in a position to continue working as colleagues, either to 
capitalize on their shared human capital, or because their shared experience and 
awareness of each other’s knowledge, skills and competences allows for effective 
collaboration and communication. This might be for another employer, but some 
come together to start anew, as a serial new venture team. Irrespective of the firm, 
the persistence of these ties could be interpreted as a sign that value is obtained in 
other organizational settings (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007). 
To investigate the extent to which NVT members stay together and what the 
determinants of these co-moves are, we rely on detailed information from the 
Danish register (IDA). This database allows us to identify all newly registered firms’ 
new ventures with two or more individuals. These might be early employees and/or 
co-founders and are referred to as new venture teams (NVTs). We follow these new 
ventures and NVTs and select those that closed after up to five years after founding. 
Upon identifying the dissolved new ventures, we identify the career trajectory of the 
NVT members following the dissolution and identify where they move to, that they 
remain together in the new career, and the extent to which they re-enter into 
entrepreneurship. Because we are interested to understand the determinants of co-
mobility we focus on the relationship that exist between NVT members, and more 
specifically on the relationship between individual pairs or dyads. 
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In examining the career trajectory of those NVT members who remain active on the 
labor market, we identify that 18.3% re-appear in organizations with former NVT 
members in the year following the dissolved new venture. Co-mobility is more 
prevalent among NVTs with prior joint work experience, which indicates that there 
are workers who follow each other in their careers. Moreover, individuals in a 
technical occupation are more likely to co-move. Finally, we find that NVT co-
movers are more likely to join small firms and re-enter into entrepreneurship by 
actively taking part in newly established ventures, preferably in the same industry.  
These findings are particular relevant for policy makers and entrepreneurship 
researchers. For policy makers, the findings demonstrate the dynamic nature of 
entrepreneurial process and that the closure of the new venture might be part of a 
continuous process of value creation. Consequently, following up on these 
entrepreneurs, including NVTs, might inform the development of more effective 
entrepreneurship policy.  For entrepreneurship researchers the findings call for a 
deeper understanding on the consequences of NVT mobility. Furthermore, the 
relatively high incidence of re-entry into entrepreneurship opens up a new avenue to 
understanding processes involving learning by failure, as this learning might not be 
limited to the individual level. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we discuss the overall 
theoretical framework and hypotheses. Subsequently, we describe the data, sample, 
and models, and then the results. The last section provides an overall discussion of 
our results and recommendations for future research. 
4.2 Theoretical framework  
New Venture Dissolution and the Diffusion of Knowledge 
There is a long history in using survival rates as a measure of entrepreneurial 
success.  While a large share of closure are associated with bankruptcies or 
otherwise poor (economic) performance, there is a recent body of literature 
investigating entrepreneurial exit that argues such dissolution cannot unequivocally 
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be regarded as failure. (Balcaen et al., 2012; Bates, 2005; Cope, 2011; Coad, 2014; 
Head, 2003; Jenkins & McKelvie, 2016; Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Wennberg et al., 
2010; Wennberg & DeTienne, 2014). Even when the new venture is forced to close 
down for the above-mentioned reasons, this does not necessarily mean that all 
aspects of the new venture failed, at least not for the entire period (Coad, 2014). A 
case in point is an entrepreneur who stated the following under interview
5
:“[My 
company] in its own way was very successful. Financially it was certainly not. But it 
was a well-regarded product and helped a lot of people, well-regarded technology 
before its time. So across the board, very positive for me.” 
Thus, instead of marking this event as the closure of a business, the forfeit of an 
entrepreneurial opportunity, or even the end of a career, we might consider it as part 
of a dynamic process where the opportunity, through employee mobility, is explored 
in another organizational setting (Jenkins & McKelvie, 2017). There is a well-
established body of literature that demonstrates how employee mobility leads to the 
transfer of knowledge and capabilities, both within and between firms (Almeida & 
Kogut, 1998; Song et al., 2003; Campbell et al., 2012). The mobility following the 
closure of the new venture might then be another form of employee mobility in 
which valuable assets are diffused to other organizations, thereby capturing value 
from these assets despite the closure of the new business.  
Hoetker & Agarwal (2007) have empirically demonstrated that such transfers take 
place.   Following the career trajectory of former employees from closed 
(innovative) businesses, they identified that these employees were the driving force 
behind a persistent citing pattern to patents developed in the “failed” businesses. 
Thus, employee mobility knowledge and capabilities helped in retaining knowledge 
and capabilities, which offered value in other organizational settings. Subsequently, 
the knowledge and capabilities have outlasted the existence of the businesses from 
where they originated. Thus, as stated by Ingram (2002): “The experience of a failed 
                                                          
5
 From interviews with founders, employees, and investors in the US and DK from 
the period of 2014 to 2016.  
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organization might be particularly likely to diffuse through employee mobility as 
participant in the failure go to new jobs” (p.657).   
Although such mobility can serve as a conduit for knowledge transfer, there are 
limits to this knowledge transfer as the closure of the business renders some 
elements of the knowledge inaccessible (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007). For example, 
the knowledge residing in organizational structures can no longer be accessed as the 
organization has disappeared.  
Capturing Value through Co-mobility 
In the context of a NVT, inaccessibility might be caused when knowledge 
capabilities and complementary assets that arise from teamwork disappear when the 
team dissolves. From the moment team members start to collaborate, they build a 
shared history, and develop shared experiences and routines (Pisano, 1994). 
Through these shared experiences, team members obtain critical information on the 
knowledge, skills, and personal characteristics of their fellow teammates (Katz, 
1982; Gruenfeld et al., 1996; Zheng et al., 2016). This knowledge allows teams to 
plan more sensibly, assign tasks to those who are best at performing them, and 
coordinate more effectively as team members can anticipate each other’s behavior 
(Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000). In addition, it also allows for the establishment of 
mutual trust among team members (McEvily et al. 2003). Furthermore, through the 
development of a shared experience, teams engage in joined knowledge 
accumulation, which causes them to develop team-specific human capital (Huckman 
et al., 2009).  
These shared experiences and team-specific human capital can be readily applied 
(Reagans et al., 2004) and would potentially be valuable in another organizational 
setting. Understandably, this requires that the team moves collectively. Existing 
research has demonstrated that organizations and individuals can benefit from such 
collective moves (Groysberg et al., 2008; Campbell et al., 2014; Marx & 
Timmermans, 2017). 
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Furthermore, the field of entrepreneurship has also been rather vocal in how the 
transfer of shared experience and team-based human capital can lead to the superior 
performance of new ventures. More specifically, NVTs where team members have 
joint prior work experience are better at attracting venture capital (Roure & 
Madique, 1986); have more speed in the delivery of new products (Beckman, 2006; 
Beckman et al., 2007); demonstrate higher levels of sales (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990); deliver a higher return on assets (Zheng et al., 2016); and have 
a higher likelihood of survival (Coad & Timmermans, 2014). 
Obtaining shared experiences and building team-specific human capital happens in 
all settings where individuals collaborate. Also in NVTs, where some have claimed 
that they are often engaged in more intensive communication compared to work 
teams in established firms (Zheng et al., 2016),  or when NVT members co-move, 
parts of the knowledge that reside in the organizational structures of the new 
ventures will remain intact.. The motive for co-mobility might be relevant for NVT 
members and prospective employers, irrespective of the organizational setting into 
which these NVT members co-move.  
Shared Entrepreneurial Experience, Learning, and Re-entry into 
Entrepreneurship 
While we have emphasized the benefits of co-mobility in terms of the transfer of 
knowledge and capabilities, the shared (entrepreneurial) experience might also offer 
benefits in terms of coping with closure and subsequent learning from “failure”. 
Entrepreneurship is associated with processes of experiential learning (Stam et al., 
2008), and many entrepreneurs make multiple attempts to start a new venture 
(Sarasvathy et al., 2013). Indeed, empirical studies demonstrate that close to 20 
percent of businesses are run by serial or habitual entrepreneurs in various countries, 
such as Germany (Wagner, 2004), Great Britain (Westhead & Wright, 1998), 
Finland (Hyytinen & Ilmakunnas, 2007), and Portugal (Amaral et al., 2011).  
Through their shared entrepreneurial experience, team members might have 
developed tacit knowledge of entrepreneurship, which provides them with more 
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entrepreneurial experience to recognize and evaluate potential opportunities (Baron 
& Ensley, 2006). Second, this joint experience of founding a new venture provides 
collective knowledge that guides the entrepreneurial process and reduces errors 
(Witt, 2000; Nielsen & Sarasvathy, 2016). As a result, it allows the team members to 
undertake aspects of a new firm’s activities more effectively in the future (Delmar & 
Shane, 2006). As the entrepreneurial experience has allowed team members to 
become familiar with each other understand their roles within the firm, they have set 
an important condition for overcoming the challenges associated with liabilities of 
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). Also, entrepreneurs with prior experience of business 
termination identified more business opportunities in a given period than those 
without such experience (Ucbasaran et al., 2009). Finally, staying together may 
provide the restart with greater access to the financial, social, and human resources 
(Kor & Mahoney, 2000) needed to re-enter. Therefore, besides value being 
obtainable from co-mobility in general, there are particular benefits that can be 
captured by re-entry into entrepreneurship as a serial entrepreneurial team.  
Admittedly, one reason for a new venture closure might be poor team dynamics. In 
these instances, the closure of the new venture and dispersion of NVT members is 
without much consequence and it would be rather unlikely that collaboration would 
continue. However, given that the dissolution of new ventures cannot unequivocally 
be classified as failure, there might be some value or particular intangible assets 
embedded in the team that might be lost when NVT members each go their separate 
ways. Subsequently, value might be retained when NVT members co-move, either 
to work for another employer or to engage in another entrepreneurial process. 
The question that arises is to what extent such co-mobility patterns occur, or more 
specifically: (i) to what extent do the NVT members stay together following the 
dissolution of the new venture; (ii) what are the determinants of these co-moves; and 
(iii) what are the destinations of co-movers and, in particular, the implications in 
terms of re-entry into entrepreneurship? This paper will address these questions. 
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4.3 Method 
Data and Sampling 
In our effort to answer these questions, we rely on the Danish Integrated Database 
for Labor Market Research (IDA). The IDA is a longitudinal and universal database 
based on government registers and administered by Statistics Denmark. The 
database contains information on all individuals, workplaces, and firms in the 
Danish economy. The IDA is well suited to our analysis, as we are able to follow 
career trajectories of individuals and can identify co-worker relationships. 
Furthermore, the unique firm and workplace identification numbers, in combination 
with the new firm registry, allow us to identify new ventures, the year in which these 
were established, and the year in which these new ventures terminated their 
activities. For our analysis, we limit ourselves to new ventures established between 
2001 and 2006; the lower bound is chosen due to a structural break in the data and 
the upper year restriction is a result of data availability.  
To create a clean sample of dissolved new venture, we only include new ventures 
where we know with certainty that the new venture terminated up to five years after 
founding based on the listed date of deregistration. Furthermore, by following the 
identification numbers of workplaces and firms, we exclude those instances where 
the new venture was subject to a merger and acquisition or experienced a change in 
ownership (e.g. an IPO). Other restrictions that we impose are based on size. First, 
we are interested in new venture teams and exclude all new ventures that involve 
only one individual. Second, we exclude new registrations with more than 10 
employees in the founding year. Via this restriction, we remove a large share of 
“false” new ventures, e.g. entry of new economic activity that is the result of entry 
from established firms from abroad, and can better deal with the complexity of 
relationships among NVT members. 
Finally, we exclude all new ventures in public or heavily public regulated industries. 
Following these rather strict selection criteria, we initially identify 3,330 team-based 
The aftermath of new venture failure 
166 
 
new ventures that ceased operations within 5 years of their founding. Please note 
that this sample will decrease further due to missing observations of NVT members. 
New Venture Team Members 
Our operationalization of the NVT concept is more inclusive compared to the earlier 
usage of the term. As such, our definition aligns closely with the work of Gartner et 
al. (1994) and Ruef (2010) on entrepreneurial groups and conceptualizes the NVT 
more as founders and joiners (Roach & Sauermann, 2015). Due to limitations 
imposed by government registers, we can only identify individuals who have a 
formal attachment to the new venture in the form of being a founder, employer, 
owner or an (early) employee. All those affiliated with a new organization up until 
the closure of the new venture are regarded as NVT members; however, we create a 
dummy variable that indicates if the individual was an NVT member in the year of 
founding. As an additional criterion, we determine that an NVT member has to be 
present with at least one other NVT member during the observational period to 
assure that the NVT members are actually collaborators; this criterion results in the 
exclusion of 60 observations. Given these restrictions, we identify 18,509 NVT 
members.  
NVT co-mobility can only be determined for those NVT members that remain active 
on the labor market, either as a founder/owner, an employer or an employee. 
Individuals who are unemployed, or otherwise outside the labor market, following 
the dissolution are excluded from the sample. The IDA allows us to identify the 
labor market status for all NVT members and we identify 15,038 (81.25%) NVT 
members who are still active (see Table 1).
6
 These findings mirror the work by 
Jenkins & McKelvie (2017), who find that the majority of owner-managers remain 
active on the labor market following the closure of the new venture. 
                                                          
6
 The remaining 18.75% can be classified as follows: Just over 6% are registered as 
unemployed or on sick leave. Close to 8% of the NVT members are outside the 
labor force; based on the information in the register, we identify that the majority of 
NVT members below the age of 25 are pursuing an education and the majority of 
NVT members over 60 are retired. Approximately 4% are no longer registered in 
Denmark, which means they either left the country, passed away, or are missing. 
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“Insert Table 1 Here” 
Besides the restriction that an NVT should remain active on the labor market, they 
also need to be affiliated with an identifiable workplace; in cases where the firm and 
workplace identification number is not known, the individual is removed from the 
sample. Finally, we observe 1,618 NVT members who return to, or never left, the 
employer they worked for in the year prior to founding the new venture. Because we 
were not able to identify whether this type of return really meant a move, we 
removed these individuals from our sample. Following these sets of restrictions, we 
identify 11,903 NVT members, who are affiliated to 2,403 new ventures. 
New Venture Team Member Dyads 
To understand the determinants of co-mobility we focus on the relationship that 
exist between NVT members, and more specifically on the relationship between 
individual pairs or dyads. There are both conceptual and methodological motives to 
focus on the dyad. First, dyads provide us with insights on the nature of the 
relationship between individuals, as we can identify how the characteristics of one 
NVT member align with the characteristics of the other. Individual-level analysis 
will not capture this effect. We are able to identify to what extend the individuals are 
similar in terms of some ascribed characteristics; for example, gender, age, and 
nationality. Focusing on dyads also allows us to identify other relationships between 
individuals that might explain why they decide to co-move; for example, prior joint 
work relations or family ties. Moreover, we can also link achieved characteristics, 
where some combined skills might be more prone to interdependencies in the 
workplace and, subsequently, would make NVT members more likely to co-move.  
Focusing on dyads is also methodologically meaningful (Harper, 2008; Coad & 
Timmermans, 2014). When limiting ourselves to dyads, there is a straightforward 
relationship, which is the relationship between A and B. When moving to larger 
teams, for example triads, the measurement becomes increasingly more complex. 
This is particularly valid when investigating mobility patterns, as mobility patterns 
of individuals within a team differ; for example, in a team of three NVT members 
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only two might co-move, while the third follows a different career path. Creating a 
team-level co-mobility measure, such as the share of co-movers, and investigating 
how team-level characteristics determine this co-mobility rate becomes less 
meaningful. To illustrate, in larger teams we might identify a certain level of 
homogeneity among team members, but we cannot determine, based on this unit 
level construct, if those that co-move reflect the homogeneity in the team. Second, in 
larger NVTs, we are also confronted with subgroups of co-movers who each co-
move to different employers. The motives for each subgroup to co-move might 
differ, and each subgroup might have different dyad-level characteristics.  
Dyads are created by linking each NVT member with another NVT member, 
irrespective of co-mobility, making the total number of dyads per new venture 
𝑛𝑗∙(𝑛𝑗−1)
2
, 
where 𝑛𝑗 is the number of NVT members in new venture 𝑗.
7
 In total, our sample of 
NVT members yields 36,403 unique dyads. 
New Venture Team Co-mobility 
Our main variable of interest is to identify whether the two individuals that make up 
the dyad are co-movers. In this instance, we are rather strict in determining co-
mobility since the two NVT members should not only re-appear working for the 
same employer, but also re-appear in working at the same workplace or workplace 
address. In this approach, we follow Marx & Timmermans (2017), who argue that 
moving to the same workplace would be a more accurate indicator for a persisting 
work relationship as movement to the same employer might result in NVT members 
ending up working at different locations, particularly when the organization is 
larger. As an indicator for co-mobility, we create a dummy variable with the value 
“one” when co-mobility occurs and “zero” otherwise. 
                                                          
7
 To illustrate, an NVT consisting of two members will provide us with one dyad, an 
NVT consisting of three members has three dyadic work relationships, and an NVT 
consisting of four members consists of six dyads. 
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Dyad-level Characteristics 
The detailed person level information obtained from the IDA allows us to create a 
set of dyad-level variables. First, we create dyad-level indicators on ascribed 
characteristics such as gender, age, and nationality. For gender, we create dummy 
variables for all-male dyads and all-female dyads, the mixed-gender dyad being the 
omitted category in our regression analysis. For age, we create a measure for the 
average age of the individuals in the dyad and the age dispersion, measured by the 
absolute age difference in the dyad. For nationality, we make a simple distinction 
between Danish and foreign citizens creating a dummy variable for all-Dane dyads 
and all-foreign dyads, the mixed Danish-foreign dyad being the omitted category.  
Homogeneity on these dimensions is often associated with effective interpersonal 
collaboration and reduced conflict (Jackson et al., 2003). In addition, similarity on 
these ascribed characteristics is a strong predictor of team formation (Williams & 
O’Reilly, 1998), also within entrepreneurship (Ruef et al., 2003). Thus, we expect 
that homogeneous dyads are more likely to demonstrate persistence in their work 
relationships, also because heterogeneity in the dyad might have been the reason 
why they closed the new venture in the first place. 
The individuals in the dyad might also have established relationships besides being 
NVT members. Such relationships might determine largely the extent to which NVT 
members co-move, and might also explain why they are NVT members in the first 
place. The first relation we identify is whether the dyad consists of members from 
the same family. For family ties, we identify spousal relationships, relationships 
between siblings, and relationships between parents and their children. Among 
family dyads, we expect a stronger commitment to continue a working relationship. 
Another relationship we identify is whether NVT team members have a joint work 
relationship prior to establishing the new venture. As highlighted in the theory 
section, research on entrepreneurship has demonstrated the importance of prior joint 
work experience (Coad & Timmermans, 2014; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Roure & Maidique, 1986), and this experience might be a determinant for 
subsequent co-mobility. We created a dummy variable with the value “one” 
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whenever the individuals in the dyad worked at the same workplace prior to 
establishing the new venture; the dummy variable receives a “zero” otherwise. 
As for the achieved characteristics, we rely on the educational background of the 
individuals in the dyad, mainly as these are the only variables at our disposal. First, 
we create a variable indicating the average education level, measured in years of 
education. Second, we create a measure indicating the disparity in education level, 
and, similar to age, we measure this dispersion by the absolute difference in years of 
education. In addition, we create a dummy variable indicating whether the dyad 
includes one or two individuals with a college degree, a technical or engineering 
degree, or a business degree. 
In creating these educational disciplines, we attempt to capture motives that underlie 
the joint knowledge accumulation and complementarity arguments for co-mobility. 
More specifically, we argue that joint knowledge accumulation is strong for 
technically oriented team members, specifically when the dyads are comprised of 
two engineers. Individuals with a technical background are more inclined to work on 
joint projects, due to the interdependent nature of technical work. They have 
common tools and mental models to discuss and may find joint projects to work on. 
Besides, because of the complexity of technical work (Janz et al., 1977), individuals 
need to work with others to add more knowledge and share ideas. 
Finally, we define a set of dyad-level characteristics related to NVT membership—
that is, whether both team members were members in the year of founding, whether 
only one individual was a member in the year of founding, or whether both joined 
the team in later years. We develop a similar variable, but focus on whether 
members were present in the last observation prior to the dissolution. We also 
identify whether one person in the dyad is registered as the founder/owner of the 
business. 
New Venture and New Venture Team Characteristics 
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In addition to dyad-level characteristics, we also include overall venture-level 
characteristics. We identify different characteristics of the new venture including the 
size at founding, the year of founding, the location of the new venture (more 
precisely, whether the firm is located in the capital region), firm age upon closure 
(the longevity of the firm), and industry.  
For industry, we identify the different sectors within the NACE rev2 industrial 
classification system.
8
 To create a distinction in the rather broad sector of 
manufacturing industries, we divide this category into high- and low-tech industries 
using the OECD industry classification. Based on this classification, we create a 
subsample of new ventures that are active within high-tech and knowledge-intensive 
business services. New ventures in these industries spend a reasonable amount of 
resources on development activities performed by skilled workers. Therefore, NVT 
members from closed high-tech start-ups may tend to stick together, so they can 
continue to build on these earlier efforts. Furthermore, in close relation to the skillset 
in the dyad, individuals working in high technology industries are skilled people 
with technical abilities who, as mentioned before, are more interdependent in their 
work. Using the previously mentioned family relationship dyad, we also create a 
dummy variable with a value of “one” if at least one family relationship existed in 
the founding year of the organization. Based on this measure, we identify if this new 
business is a family firm.  
Finally, we include an indicator on how the firm performed prior to closure. As 
mentioned previously, research on new venture exit demonstrates that exits in 
general, and thereby closures of new ventures in particular, are not unequivocally be 
regarded as “failures” (Balcaen et al., 2012; Bates, 2005; Cope, 2011; Coad, 2014; 
Head, 2003; Jenkins & McKelvie, 2016; Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Wennberg et al., 
2010; Wennberg & DeTienne, 2014), nor are all “failures” completely without value 
                                                          
8
 These sectors are: manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail, 
accommodation and food services, transportation and storage, information and 
communication, financial insurance activities, real estate activities, professional, 
scientific and technical activities, and administrative and support service activities. 
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(Coad, 2014). The data does not provide us with information on the motives for the 
dissolution; however, we argue that those who perform better prior to dissolution 
have a potentially stronger signaling value regarding the abilities of the NVT to 
potential future employers. In addition to sending a signal to potential future 
employers, it might also maintain confidence internally in the NVT to persist their 
co-working relationship. As a measure of performance, we include a measure on the 
turnover in the year prior to the closure. Table 2 provides an overview and 
description of all the key variables. 
“Insert Table 2 Here” 
Post-Dissolution Employment Characteristics 
The variables listed above are meant to establish the determinants of co-mobility 
among NVT members. However, besides understanding the factors that drive these 
co-moves, we also want to investigate the particularities of their post-dissolution 
career trajectory, that is, for which type of firms these co-movers work for and the 
extent to which they re-enter into entrepreneurship. To identify the career trajectory 
following the new venture closure, we identify the new employer and create a set of 
characteristics on this employer, i.e., size industry and age. In addition to the age of 
the firm, we also identify, by using the previously mentioned new firm register, 
whether this new employer is a newly established business.  
4.4 Results 
 In Table 3, we present an overview on the descriptive statistics and elaborate on 
differences in means between co-moving and non-co-moving dyads. As we have 
already established, we identify 36,403 dyads, which are constructed based on 
11,903 individuals. Given on our measure for co-mobility, we identify 2,870 co-
moving dyads. Breaking down these dyads into unique individuals, there are 2,174 
individual co-movers; thus, the rate of co-mobility among NVT members is 
approximately 18.3 percent. 
“Insert Table 3 Here” 
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Regarding the overall descriptive statistics, we also observe in this sample an 
overrepresentation of males; consequently, the male dyads are most frequent. Based 
on a difference in mean test, the share of male dyads is relatively larger among co-
movers. The average age of individuals in the dyads is around 28.6, but co-moving 
dyads are older on average compared to non-co-moving dyads. The age difference is 
significantly higher among co-movers. In term of nationality, there are relatively 
more foreign dyads among co-movers, while the Dane-foreigner dyad has a 
relatively higher share among the non-co-moving dyads. 
Within the dyads, two and six percent of dyads consist of family and prior joint 
experience dyads respectively. When breaking down the dyads into individual 
observations, we find that eight percent of NVT members work with at least one 
family member and 16 percent worked with another NVT member for a previous 
employer. The share of family ties and prior joint experience dyads are, not 
surprisingly, significantly larger among co-movers. 
In terms of education, dyads with at least one individual with a college degree are 
relatively more common in our co-moving dyads; subsequently, the same is valid for 
college degree dyads. There is no significant difference in education level 
difference. There are relatively more dyads with at least one NVT member with a 
technical or business degree among the co-moving dyads; this also holds for dyads 
that consist of only technical or business degrees. 
When the dyad is observed in the year up to closure, they are also more likely to 
continue their work relationship post-dissolution. Furthermore, the founder is more 
often likely to be part of the co-moving dyad. Otherwise, when a dyad works for a 
family firm, co-mobility is relatively less frequent. Co-mobility is more frequent 
when the dyad worked in a knowledge-intensive or high-tech industry. Moreover, 
NVT members’ dyads of a better performing new venture are more likely to stay 
together.  
Logistic Regression Analysis  
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Theoretically, the longitudinal nature of the register offers possibilities to apply 
panel regression techniques; however, the five-year period in which we observe 
entry and subsequent closure does not offer any repeated instances of the event 
under investigation. This means that there are no observations where a dyad co-
moves to a newly established venture that closes within five year of founding and 
where this dyad subsequently co-moves. Consequently, we apply logistic regression 
analysis instead.  
The results of this logistic regression analysis are presented in Table 4. This table 
contains several models where we create a set of subsamples that allow us to explore 
various aspects of the NVT co-mobility phenomenon in more detail. Model 1 and 
Model 2 present the logistic regression analysis for the full sample, the difference 
between these two models is that in Model 1 we only control if the co-moving dyad 
works for a new venture in a knowledge-intensive industry, while Model 2 includes 
unreported dummy variables for our more detailed sector classification.  
The results of these models confirm most of the findings from the bivariate tests. 
First, dyads from new ventures in knowledge-intensive industries are 1.5 (=e^0.423) 
times more likely to co-move compared to dyads that worked in non-knowledge-
intensive industries. In both models, the college degree dyad (odd ratio of 2.3) and 
technical/engineering education dyad (odds ratio of 1.7) are also strongly significant. 
Given that the presence of one person with a technical/engineering education is not 
as strong and not that significant is a sign that there is some value in pairs with 
similar backgrounds. 
Established relations between NVT members demonstrate to have a particularly 
strong effect. Family members are around three times more likely to co-move and 
NVT members with prior joint experience are around 2.7 times more likely. The 
latter demonstrates that some individuals tend to follow each other in their career 
trajectory. 
 Furthermore, male dyads are 1.3 times more likely to co-move than other gender 
dyads, although this effect drops to 1.2 times more likely to co-move in Model 2 
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where we apply more detailed industry controls. Where more detailed industry 
controls are applied, the female dyads are more likely to co-move (odds ratio of 
1.16) although on a 10 percent level of significance. Foreign dyads are 1.44 times as 
likely to co-move compared to any other dyad. As expected, when firms perform 
better, there is also a higher likelihood that co-mobility occurs. 
Our sample of NVT members include all individuals that were part of the new 
venture from founding to dissolution. The question that might arise is whether early 
NVT relationships drive the co-mobility process, or through involving new team 
members in later years better matches are created that might lead to post-dissolution 
co-mobility. In Model 3, we investigate the subsample of NVT members that were 
present in the new venture in the year of founding. The ascribed characteristics and 
previous co-worker relationships are stronger determinants of co-mobility; similar to 
these measures are also strong determinants of team formation (Ruef et al., 2003). 
The education-based measures lose some of their effect and the technical and 
business dyads are only significant on the 10 percent level of significance. Why we 
see this weaker effect among these education-based variable might be explained by 
the founding process of new ventures being driven first and foremost by similarity in 
the ascribed characteristics; when the business grows, founders are aware of the 
competences they lack and let NVT members with greater skills sets join (Kaiser & 
Müller, 2015). Furthermore, when the business grows, it is also easier to involve 
more highly educated members in the new venture (Bublitz et al., 2018). Since these 
skills are then important in further development of the business, the value is 
identified and NVT members might recognize the potential value post-dissolution. 
Family and NT members with prior joint experience maintain their strong effect. 
The performance of the new venture remains positive, but better performance is a 
stronger motivator for first year NVT members to remain together. 
“Insert Table 4 Here” 
As the previous models have demonstrated, family ties and prior joint experience are 
strong determinants for co-mobility. Consequently, it might not necessarily be the 
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shared experience and joint knowledge accumulation in the new venture that makes 
these individuals co-move shared experiences and human capital from a previous 
workplace. In Model 4, we create a subsample removing dyads with such 
relationships. Overall, the variables point in the same direction in terms of the 
determinants of co-mobility. Noticeable differences visible on the male dyads are no 
longer significant and female dyads are more likely to co-move. Otherwise, college 
dyads are more likely to co-move, while technical/engineer skills lose some of their 
effect size, although it remains positive with a strong effect size (odds ratio of 1.44). 
The latter might indicate that there is a relatively higher share of individuals with a 
technical/engineering education background among those dyads with previous joint 
work experience, which a t-test confirms. Thus, the fact that individuals with a 
technical and engineering background have shared prior joint work experience is 
indicative that the joint knowledge accumulation might be valuable in a future 
employment setting.   
Model 1 established that NVT dyads in knowledge intensive industries are more 
likely to co-move. In Model 5, we look more closely at NVT mobility in this 
industry class. In this subsample, some differences stand out. Family ties are no 
longer of importance, while the role of joint previous experience increases in 
strength (odds ratio= 3.2). Furthermore, college dyads are no longer a factor that 
plays a role, but if it does it is negative. Dyads that comprise of two NVT members 
with a technical/engineering education demonstrate the strongest effect yet (odds 
ratio =2.1).  Since we earlier established that these dyads also tend to have prior 
joint work experience, it appears that in these there is a strong connection between 
these individuals in terms of co-mobility. Individuals with a technical and 
engineering background might thus jump in and out of entrepreneurship in a team in 
a form of habitual hybrid entrepreneurship. Contrary to other subsamples, the 
performance of the new venture is no longer significant.  
In Table 5, we will utilize the different level of turnover prior to dissolution to make 
a distinction between low-performing and high-performing dissolution. As noted 
previously, entrepreneurs close their business for various reasons and a closure can 
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therefore not necessarily be regarded as failure. Nevertheless, closure associated 
with poor performance is more likely to be perceived as failure as fall in revenues 
and rise of expenses are major issues that the firm becomes insolvent and founders 
cannot continue the business (Shepherd, 2003) and we expect differences in mobility 
patterns and characteristics of NVT dyads. To test this we ran six models for testing 
the co-mobility in low-performing (failure) vs. high-performing businesses. We by 
identifying whether the new venture had above or below median turnover (Model 6, 
Model 7 and Model 8) in the year prior to dissolution and if the new venture 
belonged to respectively the top bottom quartile of performance (Model 9, Model 10 
and Model 11).   
Model 6 and Model 9 in Table 5 confirm that NVT with higher level of performance 
are more inclined to co-move. Above median performance are 1.43 (E^0.362) more 
likely to co-move than below median performers. The upper quartile of performance 
are nearly twice as likely to co-move (odds ratio of E^0.64=1.89) times more likely 
to co-move (compared to a benchmark of those teams that perform between the 25
th
 
and 75
th
 percentile), while the bottom quartile has a lower probability (odds ratio of 
E^-0.145=0.87) of co-moving.   
Subsample analysis demonstrates that that family co-movement and team members 
with prior work experiences tend to co-move in both high and low performing 
businesses. This can be the evidence that irrespective of the new venture 
performance, persistent work relationships and strong ties can be the elements that 
provide the trust and commitment among team members and facilitate resource 
acquisition and implementation of techniques (Venkataraman, 1997) to the 
organization they move. Another interesting finding is that co-mobility is significant 
among the end dyads in both high and low performing dissolutions. This might be a 
sign that individuals with a short period of joint working experiences tend to 
continue working with each other and build their relationships and trust in order to 
boost their performance in new organizations. Furthermore, founding dyads are 
more likely to co-move even in low-performing businesses. This may be because of 
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the joint decision of the founders in termination of the business to discover new 
opportunities, or switching costs (Bates, 2005).  
“Insert Table 5 Here” 
Destination of NVT co-movers 
While we established that co-mobility is rather common among NVT members and 
that some NVT members are more likely to co-move than others, e.g. those with a 
technical/engineering background and those who work in knowledge-intensive 
industries, we have not established the location where they move to.
9
 For destination 
characteristics, we focus on the following metrics: size, industry, and whether the 
future career track is a newly established venture. Descriptive statistics are presented 
in Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8.  
 
“Insert Table 6 Here” 
“Insert Table 7 Here” 
“Insert Table 8 Here” 
 
In terms of size (see table 6), co-movers, tend to move to smaller employers rather 
than larger employers. Since co-movers move to smaller firms, this might also 
strengthen the claim that they are actually collaborating in their future career. Co-
movers are also more likely to move to firms that are active in the same four-digit 
NACE industry class, which might indicate that they also rely more heavily on the 
same industry experience. In terms of re-entry into entrepreneurship, the results are 
rather striking (see Table 8). Co-movers are affiliated with 783 unique post-
dissolution firms; however, 177 (22.6%) are new ventures. This stands in stark 
                                                          
9
 However, in our sample selection we identified that a large share of those 
confronted with exits remain active on the labor market 
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contrast with the number of new ventures that non-co-movers are associated with 
(which is 619, but only 9.4 percent). This might also link strongly to the results in 
Table 6 and Table 7, as most of the new ventures will be small in size and are most 
likely to be established in the same industry.  
On the individual level, just over 22 percent of co-movers are affiliated with a new 
venture compared to 6.5 percent of non-co-movers. Although 18 percent of NVT co-
movers make up 43 percent of NVT members that are part of a newly established 
venture following the dissolution. Consequently, not only are co-movers linked to 
new ventures, but they also establish a relatively large share of the new ventures, 
potentially as serial or habitual NVTs. 
To analyze the distinction between co-movers and co-movers who enter into 
entrepreneurship more explicitly, we ran two sets of regressions, which we present 
in Table 9. First, we ran a logistic model comparing co-moving dyads that re-enter 
into entrepreneurship with co-moving dyads who do not (Model 12, Model 14, and 
Model 16). In addition, we ran three multinomial logistic models (Model 13, Model 
15, and Model 17), which extend the models presented in Table 4. Here we compare 
the two types of co-moving dyads to non-co-moving dyads.  
“Insert Table 9 Here” 
What these models demonstrate is that the determinants of co-mobility into 
entrepreneurship and co-mobility in other forms of employment are not the same. 
Especially the education-based measures point in different directions in the 
difference models. While dyads with a college degree are more likely to co-move, 
they are less likely to do so in the form of re-entry into entrepreneurship. A potential 
reason might be that their opportunity cost of continuing entrepreneurship is too 
high. Similar patterns can be observed for dyads with a technical/engineering 
background. The instances where dyads are more likely to re-enter into 
entrepreneurship are when it involves a founder and in case of knowledge-intensive 
new ventures where the dyad had prior joint work experience and demonstrated 
better performance in the new venture.  
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4.5 Discussion and final remarks  
We know very little about what happens to NVTs when new ventures dissolve. It is 
expected that most NVT members, just like their owner managers (Jenkins & 
McKelvie, 2017), will continue their careers by applying their skills and 
competencies in other organizational settings. In the context of NVTs, investigating 
post-dissolution job mobility is valuable, as much of the shared experience and team 
human capital might disappear if the team dissolves along with the new venture.  
We demonstrate that the closure of the new venture does not necessarily mean that 
NVT work relationships end. With the purpose of contributing to the debate on the 
extent of co-movement of NVTs after new venture exits, we ran an analysis on 
Danish new ventures. We analyzed 2,403 NVTs consisting of 11,903 individuals 
whom we identified from the Danish register in the period between 2001 and 2006. 
This sample allowed us to identify NVT co-mobility, the determinants of this co-
mobility at the dyad levels, and the destination of co-movers, specifically re-entry 
into entrepreneurship. 
The first contribution of this study is that it establishes that NVT co-mobility is a 
common phenomenon, as 18.3% of the samples are shown to have co-moved 
(conditional on being active on the labor market). Thus, these relationships persist 
after new venture closure, despite a diminished quality of social relationships 
(Sutton & Callahan, 1987) and the consequence of the creation of a stigma around 
new venture closures (Cardon et al., 2011). Furthermore, previous social ties play a 
particularly important role, as prior joint work experience and family ties increase 
the likelihood of individuals co-moving. Therefore, it appears that some individuals 
follow each other in their careers. Having such strong social ties might be important 
in itself, as they are believed to improve the performance of both workers and firms 
(Boselie et al., 2001; Gelderblom & de Koning, 1996). 
The dyad-level analysis highlights that co-mobility occurs more frequently among 
homogeneous groups, indicating that people with similar human capital 
characteristics (age, gender, education, and occupation) are more inclined to 
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collectively pursue their careers. The results of previous research have also shown 
that team composition is based on similarities rather than differences (Ruef et al., 
2003). This might be due to the existence of common interests (Martin & Yeung, 
2006). As Louch (2000) indicated, it would be harder for people with different tastes 
and interests to remain in contact and work together. Previous research has also 
shown that from the gender point of view, men’s business discussion networks 
contain few women and, therefore, contribute to gender homogeneity (Aldrich, 
1999; Carter, 1994).  
Co-mobility occurs more frequently among individuals with technical and 
engineering backgrounds. This might be explained by the importance of 
collaboration and complementarities that emerge in their method of working and the 
overall complexity of technical work (Janz et al., 1977), such as the hand-overs 
involved in particular technical/engineering tasks. This was also shown by Ganco 
(2013), who found that co-inventors of patents were more likely to patent together 
again (at a different firm) when they had worked on more complex technologies. In 
these technical and engineering teams, complementarities may include learning to 
work with a shared set of tools or technologies. Such mutually dependent work 
relationships are also more frequent in knowledge-intensive industries in general; 
consequently, higher rates of co-mobility are not only found among workers with 
technical and engineering backgrounds, but also among NVT members working in 
knowledge-intensive startups. 
The second contribution of this study is the finding that a relatively large share of 
co-movers re-enters into entrepreneurship, i.e., larger compared to one-person 
attempting to establish a new business. Consequently, many newly established team-
based ventures are comprised of individuals who have shared experience of starting 
new ventures, and they might be referred to as a serial entrepreneurial team. 
However, the determinants of co-mobility for established firms and re-entry into 
entrepreneurship are not the same, particularly when it comes to more highly 
educated individuals.  
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Given the negative emotions associated with business failure, including pain, 
humiliation, blame, and anger (Cope, 2011; Shepherd, 2003; Singh et al., 2007), 
such failure may lead to the fear of continuing the entrepreneurial process and 
staying together may provide the restart with greater access to the financial, social, 
and human resources (Kor & Mahoney, 2000) needed to re-enter. Furthermore, each 
team member keeps adding to the variety of views, skills, and knowledge, and this 
enables the team to complete complex tasks (Ucbasaran et al., 2003). Furthermore, 
as the re-entry of NVTs occurs frequently, curiosity arises regarding aspects of 
team-level learning from failure within entrepreneurship, in addition to the 
individual-level learning currently investigated within the field of entrepreneurship 
(Nielsen & Sarasvathy, 2016; Sarasvathy et al., 2013; Shepherd, 2003; Stam & 
Schutjens, 2006). 
Limitations and Future Research 
Before concluding, we would like to highlight a number of limitations of our 
analysis. Since the study focused on Denmark, how valid our findings are for the 
institutional context in other countries remains an open question. Furthermore, we 
obtained our data from the Danish register, which was gathered using government 
records. Even though the data were heavily detailed and longitudinal, they pose 
some limitations with regard to investigating entrepreneurship. First, there were 
constraints on firm registrations and a lack of information on nascent 
entrepreneurship and the motivation for startup and closure. In addition, 
observations were only made once a year; we did not observe startups that entered 
and dissolved within the first year. Also, we only observed individuals with a formal 
attachment to the organization, and the exact role of each individual in the NVT was 
not known. 
With these caveats in mind, we have found support for co-mobility and subsequent 
team-level re-entry into entrepreneurship. Identifying the existence of these mobility 
patterns opens up other avenues for research. To better understand the mechanisms 
behind this co-moving behavior, it would be highly relevant to conduct field work 
aimed at constructing more grounded theory regarding NVT co-mobility. This is 
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pivotal, since it will allow researchers to observe different factors that cannot be 
identified through the dataset used in the present study, including what the 
underlying motives are for co-moving. 
Another implication of NVT co-mobility could be looking at this specific 
phenomenon from the firm-level perspective. It would be advantageous to 
understand how the entrepreneurs’ co-mobility affects the organization for which 
they work following the new venture dissolution. Does the new firm benefit from 
hiring these entrepreneurs? Besides, since founding a new venture is one of the 
results of our study, researchers might be interested in exploring how joint 
movement affects the success of a new venture. Does the new venture perform well, 
and how can the previous experience of the NVT that closed benefit the performance 
of the new venture? 
Finally, we want to introduce a new perspective to the growing body of literature on 
serial and habitual entrepreneurship—that is, the serial or habitual entrepreneurial 
team. The data suggest that this is not an uncommon phenomenon, particularly in 
high-tech and knowledge-intensive ventures. The existence of serial new venture 
teams would also call for studies that consider team-level perspective on failure and 
learning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aftermath of new venture failure 
184 
 
References 
Aldrich, H. 1999. Organizations Evolving, Thousands Oaks. 
Almeida, P., & Kogut, B. 1999. Localization of knowledge and the mobility of 
engineers in regional networks. Management science, 45(7): 905-917. 
Amaral, A. M., Baptista, R., & Lima, F. 2011. Serial entrepreneurship: impact of 
human capital on time to re-entry. Small Business Economics, 37(1): 1-21. 
Balcaen, S., Manigart, S., Buyze, J., & Ooghe, H. 2012. Firm exit after distress: 
Differentiating between bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation and M&A. Small 
Business Economics 39(4): 949–975. 
Baron, R. A., & Ensley, M. D. 2006. Opportunity recognition as the detection of 
meaningful patterns: Evidence from comparisons of novice and experienced 
entrepreneurs. Management science, 52(9): 1331-1344.  
Bates, T. 2005. Analysis of young, small firms that have closed: delineating 
successful from unsuccessful closures. Journal of Business Venturing, 20(3): 
343-358. 
Beckman, C. M. 2006. The influence of founding team company affiliations on firm 
behavior. Academy of Management Journal, 49(4):741-758. 
Beckman, C. M., Burton, M. D., & O'Reilly, C. A. 2007. Early teams: the impact of 
team demography on VC financing and going public. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 22(2): 147-173. 
Boselie, P., Paauwe, J., & Jansen, P. 2001. Human Resource Management and 
Performance: Lessons from the Netherlands, International Journal of Human 
Resource Management 12(7): 1107–1125. 
Bruderl, J., & Schussler, R. 1990. Organizational mortality: The liabilities of 
newness and adolescence. Administrative Science Quarterly, 530-547. 
Chapter 4. Till death do us part? New venture dissolution and enduring work relationships 
185 
Bublitz, E., Nielsen, K., Noseleit, F., & Timmermans, B. 2018. Entrepreneurship, 
human capital, and labor demand: a story of signaling and matching. Industrial 
and Corporate Change, 27(2): 269-287.  
Campbell, B. A., Saxton, B. M., & Banerjee, P. M. 2014. Resetting the shot clock: 
The effect of comobility on human capital. Journal of Management, 40(2): 531-
556.  
Cardon, M. S., Stevens, C. E., & Potter, D. R. 2011. Misfortunes or mistakes? 
Cultural sensemaking of entrepreneurial failure. Journal of Business Venturing, 
26: 79-92. 
Carter, N. 1994. Reducing barriers between genders: Differences in new firm 
startups. In annual meeting of the Academy of Management, August, Dallas, TX. 
Coad, A. 2014. Death is not a success: Reflections on business exit. International 
Small Business Journal, 32(7): 721-732. 
Coad, A., & Timmermans, B. 2014. Two's Company: Composition, Structure and 
Performance of Entrepreneurial Pairs. European Management Review, 11(2): 
117-138. 
Cope, J. 2011. Entrepreneurial learning from failure: An interpretative 
phenomenological analysis. Journal of Business Venturing, 26: 604-623. 
Delmar, F., & Shane, S. 2006. Does experience matter? The effect of founding team 
experience on the survival and sales of newly founded ventures. Strategic 
Organization, 4(3): 215-247. 
Drucker, P. 2014. Innovation and entrepreneurship. Routledge. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Schoonhoven, C. B. 1990. Organizational growth: Linking 
founding team, strategy, environment, and growth among US semiconductor 
ventures, 1978-1988. Administrative science quarterly, 504-529.  
The aftermath of new venture failure 
186 
 
Ganco, M. 2013. Cutting the Gordian knot: The effect of knowledge complexity on 
employee mobility and entrepreneurship. Strategic Management Journal, 34: 
666–686. 
Gartner, W. B., Shaver, K. G., Gatewood, E., & Katz, J. A. 1994. Finding the 
entrepreneur in entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 18: 5-
5.  
Gelderblom, A., & de Koning, J. 1996. Evaluating Effects of Training within a 
Company: Methods, Problems and One Application, Labour 10: 319–337. 
Groysberg, B., Lee, L. E., & Nanda, A. 2008. Can they take it with them? The 
portability of star knowledge workers' performance. Management Science, 54(7): 
1213-1230.  
Gruenfeld, D. H., Mannix, E. A., Williams, K. Y., & Neale, M. A. 1996. Group 
composition and decision making: How member familiarity and information 
distribution affect process and performance. Organizational behavior and human 
decision processes, 67(1): 1-15. 
Harper, D. A. 2008. Towards a theory of entrepreneurial teams. Journal of business 
venturing, 23(6): 613-626. 
Head, B. 2003. Redefining business success: Distinguishing between closure and 
failure. Small Business Economics, 21: 51-61. 
Hoetker, G., & Agarwal, R. 2007. Death hurts, but it isn’t fatal: The post exit 
diffusion of knowledge created by innovative companies. Academy of 
Management Journal, 50: 446-467. 
Huckman, R. S., Staats, B. R., & Upton, D. M. 2009. Team familiarity, role 
experience, and performance: Evidence from Indian software services. 
Management science, 55(1): 85-100. 
Chapter 4. Till death do us part? New venture dissolution and enduring work relationships 
187 
Hyytinen, A., & Ilmakunnas, P. 2007. What distinguishes a serial entrepreneur?. 
Industrial and corporate change, 16(5): 793-821. 
Ingram, P. 2002. Interorganizational learning. In J. A. C. Baum (Ed.), Blackwell 
companion to organizations: 652-663. Maiden, MA: Blackwell 
Jackson, S. E., Joshi, A., & Erhardt, N. L. 2003. Recent research on team and 
organizational diversity: SWOT analysis and implications. Journal of 
management, 29(6): 801-830. 
Janz, B. D., Colquitt, J. A., & Noe, R. A. 1997. Knowledge worker team 
effectiveness: The role of autonomy, interdependence, team development, and 
contextual support variables. Personnel psychology, 50(4): 877-904. 
Jenkins, A., & McKelvie, A. 2016. What is entrepreneurial failure? Implications for 
future research. International Small Business Journal, 34(2): 176-188. 
Jenkins, A., & McKelvie, A. 2017. Is this the end? Investigating firm and individual 
level outcomes post-failure. Journal of Business Venturing Insights, 8: 138-143. 
Kaiser, U., & Müller, B. 2015. Skill heterogeneity in startups and its development 
over time. Small Business Economics, 45(4): 787-804. 
Katz, R. 1982. The effects of group longevity on project communication and 
performance. Administrative science quarterly, 81-104. 
Klotz, A. C., Hmieleski, K. M., Bradley, B. H., & Busenitz, L. W. 2014. New 
venture teams: A review of the literature and roadmap for future research. 
Journal of Management, 40(1): 226-255. 
Knott, A. M., & Posen, H. E. 2005. Is failure good?. Strategic Management 
Journal, 26(7): 617-641. 
The aftermath of new venture failure 
188 
 
Kor, Y.Y. & Mahoney, J.T. 2000. Penrose’s Resource-Based Approach: the Process 
and Product of Research Creativity, Journal of Management Studies, 37(1): 109–
139. 
Louch, Hugh, 2000. Personal network integration: transitivity and homophily in 
strong-tie relations. Social Networks 22: 45–64. 
Martin, J. L., & Yeung, K. T. 2006. Persistence of close personal ties over a 12-year 
period. Social Networks, 28(4): 331-362. 
Marx, M., & Timmermans, B. 2017. Hiring molecules, not atoms: Comobility and 
wages. Organization Science, 28(6): 1115-1133.  
McEvily, B., Perrone, V., & Zaheer, A. 2003. Trust as an organizing principle. 
Organization science, 14(1): 91-103. 
Moreland, R. L., & Myaskovsky, L. 2000. Exploring the performance benefits of 
group training: Transactive memory or improved communication? 
Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 82(1): 117-133.  
Nielsen, K., & Sarasvathy, S. D. 2016. A market for lemons in serial 
entrepreneurship? Exploring type I and type II errors in the restart decision. 
Academy of Management Discoveries, 2(3): 247-271. 
Pisano, G. P. 1994. Knowledge, integration, and the locus of learning: An empirical 
analysis of process development. Strategic Management Journal, 15(S1): 85-
100. 
Reagans, R., Zuckerman, E., & McEvily, B. 2004. How to make the team: Social 
networks vs. demography as criteria for designing effective teams. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 49(1): 101-133. 
Roach, M., & Sauermann, H. 2015. Founder or joiner? The role of preferences and 
context in shaping different entrepreneurial interests. Management Science, 
61(9): 2160-2184. 
Chapter 4. Till death do us part? New venture dissolution and enduring work relationships 
189 
Roure, J. B., & Maidique, M. A. 1986. Linking prefunding factors and high-
technology venture success: An exploratory study. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 1(3): 295-306.  
Ruef, M. 2010. The entrepreneurial group: Social identities, relations, and 
collective action. Princeton University Press.  
Ruef, M., Aldrich, H. E., & Carter, N. M. 2003. The structure of founding teams: 
Homophily, strong ties, and isolation among US entrepreneurs. American 
sociological review, 195-222. 
Sarasvathy, S. D., Menon, A. R., & Kuechle, G. 2013. Failing firms and successful 
entrepreneurs: Serial entrepreneurship as a temporal portfolio. Small business 
economics, 40(2):417-434. 
Santarelli, E., & Vivarelli, M. 2007. Entrepreneurship and the process of firms’ 
entry, survival and growth. Industrial and Corporate Change, 16(3): 455-488. 
Shane, S. A. 2008. The illusions of entrepreneurship: The costly myths that 
entrepreneurs, investors, and policy makers live by. Yale University Press. 
Shepherd, D. A. 2003. Learning from business failure: Propositions of grief 
recovery for the self-employed. Academy of Management Review, 28: 318-328. 
Singh, S., Corner, P., & Pavlovich, K. 2007. Coping with entrepreneurial failure. 
Journal of Management and Organization, 13: 331-344. 
Song, J., Almeida, P., & Wu, G. 2003. Learning–by–Hiring: When is mobility more 
likely to facilitate interfirm knowledge transfer? Management Science, 49(4): 
351-365. 
Stam, E., & Schutjens, V. 2006. Starting anew: Entrepreneurial intentions and 
realizations subsequent to business closure. ERIM Report Series Reference No. 
ERS-2006-015-ORG. 
The aftermath of new venture failure 
190 
 
Stam, E., Audretsch, D., & Meijaard, J. 2008. Renascent entrepreneurship. Journal 
of Evolutionary Economics, 18(3-4): 493-507. 
Stinchcombe, A. L. 1965. Social Structure and Organizations, In J. G. March (Ed.), 
Handbook of Organizations. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Sutton, R. I., & Callahan, A. L. 1987. The stigma of bankruptcy: Spoiled 
organizational image and its management. Academy of Management Journal, 30: 
405-436. 
Ucbasaran, D., Lockett, A., Wright, M., & Westhead, P. 2003. Entrepreneurial 
founder teams: Factors associated with member entry and exit. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 28: 107-127. 
Ucbasaran, D., Shepherd, D. A., Lockett, A., & Lyon, S. J. 2013. Life after business 
failure: The process and consequences of business failure for entrepreneurs. 
Journal of Management, 39: 163-202. 
Ucbasaran, D., Westhead, P., & Wright, M. 2009. The extent and nature of 
opportunity identification by experienced entrepreneurs. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 24: 99-115. 
Venkataraman, S. 1997. The Distinctive Domain of Entrepreneurship Research: An 
Editor’s Perspective, in J. Katz and R. H. S. Brockhaus (eds) Advances in 
Entrepreneurship, Firm Emergence, and Growth, 119–38. Greenwich, CT: JAI 
Press. 
Wagner, J. 2004. Are young and small firms hothouses for nascent entrepreneurs? 
Evidence from German micro data. 
Wennberg, K., Wiklund, J., DeTienne, D., & Cardon, M. 2010. Reconceptualizing 
entrepreneurial exit: Divergent exit routes and their drivers. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 25: 361-375. 
Chapter 4. Till death do us part? New venture dissolution and enduring work relationships 
191 
Wennberg, K. & DeTienne, D. R. 2014. What do we really mean when we talk 
about ‘exit’? A critical review of research on entrepreneurial exit. International 
Small Business Journal, 32(1): 4-16. 
Westhead, P., & Wright, M. 1998. Novice, portfolio, and serial founders: are they 
different?. Journal of business venturing, 13(3): 173-204. 
Williams, K. & O’Reilly, C. 1998. Demograhpy and diversity in organizations: A 
review of 40 years of research. In Staw, B. and Cummings, L., editors, Research 
in Organizational Behavior, pages 77–140. JAI Press, Greenwich. 
Witt, U. 2000. Changing Cognitive Frames – Changing Organizational Forms: An 
Entrepreneurial Theory of Organizational Development, Industrial and 
Corporate Change 9(4): 733–45. 
Zheng, Y., Devaughn, M. L., & Zellmer‐Bruhn, M. 2016. Shared and shared alike? 
Founders' prior shared experience and performance of newly founded banks. 
Strategic Management Journal, 37(12): 2503-2520. 
  
The aftermath of new venture failure 
192 
 
Male dyad Both NVT members in the dyad are male 
Female dyad Both NVT members in the dyad are female
Mix gender dyad Dyad with male and female
Average age dyad The avereage age of the NVT members in the dyad
Age difference dyad The absolute age difference NVT members in years
Dane dyad Both NVT members have the Danish nationality
Foreign dyad Both NVT members have a non-Danish nationality
Dane-foreign dyad Dyad with Danes and non-Danes
Family dyad Both NVT members are part of the same family
Prior joined experience Both NVT members worked at the same workplace prior to starting the new venture
Average education year dyad The average years of education of the NVT members in the dyad
Education year difference dyad The absolute difference in years of education between NVT members in the dyad
1 NVT member with college degree Only one of the NVT members has a college degree (or higher)
1 NVT member with technical education Only one of the NVT members has an education background in engineering
1 NVT member with business education Only one of the NVT members has an education background in business and/or economics
College degree dyad Both NVT members have a college degree
Technical/engineering education dyad Both NVT members have an educational background in Engineering
Business/administration dyad Both NVT members have an educational background in Business and Economics
1 NVT member present at end Only one of the NVT members was present in the year prior to new venture exit
1 NVT member present at start Only one of the NVT members was present in the year of new venture founding
End dyad Both NVT members where present in the final observation before new venture exit
Start dyad Both NVT members where present in the first observation following firm founding
Founder dyad the registered founder/owner of the new venture is part of the dyad
Copenhagen The new venture was located in the Larger Copenhagen Area 
Family firm The new venture is considered to be a family firm
Knowledge-intensive industry The new venture is active in a knowledge intensive industry
Last-year turnover (10.000 DKK) Turnover in the year prior to new venture exit
Variable Description
Table 1: Labor market status of NVT members in the year following the new 
venture closure 
 
 
Table 2: Variables and Variable Description 
 
  
Labor market status in the  year after new venture dissolution (n=18,509) count %
Wage earner/entrepreneur 15,038       81.25 %
Unemployed/leave of absence 1,240          6.70 %
Outside the labor force 1,443          7.80 %
Unknown (i.e. migrated, missing, died) 788             4.26 %
Total 18,509       100.00 %
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no (n = 33,533) yes (n = 2,870) p-value
Male dyad 0.413 0.492 0.405 0.499 0.000
Female dyad 0.285 0.452 0.289 0.238 0.000
Mix gender dyad 0.302 0.459 0.305 0.262 0.000
Average age dyad 28.632 9.371 28.289 32.643 0.000
Age difference dyad 10.122 9.389 10.083 10.580 0.007
Dane dyad 0.856 0.351 0.856 0.863 0.263
Foreign dyad 0.041 0.198 0.040 0.051 0.006
Dane-foreign dyad 0.103 0.303 0.104 0.086 0.002
Family dyad 0.022 0.146 0.019 0.056 0.000
Prior joined experience 0.064 0.245 0.057 0.148 0.000
Average education year dyad 1.428 1.361 1.401 1.747 0.000
Education year difference dyad 1.393 1.509 1.396 1.357 0.188
1 NVT member with college degree 0.155 0.362 0.156 0.145 0.111
1 NVT member with technical education 0.176 0.380 0.172 0.214 0.000
1 NVT member with business education 0.203 0.403 0.202 0.221 0.013
College degree dyad 0.032 0.177 0.030 0.055 0.000
Technical/engineering education dyad 0.074 0.262 0.069 0.127 0.000
Business/administration dyad 0.033 0.178 0.032 0.045 0.000
1 NVT member present at end 0.206 0.404 0.214 0.110 0.000
1 NVT member present at start 0.280 0.449 0.278 0.296 0.044
End dyad 0.260 0.438 0.231 0.590 0.000
Start dyad 0.262 0.440 0.267 0.208 0.000
Founder dyad 0.196 0.397 0.192 0.242 0.000
Copenhagen 0.250 0.433 0.251 0.239 0.181
Family firm 0.236 0.425 0.241 0.187 0.000
Knowledge-intensive industry 0.122 0.328 0.118 0.175 0.000
Last-year turnover (10.000 DKK) 33.894 60.984 31.105 66.488 0.000
Values in bold are signicantly higher on the 5 percent level
Mean SD
Difference-in-means co-mobility
Variable
Table 3: Descriptive statistics and difference-in-means test for dyads (n=36,403) 
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MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5
Sample All dyads All dyads
Founding year 
dyads
Excluding family 
and prior joined 
experience dyads
Knowledge 
intensive and 
High tech 
industries 
0.261*** 0.166** 0.361** 0.112 0.369**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.14)
0.081 0.153* 0.206 0.177** -0.039
(0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.06) (0.24)
0.037*** 0.028*** 0.018** 0.032*** 0.050***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
-0.006* -0.005 -0.009 -0.002 -0.019*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
-0.103 -0.122 -0.028 -0.226** 0.308
(0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.08) (0.22)
0.321** 0.367** 0.650** 0.387** 0.256
(0.12) (0.12) (0.25) (0.13) (0.43)
1.150*** 1.148*** 1.004*** 0.243
(0.12) (0.12) (0.20) (0.56)
0.933*** 0.936*** 1.096*** 1.170***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.16)
-0.029 -0.045** -0.096 -0.067*** 0.069
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04)
-0.157*** -0.140*** 0.040 -0.171*** 0.047
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07)
0.175* 0.200** 0.009 0.303*** -0.507**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.17) (0.07) (0.19)
0.162* 0.126 0.158 0.136 0.065
(0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.17)
0.155* 0.139* -0.089 0.132 -0.380*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.07) (0.15)
0.838*** 0.829*** 0.240 1.022*** -0.679*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.33) (0.14) (0.28)
0.577*** 0.526*** 0.479* 0.367** 0.759***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.21) (0.12) (0.23)
0.303* 0.216 0.522* 0.320* -0.401
(0.13) (0.13) (0.24) (0.14) (0.26)
-0.167* -0.168* -0.192 -0.061 -1.332***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.08) (0.28)
0.085 0.183** 0.218*** 0.224
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.16)
1.376*** 1.330*** 0.676*** 1.560*** 1.076***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.06) (0.17)
-0.244** -0.125 -0.006 -0.476*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.23)
0.269*** 0.308*** 0.233* 0.355*** 0.447**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.17)
0.031 -0.058 -0.160 -0.046 1.099***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.17)
-0.026 0.031 0.111 0.073 -0.071
(0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.07) (0.37)
0.423***
(0.06)
0.003*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.004*** -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-4.153*** -4.235*** -3.723*** -4.472*** -4.728***
(0.19) (0.20) (0.45) (0.22) (0.56)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Startup size dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies no yes yes yes yes
firm age dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.151 0.162 0.135 0.166 0.267
Log Likeilhood -8524.205 -8419.641 -1932.575 -7030.669 -1138.614
N 36,403 36,403 9,551 33,317 4,323
significance levels***< 0.01; **<0.05; *0.10
Male dyad
Female dyad
Average age dyad
Age difference dyad
Dane dyad
Constant
Start dyad
Founder dyad
Copenhagen 
Family firm
Knowledge-intensive industry
Last-year turnover (10.000 DKK)
College degree dyad
Technical/engineering education dyad
Business/administration dyad
1 NVT member present at end
1 NVT member present at start
End dyad
Foreign dyad
Family dyad
Prior joined experience dyad
Average education year dyad
Education year difference dyad
1 NVT member with college degree
1 NVT member with technical education
1 NVT member with business education
Table 4: Logistic Regression Results Dyads 
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MODEL6 MODEL 7 MODEL 8 MODEL 9 MODEL 10 MODEL 11
All dyads All dyads All dyads All dyads 
Below median 
turnover
above median 
turnover
Bottom last turnover 
quartile
Top last turnover 
quartile
Male dyad 0.202*** 0.031 0.463*** 0.205*** 0.319* 0.058
(0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.14) (0.09)
Female dyad 0.153* 0.274*** -0.017 0.168** -0.143 0.119
(0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.17) (0.10)
Average age dyad 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.038*** 0.017***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Age difference dyad -0.005* 0.000 -0.013** -0.004 -0.016** -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Dane dyad -0.060 -0.196* -0.067 -0.086 0.183 -0.278*
(0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.20) (0.13)
Foreign dyad 0.351** 0.477** 0.220 0.343** 0.326 -0.332
(0.12) (0.16) (0.19) (0.12) (0.28) (0.24)
Family dyad 1.169*** 1.142*** 1.166*** 1.202*** 1.357*** 1.282***
(0.12) (0.20) (0.16) (0.12) (0.24) (0.34)
Prior joined experience dyad 0.925*** 0.864*** 1.053*** 0.941*** 0.882*** 0.872***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.17) (0.13)
Average education year dyad -0.127*** -0.093** -0.225*** -0.133*** -0.131 -0.005
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05)
Education year difference dyad -0.052** -0.067** 0.001 -0.056*** 0.055 -0.076**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
1 NVT member with college degree 0.222** 0.111 0.314** 0.242*** 0.076 -0.203
(0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.17) (0.12)
1 NVT member with a technical education 0.175** 0.007 0.296* 0.195** 0.032 -0.065
(0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.19) (0.11)
1 NVT member with a business education 0.135* 0.103 0.114 0.142* 0.016 0.014
(0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06) (0.18) (0.10)
College degree dyad 0.835*** 0.365 1.079*** 0.904*** 0.428 -0.314
(0.13) (0.22) (0.17) (0.13) (0.29) (0.30)
Technical/engineering education dyad 0.525*** 0.189 0.974*** 0.571*** 0.459 0.032
(0.10) (0.13) (0.17) (0.10) (0.27) (0.18)
Business/administration dyad 0.181 0.072 0.327 0.223 0.231 -0.246
(0.13) (0.16) (0.24) (0.13) (0.37) (0.20)
1 NVT member persent at end -0.173* -0.252** -0.157 -0.231** -0.122 -0.350**
(0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.17) (0.13)
1 NVT member present at start 0.203*** 0.340*** 0.023 0.224*** -0.221 0.455***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.16) (0.10)
End dyad 1.318*** 1.309*** 1.002*** 1.207*** 0.889*** 1.471***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.16) (0.10)
Start dyad -0.106 0.114 -0.319* -0.078 -0.684*** 0.200
(0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.08) (0.21) (0.18)
Founder dyad 0.274*** 0.310*** 0.424*** 0.307*** 0.566*** 0.316**
(0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.16) (0.12)
Copenhagen -0.049 -0.259** -0.017 -0.053 0.047 -0.754***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.13) (0.13)
Family firm 0.020 -0.212* 0.286** -0.015 0.011 -0.950***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.16) (0.16)
last year turnover (above median) 0.362***
(0.05)
last year turnover (top quartile) 0.640***
(0.05)
last year turnover bottom quartile) -0.145*
(0.07)
Last year turnover (10.000 DKK) 0.004*** 0.030** -0.171** 0.002***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00)
Constant -4.513*** -4.150*** -4.463*** -4.303*** -5.022*** -4.389***
(0.20) (0.29) (0.31) (0.20) (0.60) (0.43)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Startup size dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
firm age dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.157 0.132 0.176 0.163 0.155 0.211
log likelihood -8470.497 -5101.675 -3171.607 -8408.309 -1384.362 -3057.457
N 36,398 18,196 18,202 36,398 8,549 9,080
significance levels***< 0.01; **<0.05; *0.10
Sample All dyads All dyads 
Table 5:  analysis of the co-mobility on low-performing vs. high-performing dissolution 
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Table 6: Destination, size categories 
  # Firms 
  Comovers Non- Comovers Total 
<10 employees 337 13.3 % 2,204 86.7 % 2,541 
  46.4 % 
 
36.9 % 
 
37.9 % 
11-25 employees 149 10.8 % 1,228 89.2 % 1,377 
  20.5 % 
 
20.6 % 
 
20.6 % 
26-50 employees 73 9.0 % 734 91.0 % 807 
  10.1 % 
 
12.3 % 
 
12.1 % 
51-100 employees 45 7.8 % 533 92.2 % 578 
  27.0 % 
 
8.9 % 
 
8.6 % 
101-250 employees 27 5.3 % 486 94.7 % 513 
  3.7 % 
 
8.1 % 
 
7.7 % 
>250 employees 95 10.8 % 785 89.2 % 880 
  13.1 % 
 
13.1 % 
 
13.1 % 
Total 726 10.8 % 5,970 89.2 % 6,696 
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  # Individuals 
  Comovers Non- Comovers Total 
<10 employees 1,028 31.2 % 2,270 68.8 % 3,298 
  40.5 % 
 
26.6 % 
 
29.8 % 
11-25 employees 550 29.7 % 1,303 70.3 % 1,853 
  226.0 % 
 
15.3 % 
 
16.8 % 
26-50 employees 239 22.6 % 817 77.4 % 1,056 
  9.4 % 
 
9.6 % 
 
9.6 % 
51-100 employees 301 32.5 % 626 67.5 % 927 
  11.9 % 
 
7.3 % 
 
8.4 % 
101-250 employees 100 13.7 % 632 86.3 % 732 
  3.9 % 
 
7.4 % 
 
6.6 % 
>250 employees 320 10.0 % 2,871 90.0 % 3,191 
  12.6 % 
 
33.7 % 
 
28.9 % 
Total 2,538 23.0 % 8,519 77.0 % 11,057 
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Table 7: Destination, same industry (4 digit NACE rev2) 
 
 
  # Firms 
  Comovers Non- Comovers Total 
Same Industry 294 21.4 % 1,080 78.6 % 1,374 
  41.4 % 
 
18.3 % 
 
20.7 % 
Other Industry  417 7.9 % 4,832 92.1 % 5,249 
  58.6 % 
 
81.7 % 
 
79.3 % 
Total 711 10.7 % 5,912 89.3 % 6,623 
  # Individuals 
  Comovers Non- Comovers Total 
Same industry 1,183 49.2 % 1,222 50.8 % 2,405 
  48.0 % 
 
14.5 % 
 
22.0 % 
Other industry 1,282 15.1 % 7,226 84.9 % 8,508 
  52.0 % 
 
85.5 % 
 
78.0 % 
Total 2,465 22.6 % 8,448 77.4 % 10,913 
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  # Firms 
  Comovers Non- Comovers Total 
Established firms 606 9.2 % 5,951 90.8 % 6,557 
  77.4 % 
 
90.6 % 
 
89.2 % 
New ventures 177 22.2 % 619 77.8 % 796 
  22.6 % 
 
9.4 % 
 
10.8 % 
Total 783 10.6 % 6,570 89.4 % 7,353 
  # Individuals 
  Comovers Non- Comovers Total 
Established firms 1,693 15.7 % 9,093 84.3 % 10,786 
  77.9 % 
 
93.5 % 
 
90.6 % 
New ventures 481 43.1 % 636 56.9 % 1,117 
  22.1 % 
 
6.5 % 
 
9.4 % 
Total 2,174 18.3 % 9,729 81.7 % 11,903 
 
Table 8: Destination, new established firm 
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 MODEL 12 MODEL 14 MODEL 16
All dyads 
Excluding 
family and 
prior joined 
experience 
dyads
Knowledge 
intensive and 
High tech 
industries 
Comove 
Non_e'ship
Comove 
e'ship
Comove 
Non_e'ship
Comove 
e'ship
Comove 
Non_e'ship
Comove 
e'ship
0.214 0.089 0.502*** 0.249 0.011 0.554*** -0.453 0.405** 0.366
(0.15) (0.06) (0.12) (0.17) (0.07) (0.13) (0.52) (0.15) (0.33)
-0.688*** 0.210** -0.268 -0.708*** 0.232*** -0.202 -0.202 -0.064 0.278
(0.19) (0.06) (0.16) (0.21) (0.07) (0.17) (0.87) (0.26) (0.52)
0.014* 0.027*** 0.035*** 0.024** 0.028*** 0.047*** 0.044 0.046*** 0.055*
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
-0.014* -0.002 -0.014* -0.016* 0.001 -0.015* -0.055 -0.011 -0.070***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
-0.089 -0.112 -0.133 -0.268 -0.215* -0.214 -0.162 0.215 0.301
(0.20) (0.08) (0.16) (0.22) (0.09) (0.17) (0.91) (0.23) (0.50)
-0.135 0.320* 0.286 -0.437 0.340* 0.239 2.54 -0.223 1.574*
(0.34) (0.14) (0.24) (0.43) (0.15) (0.26) (1.50) (0.52) (0.79)
0.196 1.167*** 1.066*** 1.672 -0.637 1.343
(0.28) (0.13) (0.22) (1.57) (0.75) (0.82)
-0.662*** 1.027*** 0.525*** 0.574 1.086*** 1.368***
(0.20) (0.08) (0.16) (0.54) (0.17) (0.36)
0.042 -0.048** -0.021 0.034 -0.069*** -0.043 0.555* 0.037 0.256**
(0.07) (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) (0.02) (0.04) (0.27) (0.05) (0.09)
0.015 -0.156*** -0.102 0.029 -0.191*** -0.132* 0.267 0.029 0.515**
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.17) (0.07) (0.16)
0.300 0.152* 0.444** 0.245 0.255** 0.578*** -1.755 -0.368 -2.065***
(0.18) (0.08) (0.14) (0.22) (0.08) (0.16) (0.92) (0.20) (0.52)
-0.259 0.202** -0.207 -0.334 0.225** -0.243 -0.495 0.097 -0.313
(0.18) (0.07) (0.15) (0.22) (0.08) (0.17) (0.65) (0.19) (0.37)
-0.747*** 0.266*** -0.538*** -0.923*** 0.265*** -0.629*** -0.015 -0.425* -0.333
(0.18) (0.07) (0.15) (0.22) (0.07) (0.18) (0.63) (0.17) (0.35)
-1.311*** 0.990*** 0.087 -1.420*** 1.201*** 0.173 -4.996*** -0.551 -3.240***
(0.36) (0.14) (0.34) (0.41) (0.15) (0.38) (1.30) (0.31) (0.85)
-0.005 0.566*** 0.448* -0.05 0.386** 0.381 1.143 0.893*** 0.199
(0.28) (0.11) (0.20) (0.33) (0.13) (0.23) (0.95) (0.25) (0.51)
-0.808* 0.356* -0.461 -1.031 0.499** -0.581 -1.499 -0.283 -1.221*
(0.39) (0.14) (0.30) (0.54) (0.15) (0.40) (0.95) (0.27) (0.62)
0.479* -0.293*** 0.262 0.640** -0.216* 0.445** 0.318 -1.345*** -1.324*
(0.19) (0.08) (0.14) (0.24) (0.09) (0.15) (1.18) (0.32) (0.64)
-0.009 0.194** 0.158 -0.033 0.242*** 0.169 -0.205 0.266 0.056
(0.16) (0.07) (0.13) (0.18) (0.07) (0.14) (0.63) (0.17) (0.42)
0.088 1.333*** 1.314*** 0.14 1.577*** 1.528*** -1.085 1.409*** 0.148
(0.16) (0.06) (0.12) (0.19) (0.07) (0.13) (0.61) (0.19) (0.40)
-0.293 -0.057 -0.347* 0.127 -0.005 -0.022 -1.914* -0.277 -1.082*
(0.21) (0.09) (0.17) (0.24) (0.11) (0.17) (0.85) (0.24) (0.54)
0.389* 0.223** 0.592*** 0.355 0.282*** 0.586*** 1.379* 0.245 1.153**
(0.16) (0.07) (0.13) (0.19) (0.08) (0.14) (0.57) (0.19) (0.37)
1.114*** -0.265*** 0.691*** 1.541*** -0.279*** 0.803*** -0.674 1.084*** 1.007*
(0.18) (0.06) (0.10) (0.22) (0.07) (0.12) (0.68) (0.18) (0.47)
0.786*** -0.175* 0.667*** 1.026*** -0.184* 0.830*** 2.074 0.131 0.293
(0.15) (0.07) (0.12) (0.18) (0.08) (0.12) (1.68) (0.36) (1.10)
-0.001 0.004*** 0.002** 0 0.004*** 0.002** 0.033*** -0.009*** 0.021***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
-1.069 -4.679*** -5.298*** -2.331*** -4.758*** -6.173*** -1.498 -5.862*** -5.114***
(0.55) (0.22) (0.39) (0.64) (0.25) (0.45) (2.38) (0.63) (1.33)
Year dummies yes yes yes
Startup size dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
firm age dummies yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.210 0.267 0.553
Log Likeilhood -1085.246 -821.391 -99.865
N 2,851 2,316 443
significance levels***< 0.01; **<0.05; *0.10
0.1790.169
-9496.803
Start dyad
Founder dyad
Copenhagen 
Family firm
Last-year turnover (10.000 DKK)
Constant
College degree dyad
Technical/engineering education 
dyad
Business/administration dyad
1 NVT member present at end
1 NVT member present at start
0.320
MODEL 13 MODEL 15 MODEL 17
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
36,404 33,428 4,456
-1227.852-7854.759
End dyad
Prior joined experience dyad
Average education year dyad
Education year difference dyad
1 NVT member with college degree
1 NVT member with technical 
education
1 NVT member with business 
education
Foreign dyad
Family dyad
Knowledge intensive and 
High tech industries (mlogit)
Excluding family and prior 
joined experience dyads 
(mlogit)
All dyads (mlogit)
Male dyad
Female dyad
Average age dyad
Age difference dyad
Dane dyad
Sample
Table 9: Regression Re-entry into Entrepreneurship 
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Abstract 
This paper explores how an open approach to new venture creation – purposefully 
managing knowledge flows across the venture’s organizational boundary – can be 
beneficial for start-up entrepreneurs. Our inductive case study, of both failure and 
success, identifies the key attributes of this open approach and how they affect start-
ups’ short-term survival. We find that ecosystem collaboration, user involvement 
and an open environment directly influence new venture survival, and that their 
effects were moderated by the entrepreneurs’ open mindset. These findings carry a 
number of implications for entrepreneurship and innovation research and practice, 
providing some attention points for researchers, entrepreneurs, investors and policy 
makers interested in developing successful new ventures. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Venture creation is an important topic in entrepreneurship research (Shook, Priem & 
McGee, 2003). New firms are key drivers of economic development and industry 
evolution (Schumpeter, 1934). They are also essential job creators and competition 
facilitators (Birch, 1987). Technology start-ups are an important source of 
innovation and wealth creation and have thus become an important area of research 
(Shane & Venkataraman, 2003; Gruber, MacMillan & Thompson, 2008; Beckman 
et al., 2012). However, a large proportion of new firms fail quickly (Phillips & 
Kirchhoff, 1989; Dahl & Reichstein, 2007), and few grow to medium size 
(Kirchhoff, Linton & Walsh, 2013). A variety of factors, such as size, access to 
resources and the age of the new venture, have been suggested as determinants of 
the survival and success of new firms (Phillips & Kirchhoff, 1989; Klepper, 2002; 
Shane, 2003; Dahl & Reichstein, 2007). One of the factors suggested as being 
crucial to new venture success is openness to external knowledge sources, the 
importance of which is driven by the liabilities of smallness. The increased costs of 
research and development (R&D) and lack of resources have made open innovation 
increasingly important for researchers, practitioners and policy makers (Chesbrough, 
2003; Dahlander & Gann, 2010; de Jong, Kalvet & Vanhaverbeke, 2010). Open 
innovation implies leveraging external knowledge and commercialization 
opportunities by managing the flows of innovation-related knowledge and 
technologies across corporate boundaries (Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014; West & 
Bogers, 2014). While the extant research has explored some of the implied benefits 
(and costs) of open innovation in general and for entrepreneurship in particular, the 
exact mechanisms by which openness benefits entrepreneurs are not yet fully 
understood. Moreover, while some determinants have been identified, a holistic 
view of how different openness factors jointly determine the likely success of new 
ventures has yet to be proposed. We address this research gap by investigating how 
openness to external knowledge sources can facilitate successful new venture 
creation. We explore how an open innovation approach can sustain start-ups by 
addressing the following research questions: What are the key attributes of an open 
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approach to new venture creation, and how do they affect a start-up’s short-term 
survival? We investigate these questions through an exploratory multiple case study 
that sheds light on the advantages of open innovation for start-ups. 
5.2 Background 
Virtues and Challenges of Entrepreneurial Start-ups 
Entrepreneurship, the creation of new wealth through innovative activities, plays an 
important role in the development and commercialization of new technologies 
(Drucker, 1985; Dollinger, 1994). Entrepreneurs create value by leveraging 
innovation to exploit new opportunities and create new product market domains 
(Miles, 2005). The term ‘start-up’ implies that a venture is new and may be seeking 
to create a new market. Since new ventures introduce new products or services that 
overturn the positions of incumbent firms, they are often considered the sources of 
‘gales of creative destruction’ (Criscuolo, Nicolaou & Salter, 2012). They are also 
assumed to be more innovative than established firms (Bhide, 2000; Shane, 2008). 
Since start-ups are pivotal for job generation and economic growth, they are 
becoming an increasingly important part of the economic system (Reynolds & 
White, 1997). However, new ventures have both limited resources and numerous 
investment needs, including R&D, organization building and market development. 
How to allocate these limited resources is perhaps an entrepreneur’s most critical 
decision. 
Although entrepreneurs may be technically familiar with their own field, their 
technical focus may have a negative effect on the managerial skills necessary to run 
a successful business (Teece, 1986). Regardless of whether these owner 
entrepreneurs possess adequate skills, they are often responsible for all facets of firm 
operation (McGregor & Gomes, 1999), including general, financial, human resource 
and production management (Almeida & Fernando, 2008). A lack of knowledge of 
how to identify and exploit opportunities may also pose a challenge to 
entrepreneurs’ decision making (Alvarez & Barney, 2010). 
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 The Openness Advantage for Entrepreneurial Start-ups  
Given the resource-constrained context, entrepreneurial growth is dependent on a 
combination of internal knowledge and external resources (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Presutti, Boari & Majocchi, 2011). Diverse external 
knowledge-sourcing relationships are an important determinant of entrepreneurs’ 
ability to identify more (and more varied) market opportunities (Gruber, MacMillan 
& Thompson, 2013), implying that entrepreneurs need to develop business models 
that allow for external sources of knowledge to flow into the new venture. Such 
openness as a way to accelerate internal innovation activities has attracted increasing 
attention in both research and practice (Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014; West & 
Bogers, 2014). Moving beyond the individual company-level perspective, openness 
to external knowledge sources is also reflected more generally in the larger 
innovation ecosystem, network, cluster and institutional context (Powell, Koput & 
Smith-Doerr, 1996; Dahl & Pedersen, 2004; Adner, 2006). In fact, entrepreneurs’ 
new venture success can be significantly challenged by the innovation ecosystem in 
which it is embedded (Nambisan & Baron, 2013). However, while entrepreneurs in 
particular, and small and medium-sized companies in general, stand to benefit 
significantly from external sources of innovation, this topic has not received much 
attention in the open innovation literature (van de Vrande et al., 2009; Chesbrough 
& Bogers, 2014). New ventures’ acquisition and exploration of external knowledge 
depends on issues such as the frequency of interactions with external partners 
(Harms, Konrad & Schwarz, 2009; Presutti, Boari & Majocchi, 2011) and the 
general network embeddedness and knowledge spillovers that the venture can 
capture in developing its business model (Greve & Salaff, 2003; Gilbert, McDougall 
& Audretsch, 2008; van de Vrande et al., 2009; Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014). At the 
same time, new ventures must consider cost increasing effects and decreasing 
returns (Laursen & Salter, 2006; Faems et al., 2010), while considering how to 
manage inflows of new ideas and intellectual property when looking for variety and 
diversity in external knowledge acquisition (Chesbrough, 2003; Bogers, Bekkers & 
Granstrand, 2012; Gruber, MacMillan & Thompson, 2013). Many factors can affect 
Chapter 5. Background paper: Open for entrepreneurship: How open innovation can foster new venture creation 
205 
how openness to external sources fosters successful new venture creation, although 
the specific attributes and relations are not fully understood. 
5.3 Research Method 
Case Study 
Given the state of the literature and the need for a holistic approach to understanding 
how an open approach to new venture creation influences a start-up’s short-term 
survival, we conducted an exploratory and inductive case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Yin, 2009). We build on two cases involving iFabrikken, an entrepreneurship 
factory in Sønderborg, southern Denmark, where various start-ups can work as part 
of an entrepreneurship incubator. We adopt the replication method, in which the 
cases are selected so that they predict (a) similar results (literal replication) or (b) 
contrasting results (theoretical replication), which will lead to the development of a 
rich theoretical framework (Yin, 2009). In developing the design of the case study, 
we conducted an extensive pilot study with eight preliminary interviews. 
Data Collection 
We collected data from three sources. First, interviews were conducted during the 
first half of 2013. In addition, non-participant observation and written 
documentation served as complementary data sources. As part of a preliminary pilot 
study, we conducted eight semi-structured interviews with the start-ups in southern 
Denmark (see Table 1). The interviews took place in iFabrikken and at the 
university where the research took place. These preliminary interviews helped us to 
select two appropriate cases for this study. The main selection criteria for the two 
central cases in our study were the characteristics of the cases of success, survival 
and failure in the market. The first case, eholms, was considered a successful case 
that had substantial growth in the local and international markets. The second case, 
Stenbaek, failed. Its founder then developed a new concept that he had not yet 
commercialized and tried to find a way to survive in the market following the 
previous failure. These two cases were appropriate for contrasting and comparing 
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different degrees of progress in releasing a product/service to the market, survival 
and failure. The main themes discussed in the semi-structured interviews were the 
vital challenges and barriers for the company’s survival, the mechanisms employed 
to overcome these challenges and how open innovation mechanisms influenced this 
process. For the selected cases, we conducted two semi-structured interviews and 
three informal conversations with the founders of these two companies. The semi-
structured interviews lasted one hour, and the informal meetings each lasted 30 
minutes on average; the interviews were all audio-recorded and transcribed. The 
transcripts were complemented with notes about the non-recorded aspects of the 
interviews as soon as each interview finished. We collected the documentation data 
in the form of information gathered from the websites, contents of e-mails and the 
standardization protocols. These data are related to the companies’ strategies, 
partners and product/service. In addition, direct, nonparticipant observations of the 
entrepreneurs’ activities, meetings and interactions at iFabrikken were used as a data 
source. These observations occurred three times in March and April 2013. During 
each observation, we monitored the networking aspects of the startups to understand 
the effect of the environment (i.e., iFabrikken) on the start-ups’ way of doing work. 
We constructed a narrative of the findings using a combination of the interviews, 
documents and observations. We chose eholms as a case of success because this 
start-up grew quickly in the short time between its inception in 2010 and the study 
period, and made significant progress in commercializing the product into local and 
international markets within less than two years. The other case was chosen as a 
case of failure, as its first business failed (in 2010), and it was investing in a new 
business concept (2012), which had not yet been commercialized. 
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Table 1: Overview of Start-Ups Interviewed in Preliminary Pilot Study 
Start-up 
Age 
(years) 
Domain 
Number of 
employees 
Situation in the 
market 
Collaboration with 
iFabrikken 
eholms 2.5 
Product, 
technology based 4 
Commercialized the 
product, growth in 
selling 
Yes 
 
 
Stenbaek 
 
 
2.5 
Service, 
technology based 1 
Failed (Internet 
advertisement) 
 
Not commercialized 
(Mobile platform) 
No 
 
 
Yes (Mobile 
platform) 
FYDI 
 3 
Product, 
technology based 7 Not commercialized No 
InnoPlus 
 2.5 
Product, 
technology based 3 Not commercialized No 
SJService 
 3 
Product, 
technology based 2 Not commercialized Yes 
U&I 
Marketing 1 Service 2 
Giving the service to 
the small number of 
customers 
Yes 
Lifedrone 
 3 
Product, 
technology based 1 Not commercialized Yes 
Sanse og 
Motorikhus 
 
1 Service 1 Not commercialized Yes 
 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis began with writing the case stories (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 1999). 
First, we transcribed all interviews. We entered the data into chronologically ordered 
narratives. The observations and documents were used as secondary to the case 
stories. Next, we grouped the quotes and observations into emerging themes. During 
this process, a number of chronologic moments emerged that corresponded to the 
progress milestones for both start-ups, from generating an idea to commercializing 
the product/service. Within the start-ups’ development, we investigated the pivotal 
challenges and ways of overcoming them. Observations and document information 
were examined and matched. Then, we began the cross-case analysis, in which we 
identified key similarities and differences between the cases, using theoretical and 
literal replication as the basis (Yin, 2009). We performed the comparison using all 
sources of data and identified the main mechanisms affecting the start-ups’ survival 
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challenges. While external validity was addressed through the case selection (e.g., 
having cases of both success and failure), construct validity was established by using 
the general structure of questions for the initial exploratory interview. Furthermore, 
it was made explicit how certain situations caused specific results in each case 
(establishing the chain of evidence). Reliability was addressed by establishing a case 
study protocol for the interviews and by using different sources of information (i.e., 
documents, interviews and observations). To minimize the biases associated with 
data collection, all notes and reflections were written during or immediately after 
each interview session. 
5.4 Findings 
Case Descriptions 
The successful case, eholms, was established in October 2010 by two private 
founders. At the time of the study, four people were working in the company – the 
two founders and two employees. The idea behind eholms was to design, develop 
and manufacture slim magnetic wall mounts for flat screens. They started from the 
local stores in southern Denmark and then expanded to Germany, followed by 
Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, France and Turkey. The second 
case, Stenbaek, experienced an initial failure and was still surviving while 
implementing its new business concept. It was set up in October 2010 and had one 
founder who was still working on his own. Stenbaek’s business was commercials 
and banner advertisements on the Internet. This business did not go well, and the 
founder changed his business to a new concept. The new idea was to develop a new 
application for a mobile platform that would facilitate searches for local businesses. 
The development of the new concept started in December 2012. The cases were 
analysed by looking at the ways in which the two start-ups had developed and used 
the key attributes of open innovation to survive in the market. On a very general 
level, our analysis initially highlighted the process (and related challenges) that the 
entrepreneurs went through from the start (e.g., investment and lack of market 
knowledge), to market entrance (e.g., customers’ needs and capacity), to 
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internationalization (e.g., commercialization), to mass production (e.g., lack of 
resources), to location (e.g., lack of networking). On this basis, our subsequent 
analysis revealed a set of main concepts that drove the new ventures’ short-term 
survival (see Figure 1 for a visual representation of the emergent framework).  
Engaging Collaboration in the Ecosystem  
Eholms’ founder made a prototype in 2009, after which he lacked resources such as 
funding and market knowledge, which thus needed to be sourced externally. He 
stated that, after meeting a local investor and entrepreneur, ‘He found it a good idea 
and we made a partnership with each other. He is the investor at the beginning.’ The 
founder was working for the investor, who was well known in the area and managed 
some local restaurants and tourism centres. Knowing this, he shared his idea and 
showed him the first prototype. From his market knowledge, the investor found the 
idea valuable, and he decided to invest in the product. Moreover, they pursued a 
wide range of collaborative activities with different providers such as making 
connections with different partners through conferences. Stenbaek’s founder, who 
had an IT background, was working on his first business idea for two years on his 
own. He already had expertise in programming, so he started selftraining to enhance 
his capability to start his own business. For example, he tried to gain some practical 
knowledge of internet advertising. When starting the business, he did not find it 
necessary to seek help or collaborate with more skilled people in the market. Nor did 
he find it necessary to collaborate with others to invest or acquire the knowledge he 
needed to start the business. However, he eventually faced so many different 
problems that his business failed and lost all the customers that had been acquired in 
a short time. However, in the new business, he was trying to build collaborative 
relationships to compensate for his weakness in the market dimension. These 
examples show that entrepreneurs find opportunities through unique resources, such 
as personal contacts (Baron, 2006). Leveraging external sources of knowledge 
through collaboration could be one of these unique resources for opportunity 
recognition. These cases show that technological expertise needs to be 
complemented by market knowledge, which may have to come from outside the 
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start-up and thus require complementary knowledge. Collaboration helps the new 
venture to pursue innovativeness through the sharing of ideas, knowledge, expertise 
and opportunities (Ketchen, Ireland & Snow, 2007). To purposively generate 
knowledge flows into the new venture, supporting its business model (Chesbrough 
& Bogers, 2014), the venture must collaborate with various partners in its value 
network or ecosystem (Bogers & West, 2012; Gruber, MacMillan & Thompson, 
2013; Nambisan & Baron, 2013). We thus propose the following: 
Proposition 1: New ventures that collaborate with various partners in their 
ecosystem are more likely to overcome the survival challenges of resource 
constraints and knowledge absence and are consequently more likely to survive in 
the market than those that do not engage in such collaboration. 
Enabling User Involvement 
For eholms, market entry occurred through a local store, with six products in the 
shop used to observe the market reaction, receive feedback from the store and hear 
customers’ ideas about the product. This close relationship with potential users, 
including end users and intermediate customers (Bogers, Afuah & Bastian, 2010), 
helped eholms make some progress, as they received 10 more orders in a couple of 
weeks. Enabling user involvement helped to not only improve the quality of the 
product but also attract customers. In Stenbaek’s first business, the founder thought 
he knew the needs of the market well enough. He had no contact nor pursued 
collaboration with the final users or customers. Clearly, he learned from this 
experience: ‘I have lost some customers, because they say, “I don’t know what 
you’re talking about, I don’t know what I’m buying”.’ He continued: ‘From the first 
experience, I’ve realized I just need to go to the customer and try to explain and then 
get feedback: “Is this understandable, or do I need something else?” ’ These cases 
show that user involvement helped to obtain more information about the market 
situation, the customers’ reaction to the new concept, and the market capacity 
through being close to the users, in line with recent notions of ‘customer 
development’ (Blank, 2013) and the ‘lean startup’ (Reis, 2011) as well as the earlier 
literature on markets and customer orientation (Narver & Slater, 1990; Gatignon & 
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Xuereb, 1997). Firms that get users engaged in transferring their inputs will also 
access the user knowledge embedded in these inputs, which may relate to both user 
needs and solutions (von Hippel, 2005; Bogers, Afuah & Bastian, 2010). As the 
analysis of the cases shows, a close relationship with the user (both intermediate and 
end-users) and the constant collection of user feedback play a pivotal role in 
overcoming the main survival challenges, particularly commercialization. Our 
analysis shows that the intermediate and end-users can both enhance the innovation 
capabilities of the new ventures. We thus propose the following: 
Proposition 2: New ventures that enable user involvement are more likely to bring a 
successful product/service to the market, and they are consequently more likely to 
survive in the market than those that do not enable user involvement. 
Locating in an Open Environment  
Eholms was located in iFabrikken, a local entrepreneurship incubator, which 
allowed the founder to engage with a local community. He had different 
brainstorming meetings with other entrepreneurs, who suggested new ideas and 
solutions. By working in such a place, he not only saved money (on the location), 
but also took advantage of the co-operative knowledge and communication 
embedded in close relationships with other partners. The physical space 
configuration facilitates co-ordination and information sharing and influences 
behaviour. A closed workspace can be transformed into an open space to encourage 
communication, which is critical in an innovative process (Allen & Henn, 2007). 
Therefore, this location provides an open environment for entrepreneurs to network, 
obtain new ideas and exchange experiences. Working closely with an associate not 
only facilitates communication but also leads to the exchange of knowledge and 
expertise, which can enrich a partnership with new solutions and new ideas. The 
repetitive benefits of problem solving increase levels of trust and mutual 
understanding among participants. Eholms’ founder mentioned that ‘The CEO of the 
iFabrikken guides us as a mentor on how to find customers and how to build 
partnership with other customers.’ Accordingly, shared problem solving in an open 
environment is regarded as a factor in the new venture’s success. In his first 
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business, Stenbaek’s founder was sitting alone, as he thought there was no need to 
use an open space. As he stated in the interview, however, this strategy did not 
work, and he lost all of his customers quickly, leading to business failure. 
Subsequently, he joined iFabrikken, where he found new networks, used the market 
analysis guidance of other entrepreneurs, and had an opportunity to present the new 
concept to multiple industry stakeholders. He obtained their feedback and found a 
number of potential partners and customers. As he emphasized, ‘I’ve been trying to 
build a network; also, coming down here just sitting and talking and knowing what 
all the people are doing and, again, knowing a little about my weak points – and that 
is selling. I don’t have an education in selling and not much training in that. Of 
course I’m experienced now, but marketing and training or selling is not my 
strongest point. So, I am looking around a little to see if there is somebody with 
whom we could form a joined venture or partnership.’ Proximity has a strong effect 
on communication during an innovation process, as people are more likely to know 
and understand each other and thereby better co-ordinate their work. Moreover, 
physical proximity to those with knowledge of developments inside or outside an 
organization increases one’s likelihood of staying informed about those 
developments (Allen & Henn, 2007). An open environment promotes conversation 
between different disciplines, which can enable a better leveraging of external 
sources of knowledge (Bogers & Lhuillery, 2011; Gruber, MacMillan & Thompson, 
2013; West & Bogers, 2014). The nature of the workspace also affects 
organizational performance (Sailer & McCulloh, 2012). Both organizational 
structure and space influence the interaction patterns among entrepreneurs that are 
central to the innovation process, while organizational design affects the interface 
between the organization and the environment in which it operates (Sarasvathy et 
al., 2008). We thus propose the following:  
Proposition 3: New ventures that are located in an open environment are better able 
to tap into relevant external knowledge sources, and they are consequently more 
likely to survive in the market than those that do not work in such environment. 
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Moderating Role of the Entrepreneur’s Mindset Based on the findings, we have so 
far proposed that ecosystem collaboration, user involvement and an open 
environment are conducive to new ventures’ survival, as they positively affect 
opportunity recognition and commercialization (see Figure 1). Furthermore, our 
analysis has revealed another factor that does not directly affect new ventures’ 
survival but rather acts as a moderating variable between ecosystem collaboration, 
user involvement and open environment, on the one hand, and new ventures’ 
survival, on the other: we find that the entrepreneur’s mindset moderates  these 
relationships, in that an open mindset fosters the entrepreneur’s opportunity 
recognition and commercialization, thus positively influencing the likelihood of new 
venture survival (if those direct effects are established). Stenbaek’s founder was sure 
that his knowledge was sufficient for starting the business. He thought the required 
information would be acquired through self-study. In the next step, he entered the 
market and found a few customers who expressed interest in his product, although 
the overall interest declined quickly. He did not ask external parties to guide him in 
the right direction. By contrast, for his new business idea, he found it necessary to 
collaborate with people to develop the new business concept. This was an immediate 
result of a change in the founder’s way of thinking about doing business. Eholms’ 
venture development involved, from the beginning, collaboration with external 
partners, and the necessity of exploiting external knowledge is related to the 
founders’ method of starting collaborations. The innovation culture for opening up 
firm boundaries can be shaped by management in pursuit of strategic goals (Herzog 
& Leker, 2010). More generally, organizational culture can be considered among the 
capabilities needed for value creation and capture in line with the business model 
(Zott, Amit & Massa, 2011; Afuah, 2014). Culture plays an important role in the use 
of external knowledge sources in this process – for example, as a factor in its 
integration (Herzog & Leker, 2010; Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014;West&Bogers, 
2014). Individuals with an entrepreneurial mindset passionately seek new 
opportunities, pursuing the best ones with enormous discipline, and focusing on 
execution (McGrath & MacMillan, 2000). As a result, the entrepreneurs’ mindset 
about collaborating with external parties helps them to survive in the market 
The aftermath of new venture failure 
214 
 
(Ireland, Hitt & Sirmon, 2003). The open mindset does not in itself lead to new 
venture success; it does not generate or transfer any resources by itself. Rather, it 
increases the effectiveness of the entrepreneur’s collaboration within the new 
venture’s ecosystem. Similarly, merely having an ecosystem does not lead to 
success, but an open mindset will assist the entrepreneur in identifying valuable 
knowledge sources and recombining them into successful innovation (Gruber, 
MacMillan & Thompson, 2013; Nambisan & Baron, 2013; West and Bogers, 2014). 
We thus propose the following: 
Proposition 4a: The entrepreneur’s open mindset positively moderates the 
relationship between ecosystem collaboration and new venture survival.  
In his first failure, the founder of Stenbaek lost all of his customers quickly. He 
confirmed that building a close relationship with the users is a vital factor in 
business success, as he found out, because such a relationship informs entrepreneurs 
of their customers’ needs and of the market capacity for new ideas, and makes their 
ideas understandable to the users. As a result, the commercialization of the product/ 
service will be implemented more effectively. Eholms’s founder had a close 
relationship with the users, as he openly discussed his ideas with them and actively 
collected their feedback. This helped him to find new customers as well. Our 
observations and interviews show that the founders’ way of thinking about user 
involvement and the role of the users as sources of innovation facilitates product/ 
service development and eases market entry (Bogers, Afuah & Bastian, 2010). 
Believing in the role of customers in product/service development could be vital for 
new venture survival. Starting a conversation with potential customers may lead to 
positive cash flow. Moreover, an open mindset assists in identifying and engaging 
the right users as well as executing and capitalizing on the established engagement, 
turning into real value for the new venture (McGrath & MacMillan, 2000; Zott, 
Amit & Massa, 2011). We thus propose the following: 
Proposition 4b: The entrepreneur’s open mindset positively moderates the 
relationship between user involvement and new venture survival. 
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Stenbaek’s founder found it necessary to obtain the required knowledge and 
information for the new idea from external people and organizations. He located his 
office in iFabrikken in order to be close to other stakeholders and use the guidance 
of other entrepreneurs. He recognized the vital role of an open space in the 
development of his new business concept (Allen & Henn, 2007). It is also evident 
that eholms’ founder participated in conferences and located his business in an open 
space because doing so is important for an organization that wants to communicate 
and exploit knowledge (Allen & Henn, 2007). Thus, a successful innovation process 
requires that the organization be able to access, maintain and transfer knowledge 
from person to person (Allen, 1977; Allen & Henn, 2007). Our observations show 
that working in an open space is especially effective if the entrepreneur has an open 
mindset, creates a trust-based relationship, and turns potential connections into 
actual value-generating partnerships (Ketchen, Ireland & Snow, 2007; Afuah, 2014). 
On the one hand, the wide range of inputs provides the start-ups with a higher 
chance of obtaining more stakeholders and opportunities (Gruber, MacMillan & 
Thompson, 2008, 2013; Alvarez & Barney, 2010). On the other, engaging in such an 
environment encourages the start-ups to participate in debates and interactions with 
others, which may help them improve the quality of their product/service (McGrath 
& MacMillan, 2000; West & Bogers, 2014). We thus propose the following: 
Proposition 4c: The entrepreneur’s open mindset positively moderates the 
relationship between an open environment and new venture survival. 
Figure1. Framework for the Open Innovation Advantage for New Ventures 
 Ecosystem 
collaboration 
User 
involvement 
Open 
environment 
Open mindset 
New venture 
survival 
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5.5 Concluding Discussion 
In this paper, we presented an exploratory case study to show that new venture 
survival is influenced by (1) ecosystem collaboration, (2) user involvement and (3) 
open environment, and that this relationship is moderated by (4) the entrepreneur’s 
open mindset.  
Implications for Entrepreneurship and Innovation Research  
Our study is based on research conducted in southern Denmark with a limited 
number of cases. One worthwhile extension of this study would be to expand it to 
different regions and other settings. It would also be valuable to strengthen the 
empirical validity of this work by considering a larger number of cases and testing 
some of the propositions with a larger dataset. A longitudinal research design may 
be particularly useful for obtaining a more detailed insight into some of the 
dynamics and contingencies of our framework. Our study adds to the emerging open 
innovation literature, in which research in the context of entrepreneurship has been 
scarce (Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014). The research has been based on opportunity 
seeking (Gruber, 
MacMillan & Thompson, 2008, 2013), alliance formation and strategies (Colombo, 
Grilli & Piva, 2006; Neyens, Faems & Sels, 2010), and open source software 
(Gruber & Henkel, 2006), while our study focused on the effect of open innovation 
on new venture survival. We build on the fact that new ventures face pivotal 
challenges such as capital resource constraints and a lack of market knowledge as 
well as commercialization and networking limitations. The case study has shown 
that an open approach to entrepreneurship helped the founders overcome some of 
these challenges; future research should further explore the internal and external 
mechanisms that enable or prevent these processes (Ketchen, Ireland & Snow, 2007; 
West & Bogers, 2014) in line with the venture’s business model (Zott, Amit & 
Massa, 2011; Afuah, 2014; Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014). More generally, our 
findings show that the basic themes of entrepreneurship theory, such as challenges 
and opportunities (Deeds, 2001; Yli-Renko, Autio & Sapienza, 2001), must be 
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explored in more depth. Understanding the main barriers as well as the strengths of 
startups helps new venture management gain more perspective on market entry. 
Despite the emphasis on innovative start-ups, researchers must pay more attention to 
the fact that not all highly innovative start-ups will have the same future (Kirchhoff, 
Linton & Walsh, 2013). 
Implications for Entrepreneurship and Innovation Practice 
The results of this study reveal that ecosystem collaboration, user involvement and 
open environment are three main factors in startups’ market survival. Our analysis 
of two specific cases showed that collaboration enables a start-up to overcome the 
internal challenges flowing from a lack of market knowledge and capital constraints. 
This happens through collaboration with external parties, including people and 
organizations, based on trust and commitment (Ketchen, Ireland & Snow, 2007). A 
collaborative approach is sometimes essential for innovators and entrepreneurs to 
capture a significant share of the economic value (Teece, 1986). User involvement, 
the close relationship between entrepreneurs and users (i.e., intermediate users and 
end-users), is the second element of an effective open innovation model (Bogers, 
Afuah & Bastian, 2010). A significant component of innovation might be traced 
back to users (von Hippel, 2005; Shah & Tripsas, 2007). One way of innovating is 
involving lead users and collecting information about their needs. Producers can 
benefit from users to develop breakthrough products, which tend to have higher 
performance than other innovations (von Hippel, 2005). User involvement can help 
the entrepreneur build a strong relationship with users and collect their feedback 
regularly, thereby increasing the chances of successful exploitation of the innovative 
ideas, in line with the recent notions of customer development (Blank, 2013) and the 
lean start-up (Reis, 2011). An open environment was found to be another 
mechanism that enables the start-up to enhance its networking skills and learn about 
stakeholders and the industry situation. Open office designs are adopted by many 
companies because of the reduced costs and their facilitation of communication and 
productivity (Boje, 1971; Pile, 1978; Allen & Henn, 2007). Employees who 
perceive their jobs as tedious may find the contact with other people stimulating 
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(Brennan, Chugh & Kline, 2002). Such an environment provides an opportunity for 
entrepreneurs to become closer, share ideas and obtain the knowledge and 
information needed for their work. The findings indicate that an open environment is 
the leveraging factor by which entrepreneurs may compensate for their smallness 
and lack of market power. Moreover, we found that the entrepreneurs’ way of 
thinking affects what they may choose to use or what works from among the three 
openness variables. The entrepreneurial mindset directs the search for opportunities 
and the way those opportunities are exploited (Senges, 2007). Establishing an 
entrepreneurial mindset is essential to sustain the competitiveness of economic 
organizations (Neneh, 2012). It allows the entrepreneurs to establish new and 
valuable ideas (Thompson, 2004). The presence of an open culture within the 
startup’s management would enhance the effect of ecosystem collaboration, user 
involvement and open environment on survival and thus has an indirect effect on the 
survival chances of the new venture. Entrepreneurs should have a plan for growth in 
order to increase their chances of survival (Phillips & Kirchhoff, 1989); they will 
face many challenges. The results of this study may provide a clearer understanding 
of the survival barriers that should be taken into account when entering the market. 
The findings show that new ventures lack market and industry knowledge and face 
internal capital issues. In addition, they have difficulty connecting to external parties 
when entering the market and in exploiting their innovations and new ideas. They 
also lack networking skills, as they lack knowledge of the market, partners and 
stakeholders. In establishing relationships, tensions may occur depending on the 
type of connection, and the entrepreneur will need to balance co-operation and 
competition (Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1997; Bouncken et al., 2015) and consider 
how to manage knowledge flows across boundaries (van de Vrande et al., 2009; 
Dahlander & Gann, 2010) and how to protect intellectual property (Chesbrough, 
2003; Bogers, Bekkers & Granstrand, 2012). For investors in new ventures, the 
findings reveal that an open mindset while entering the market may moderate the 
relationship and impacts of collaboration. Since start-ups are small and new to the 
market, it may be vital that they have a close relationship with outside parties. This 
depends highly on the founders’ way of thinking. Finally, more generally, policy 
Chapter 5. Background paper: Open for entrepreneurship: How open innovation can foster new venture creation 
219 
makers should consider which investments are more likely to lead to new venture 
survival. Our results indicate that direct investments are not a sufficient condition, 
and that facilitating open innovation among start-ups may help increase their 
survival chances (de Jong, Kalvet & Vanhaverbeke, 2010; Chesbrough & Bogers, 
2014). 
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